United States v. Smith

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. EYRON J. SMITH, Defendant.

No. 5:22-cr-00042-DCR-MAS-1

United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Central Division

May 16, 2022

DETENTION OPINION AND ORDER

MATTHEW A. STINNETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The Indictment alleges that Defendant Eyron Smith (“Smith”) possessed with intent to distribute 40 grams or more of fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and possessed a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). [DE 1]. The United States orally sought detention per 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(f)(1)(C) and (E), and the Court conducted a detention hearing on May 6, 2022. [DE 9, 14]. The Court afforded both sides all procedural rights outlined in the Bail Reform Act (“BRA”). Per Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 9(a) and for the reasons discussed in this opinion and as stated on the hearing record, the Court grants the Government's motion for detention.

I. BRA FRAMEWORK

Based on the charges, a detention presumption arises under the BRA as to both nonappearance and danger risk. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(A). The BRA and United States v. Stone 608 F.3d 939, 945-46 (6th Cir. 2010), frame the resulting inquiry. The presumption imposes on the defendant a threshold “burden of production”; in response, “he must introduce at least some evidence” that he poses neither a flight nor a danger risk. Stone, 608 F.3d at 945; see also United States v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 1986) (imposing a responsive burden on the defendant to produce “some evidence that he will not flee or endanger the community if released”); United States v. Hernandez, No. 1:02-CR-006, 2002 WL 1377911, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 27, 2002) (requiring the defendant to “produc[e] probative, credible evidence to rebut the presumption and support his contention that he will appear . . . and [that] he does not pose a danger”). The production burden “is not heavy, ” and the Government retains the ultimate burden of persuasion. Stone, 608 F.3d at 945. An unrebutted presumption requires detention. A rebutted presumption remains a pro-detention statutory factor. See id. (“The presumption remains as a factor because it . . . reflects Congress's substantive judgment that particular classes of offenders should ordinarily be detained prior to trial.”).

Where a defendant rebuts the presumption, the burden shifts back to the United States. Detention premised on nonappearance requires preponderant evidence of flight risk. See, e.g., United States v. Patriarca, 948 F.2d 789, 793 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Curry, No. 6:06-CR-82-DCR, 2006 WL 2037406, at *6 (E.D. Ky. Jul. 18, 2006). Danger-based detention, however, demands clear and convincing evidence that no combination of conditions will reasonably ensure community safety. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). The analyses are distinct. Conditions that sufficiently target nonappearance risk may not adequately address danger potential. See United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436-37 (2nd Cir. 2001). Further, condition effectiveness inherently hinges on a defendant's predicted good faith compliance. See United States v. Tortora, 922 F.2d 880, 887 (1st Cir. 1990) (characterizing predicted compliance as critical release component); United States v. Hir, 517 F.3d 1081, 1092 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting the “critical flaw” in a set of proposed release conditions: “In order to be effective, they depend on [the defendant's] good faith compliance.”); id. at 1093 n.13 (observing that, barring a “replica detention facilit[y], ” the success of any condition combination necessarily “hinge[s] on [the defendant's] good faith compliance”).

Evidence rules do not apply in the detention hearing context. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). The key is simply evidentiary reliability and accuracy. See, e.g., United States v. Webb, 149 F.3d 1185 (Table), No. 98-1291, 1998 WL 381686, at *1 (6th Cir. June 22, 1998). Given hearing informality, the Court properly considers a wide range of proof. The nature and quality of proof, though, impacts its probative value and weight in the detention calculus. The § 3142(g) factors ultimately drive the overarching analysis.^[1]

II. ANALYSIS

As the Court's ruling and discussion on the record reflects, Smith rebutted the presumption as to flight or nonappearance risk, and the Government did not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that no conditions could reasonably assure that Smith would not flee and that he would appear for future proceedings in this case. However, Smith failed to rebut the presumption as to danger risk and, in any event, the United States showed by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions can reasonably mitigate that risk and assure community safety. Accordingly, the Court finds that Smith's detention is required under the BRA based on danger risk.

