United States v. Snype

683 F.Supp.3d 351

UNITED STATES of America v. Vernon SNYPE, Defendant.

02 Cr. 939-3 (DC)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

Signed July 19, 2023

DAMIAN WILLIAMS, Esq., United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, By: Patrick R. Moroney, Esq., Assistant United States Attorney, One Saint Andrew's Plaza, New York, NY 10007.

JAMES M. BRANDEN, Esq., 80 Bay Street Landing, Suite 7J, Staten Island, NY 10301, Attorney for Defendant.

OPINION

CHIN, Circuit Judge:

Before the Court is defendant Vernon Snype's counseled motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). See Dkt. No. 145. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted, and Snype's term of life imprisonment is reduced to time served plus no more than thirty days.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. Snype's Background

Snype was born in New York, New York, on November 25, 1960. See Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") ¶ 74. Snype never had a relationship with his father, who drank excessively and was physically abusive. PSR ¶ 76. Snype's mother, who raised him and his five siblings, also occasionally abused substances. PSR ¶ 81. His mother is now deceased. See Dkt. No. 145 at 9. Of Snype's five siblings, only three remain alive: Snype's brother, Calvin, died in 1987 from leukemia, and his sister, Andrea, died in 1998 during an asthmatic seizure. PSR ¶ 75. Snype continues to be in contact with two of his three remaining siblings -- Charisse and Anita -- both of whom reside in the Bronx. See Dkt. No. 145 at 9.

In 1994, Snype married Marisa Hicks, and the couple had a son, Jameek, in 1996. PSR ¶ 78. Around the same time, Snype also had a relationship with Laureen Flowers, who, in 1997, gave birth to Snype's son Unique. PSR ¶ 80. Snype thereafter lived with Flowers, Unique, and Destiny -- Flowers's daughter from a prior relationship whom Snype treated as his own. See Dkt. No. 145 at 9. Although Snype and Hicks separated in 1999, Snype not only remained active in Jameek's life but also assumed paternal care for Hicks's other children from a prior relationship. PSR ¶ 79.

In 2000, Flowers was diagnosed with schizophrenia. Snype served as Flowers's sole and primary caregiver, up until he was arrested in July 2002 for the underlying offense. PSR ¶ 80. Snype ensured that Flowers kept her medical appointments, took her medication, and was properly fed and generally cared for. See Dkt. No. 145 at 9. After Snype's arrest and conviction, Flowers suffered numerous psychotic episodes, she lost her job and apartment, and Snype's children were taken into foster care. Id. at 10.

Flowers continues -- to this day -- to suffer tremendously. In a letter to the Court dated April 20, 2021, Flowers explained the extent of her suffering:

I currently suffer from mental illness. Sometimes I am alright, but most times [I] hear voices and I don't have the ability to tell what's real and what's not . . . . Ever since Vernon has been in prison, my life has been unbearable. I live in homeless shelters and or on the streets. I cannot maintain my thoughts long enough to remember to pay bills or to take care of basi[c] things like bathing. My health is bad, and I often feel like I am going to die. I cannot care for myself. I sometimes urinate on myself and have the same clothes on for days before I realize it. I am constantly waking up in the hospital, or on psychiatric wards and don't remember how I got there. I am asking if you can please allow Vernon to come, [I know] he loves me and will care for me. My family is all gone. I have no one to help me. Vernon is the only person.

Dkt. No. 145 at 15.

Snype, who was forty-one years old when he committed the underlying offense, is far from being a one-time criminal offender. Indeed, Snype had a string of robbery-related New York State convictions: a 1980 conviction for robbery in the second degree, a 1981 conviction for attempted robbery in the first degree, and a 1983 conviction for robbery in the first degree. See Dkt. No. 130, Ex. A at 12-14; PSR ¶¶ 49-51, 57-64. All three convictions related to armed robberies of businesses in the Bronx. Id. At the time of these earlier offenses, Snype was eighteen, nineteen, and twenty-two years old, respectively. PSR ¶¶ 49, 57, 61. For the 1983 conviction, Snype was sentenced to ten years to life in prison; he was released from prison in 1994. PSR ¶ 64.

II. The Underlying Offense, Conviction, and Sentence

On July 6, 2002, Snype and William Partlow stole a vehicle from a parking attendant at gunpoint, see PSR ¶ 16, and drove to First Union Bank in Yonkers, New York, PSR ¶ 14. There, Snype and Partlow, who were armed with handguns and disguised with masks and gloves, PSR ¶ 14, stole $35,000 after threatening bank staff and customers at gunpoint, PSR ¶¶ 14, 16. They were accompanied by three accomplices, who sat in two separate cars outside the bank and acted as lookouts. PSR ¶ 15.

