United States v. Spencer

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. SAMUEL L. SPENCER, Defendant.

No. 21-cr-253-pp

United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin

August 14, 2024

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL ON COUNT FIVE AND MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL (DKT. NO. 229)

HON PAMELA PEPPER, Chief United States District Judge

On January 19, 2024, following a two-week trial, the jury found the defendant guilty on each of the five counts charged in the second superseding indictment (four counts of substantive sex trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C §§1591(a)(1) and (b)(1) and one count of conspiracy to commit sex trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C §1594(c)). Dkt. Nos. 158 (amended second superseding indictment); 189 (jury verdict). After receiving several extensions of time by which to do so, dkt. nos. 204, 225 227, the defendant filed a motion for acquittal on Count Five (the conspiracy count) under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 and for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, dkt. no. 229. As part of his Rule 33 motion for a new trial, the defendant asks the court to issue a Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c) subpoena and to hold an evidentiary hearing. The court will deny both motions and will deny the defendant's request for post-trial discovery and a related evidentiary hearing.

I. Background

On December 14, 2021, the grand jury returned an indictment charging the defendant with three counts of sex trafficking by force, fraud and coercion in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§1591(a)(1) and (b)(1). Dkt. No. 1. On January 11, 2022, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment adding a fourth count of sex trafficking by force, fraud and coercion. Dkt. No. 3. Each of the four substantive sex-trafficking counts corresponded to a different alleged adult female victim. Id. On March 22, 2022, the grand jury returned a second superseding indictment that added one count of conspiracy to commit sex trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1594(c). Dkt. No. 17. The second superseding indictment eventually was amended to reflect a modified date range relating to the substantive sex-trafficking offense alleged in Count Two. Dkt. Nos. 156 (order granting the government's motion to narrow Count Two of the second superseding indictment); 158 (amended second superseding indictment).

Trial began on January 8, 2024. On the second day of trial, the government began its case-in-chief, which lasted four full trial days and included testimony from thirteen witnesses. Dkt. Nos. 212-215. Of the thirteen government witnesses who testified at trial, four were the alleged sex-trafficking victims, two were expert witnesses, one was a sister of one of the alleged victims, two were non-law enforcement bystanders who testified to witnessing on isolated occasions the defendant's violence toward an alleged victim, one was the defendant's alleged coconspirator and three were either former or current law enforcement officers. Id. The government concluded its case-in-chief at the end of the day on the fifth day of trial, and the defense began its case-in-chief on the morning of the sixth day. Dkt. Nos. 216, 217.

The defense presented its entire case-in-chief on the trial's sixth day. Dkt. No. 217. Witnesses included an expert, the defense team's investigator, an individual who knew the defendant and one of the defendant's alleged victims. Id. Between testimony, the court held the jury instruction conference. Id. at 123-159. After the defendant's final witness, the court instructed the jury. The government and the defense presented their respective closing arguments on the following morning, after which the jury began its deliberations. Dkt. No. 218. The jury did not reach a verdict on that seventh day, and deliberations continued into the next morning. At approximately 11:00 a.m. on the eighth day of trial, the jury returned its verdict. Dkt. No. 219.

II. Analysis

A. Defendant's Motion for Acquittal on Count Five

The defendant moves under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 for acquittal on Count Five of the second superseding indictment (conspiracy to commit sex trafficking). The defendant argues that he should be acquitted on Count Five because (1) his purported coconspirator cannot be considered a coconspirator in the sex-trafficking conspiracy because she agreed to plead guilty to misprision of the same conspiracy, and (2) the government failed to prove that the coconspirator possessed the state of mind necessary to engage in a conspiracy. Neither argument has merit.

1. Standard of Review

A court considering a Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion asks “whether, after viewing the evidence in light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Torres-Chavez, 744 F.3d 988, 993 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). The movant “bears a heavy, indeed, nearly insurmountable, burden.” United States v. Warren, 593 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 2010). The court must defer to the credibility determinations of the jury and may overturn a verdict “only when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Torres-Chavez, 744 F.3d at 993 (citing United States v. Blassingame, 197 F.3d 271, 284 (7th Cir. 1999)).