A. Flight or Nonappearance Risk

To rebut the presumption, Smith emphasized that despite his lengthy criminal record, he has not failed to appear for court in the past, as confirmed by the record. [Pretrial Services Report (“PSR”) at 3-8]. He also proffered that he would be permitted to reside with his child's mother, Alexis Spence, at their shared residence in Nicholasville, Kentucky, where they have lived for the past five years with their child and Ms. Spence's other children. Finally, Smith noted that he was cooperative with police during his arrest in this matter and maintained that he would be willing to comply with location monitoring and home detention conditions. The Court finds this information sufficient to rebut the presumption that no conditions could reasonably assure Smith's appearance at proceedings in this case.

Although the rebutted nonappearance presumption persists as a consideration, the Government has not shown in response that it is more likely than not that no conditions could secure Smith's presence, based on the balance of BRA factors. Favoring detention based on nonappearance risk are Smith's substance use disorder history, his inconsistent employment background, and the steep penalties he faces if convicted in this case. However, because Smith's community ties are strong enough to guard against flight and his record indicates that he does appear for court proceedings, the Court is not persuaded that it could not reasonably assure his appearance with home detention, drug testing, and electronic monitoring conditions.

The Court first considers the nature and circumstances of the alleged offenses (aggravated fentanyl trafficking and unlawful possession of a firearm). 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1). Though the charged offenses are exceptionally dangerous as discussed in the following section, there are no particular flight or nonappearance markers, aside from the rebutted presumption and the potential penalties. Defendant proffered that he was cooperative during his arrest in this case, and the Government did not argue otherwise. This factor thus weighs only slightly in favor of detention.

Next the Court considers the weight of evidence that Defendant is a risk of flight or nonappearance. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(2); see United States v. Sykes, No. 04-cr-80623, 453 F.Supp.3d 1011, 1015-16 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 13, 2020) (citing United States v. Stone, 608 F.3d 939, 948 (6th Cir. 2010)) (noting that, in this Circuit, the § 3142(g)(2) factor looks only to the weight of the evidence that the defendant is a flight risk or a danger); accord United States v. Sanders, 466 F.Supp.3d 779, 785 (E.D. Mich. 2020). The salient flight or nonappearance evidence on this record stems from Defendant's substance use disorder history, his lack of steady employment, his prior fleeing and evading convictions, and his history of generally violating conditions of release. Defendant self-reported to the USPO that he had previously regularly used multiple controlled substances, including marijuana, cocaine, and prescription opiates, though he denied such use in the roughly 7 months preceding his federal arrest. [PSR at 3]. The PSR also reflects relatively inconsistent employment during Smith's adult life. [Id. at 2]. Additionally, the PSR reflects a history of probation and other conditional release violations, as well as multiple prior convictions for fleeing or evading authorities at the time of arrest. [Id. at 3-8]. There is thus some weight of flight and/or nonappearance evidence.

Consideration of the third and final flight factor tracks similar concerns as well as mitigators. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(A) (considering a defendant's family and community ties, employment, past conduct and substance use, criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings). Smith's family here and his overall record concerning court appearances weigh in his favor, while his substance use, lack of employment, and criminal history weigh against him. The fact that Smith allegedly committed the instant offenses while on conditional release for controlled substance offenses is further aggravating in terms of detention, though it is more relevant to the issue of danger than to flight or nonappearance. Id. § 3142(g)(3)(B). Regardless, collectively, the second and third BRA factors do provide some flight and nonappearance indicators on this record.

However despite this evidence of flight and/or nonappearance risk, the Court finds that the relevant concerns can be adequately addressed with specific conditions. Defendant's ties to the local community and his family here reassure the Court that he will not seek to flee. Nor does Smith have any international connections, a passport, or a history of travel. The Court therefore views continued residence with Spence and the children as a sufficient anchor and guarantee that he would remain available during the pendency of this case. Home detention...