With police en route to the bank, Snype and Partlow fled the scene by car. PSR ¶ 17. A high-speed chase ensued on the highway, with Snype and Partlow shooting their guns at the police cars chasing them. Id. After they crashed the getaway car, Snype and Partlow continued to flee on foot. Id. Partlow was found and shot and killed by police after he threatened them, id., while Snype escaped and was not arrested until July 11, 2002 -- five days after the robbery, PSR ¶ 24. When he was arrested, Snype was in possession of $20,000 in cash (much of which was still wrapped in First Union Bank money bands), fake identification cards, and two loaded firearms. Id. Snype's three other accomplices were each arrested for their roles in the robbery. PSR ¶¶ 18, 21, 22.

Snype was thereafter indicted for conspiracy to commit bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count One); bank robbery and armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d) (Counts Two and Three); and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count Four). Dkt Nos. 6, 26; PSR ¶¶ 3-6. A jury found Snype guilty of conspiracy to commit bank robbery, but it deadlocked on the remaining three counts, as to which I declared a mistrial. See United States v. Snype, No. 02-CR-0939-3, 2009 WL 2611930, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2009).

On May 19, 2004, I sentenced Snype for the instant offense. See Dkt. No. 130, Ex. A. I determined that although a conviction for conspiracy to commit bank robbery generally exposes a defendant to a maximum prison term of five years, see 18 U.S.C. § 371, I was required to sentence Snype to a term of life imprisonment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1), also known as the "three strikes" law. See Dkt. No. 130, Ex. A at 15, 31. The "three strikes" law provides that "a person who is convicted in a court of the United States of a serious violent felony shall be sentenced to life imprisonment if . . . the person has been convicted . . . on separate prior occasions . . . of . . . 2 or more serious violent felonies." 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1). I concluded that Snype's conviction for bank robbery conspiracy constituted a "serious violent felony" because of section 3559(c)(2)(F)'s enumerated offenses clause, which explicitly lists conspiracy to commit robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113 as a "serious violent felony." 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2)(F)(i); see also Dkt. No. 130, Ex. A at 2-3. I also concluded that at least two of Snype's prior robbery convictions qualified as "serious violent felonies" under section 3559(c)(2)(F)'s residual clause, because New York state convictions for first degree robbery or attempted first degree robbery have "as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force." 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii); see also Dkt. No. 130, Ex. A at 13-14. Hence, as I stated at sentencing, "I have no choice" -- a sentence of life imprisonment was required. Dkt. No. 130, Ex. A at 31.¹

In addition to life imprisonment, I also imposed restitution in the amount of $13,419, a mandatory special assessment of $100, and, in the event of release, a period of supervised release of five years. Id. Given Snype's financial circumstances, I did not impose a fine. Id.

The Second Circuit thereafter affirmed the conviction and sentence. See United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 153 (2d Cir. 2006).

III. Rehabilitation

Snype has now spent roughly half of his life behind bars. But this time has not been wasted.

Snype received his GED in 1979 and his Bachelor of Arts with a major in psychology in 1989 -- both while imprisoned on prior convictions. PSR ¶ 85. Upon his release from prison in 1994 and up until his arrest for the instant offense, Snype worked as a mental health, rehabilitation, or substance abuse counselor at various centers and hospitals. PSR ¶ 88-94. He also enrolled in a master's program and earned forty credits towards that degree. PSR ¶ 86.

In light of Snype's impressive educational history, the prison system has been unable to offer him much by way of education over the past twenty-one years. See Dkt. No. 130, Ex. B. at 3. Although there were several vocational programs that Snype wished to participate in, such as computer programming, prison regulations precluded him from doing so because of his life sentence. Id. Nonetheless, Snype has not remained idle. Since 2002, Snype has worked hard while in prison, earning enough to satisfy his special assessment fee and judgment of restitution, see Dkt. No. 113 ($13,519.00), and to amass a substantial amount in savings, see Dkt. No. 145 at 45 ($9,520.31). At times, Snype served as a suicide watch companion for other inmates, a role for which he is particularly suited given his education and experience. See Dkt. No. 130, Ex. B. at 3. Moreover, Snype has largely stayed out of trouble; his "BOP disciplinary record . . . reflects only several minor violations over nearly two decades of incarceration." Dkt. No. 130 at 5.

The extent of Snype's rehabilitation is best evidenced by letters from staff...