2. The Coconspirator's Plea Agreement

a. The Parties' Arguments

Count Five of the second superseding indictment alleged that the defendant conspired with Ericka Buie and others to engage in sex trafficking by force, fraud or coercion. Dkt. No. 17-1. The defendant asserts that Buie-“the only potential coconspirator the government identified at trial[]”-“accepted a plea deal that resulted in her pleading to a different charge-misprision of a felony.” Dkt. No. 229 at 1-2 (citing Dkt. Nos. 159, 202). He asserts that the plea deal Buie accepted provides that her misprision-of-a-felony charge “was based on the fact that the conspiracy charged in Count Five existed, Buie had knowledge of it and that she, (1) failed to notify an authority as soon as possible, and (2) that she took some step to conceal the crime.” Id. at 2 (citing the paragraph of the plea agreement that listed the elements of misprision of a felony, Dkt. No. 159 at ¶9).

The defendant argues that in pleading guilty, Buie essentially admitted that “she failed to report the sex trafficking conspiracy the government claims that she and [the defendant] participated in together.” Dkt. No. 229 at 2. He argues that Supreme Court precedent holds that “Buie cannot be liable for not reporting a crime that she committed”-in other words, that she “cannot be guilty of both conspiring with [the defendant] to engage in sex trafficking and misprision of that same offense.” Id. (citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951); United States v. Kuh, 541 F.2d 672 (7th Cir. 1976)). The defendant contends that because Buie pled guilty to the misprision charge, she cannot have been a coconspirator to the conspiracy to commit sex trafficking charge and “without any other identified coconspirators, there was no basis to find a conspiracy existed.” Id.

The defendant recounts that during the jury instruction conference, “the defense requested that the Court instruct the jury that Buie could not be considered a possible co-conspirator” given that she had accepted a plea deal to misprision of the conspiracy and that the court rejected that argument because “Buie had only signed a plea agreement and hadn't yet pled guilty to anything, and . . . was charged as a co-conspirator.” Id. at 2-3 (citing Dkt. No. 217 at 1652). The defendant contends that because Buie since has “pled guilty to misprision of the conspiracy charged in count five,” and the court has accepted her plea, “she cannot be considered a co-conspirator in that conspiracy.” Id. at 3.^[1]

The government argues that Buie's plea agreement does not provide a basis on which to acquit the defendant of Count Five's sex-trafficking conspiracy charge. It asserts that although “[t]he evidence at trial proved that Ms. Buie knowingly and willingly conspired to assist the defendant in trafficking multiple women by force, fraud, or coercion for commercial sex,” “Ms. Buie's lesser responsibility for the criminal conduct, however, combined with her acceptance of responsibility, cooperation, and the nature of her relationship with the defendant, led the government to engage in plea negotiations with Ms. Buie.” Dkt. No. 239 at 3-4. The government says that these negotiations resulted in the government offering Buie a plea to the lesser charge of misprision of felony, with the underlying felony being sex trafficking. Id. at 4.

The government argues that “the defendant is wrong about the nature of Ms. Buie's misprision plea: [she] did not plead guilty to misprision of conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking. Rather, she pled to misprision of the substantive offense of sex trafficking.” Dkt. No. 239 at 4 (emphasis in original). The government contends that “[t]his fact makes the defendant's argument inapposite” given that she did not “plead guilty to failing to report the crime she was accused of having committed,” but, rather, “to failing to report a crime that the defendant committed: the substantive offense of sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion.” Id.

The government asserts that not only does the defendant's misunderstanding of Buie's plea deal “undermine[] the entirety of the defendant's first argument seeking an acquittal on Count Five[,]” but the defendant also gets the law wrong. Dkt. No. 239 at 4 & n.1. First, the government contends that “any claim of a constitutional inconsistency between a plea to misprision and the commission of an...