United States v. St. Patrick Stewart

92 F.4th 461

UNITED STATES of America v. Gilroy St. Patrick STEWART, Appellant

No. 22-3014

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit

Argued on September 6, 2023

Filed: February 2, 2024

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 3-18-cr-00310-001), District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani

Randy S. Zelin [Argued], 641 Lexington Avenue, 29th Floor, New York, NY 10022, Counsel for Appellant

Gerard M. Karam, Christian T. Haugsby [Argued], United States Attorney's Office, Middle District of Pennsylvania, 228 Walnut Street, Suite 220, Harrisburg, PA 17101, Counsel for Appellee

Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

This dispute arises under the Fourth Amendment and requires us to apply Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015). Gilroy St. Patrick Stewart appeals the District Court's order denying his motion to suppress evidence from a traffic stop. Stewart argues that the officer unconstitutionally prolonged the traffic stop. We disagree. The officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when he extended the length of the stop. We will therefore affirm.

I

Around 6:30 p.m. on August 28, 2018, Trooper George Tessitore was monitoring westbound traffic on Interstate 80 in Carbon County, Pennsylvania, when he noticed a minivan driving more slowly than the cars around it. The vehicle had heavily tinted windows and a partially obstructed license plate—both violations of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 4524(e)(1), 1332(b)(3). Tessitore pulled the car over.

Tessitore approached the vehicle and asked the driver—Appellant Gilroy Stewart—for his driver's license and the vehicle's registration. Stewart produced an Ohio driver's license with a Cleveland address, though the vehicle was registered to a Hazel Sparkes of Baldwin, New York. Tessitore asked Stewart if the vehicle was his, and Stewart answered that it belonged to his aunt. Tessitore then explained the reasons for the stop: the dark window tint and the partially obstructed license plate, both of which violated state traffic laws. Tessitore also noticed an air freshener hanging from Stewart's rear-view mirror.

Tessitore inquired if Stewart was driving back to Cleveland, and Stewart said he was. Tessitore then asked about the address on the vehicle registration: "Where's Baldwin at? I've heard of it. I can't place it on a map, though." Mobile Video Recorder (MVR) 2:19-22. Laughing, Stewart replied without answering the question: "You know where Baldwin is." MVR 2:23-27. Tessitore countered that he did not know where Baldwin was. In response to other questions, Stewart explained that he was traveling back from New York—where he had dropped his daughter off at school—and was using the vehicle temporarily. Tessitore then returned to his police car to input information into the system and to run a search on Stewart's criminal history.

A few minutes later, Stewart exited his vehicle, and Tessitore told him he wasn't supposed to do that. Tessitore then had Stewart stand on the side of the road next to his police car, away from traffic. While Stewart stood there, Tessitore asked why Stewart, who lived in Cleveland, borrowed the New York-registered vehicle for his trip to New York. Stewart replied: "My aunt, she lives in Cleveland, too. She has that car. I took my daughter to New York and . . . I'm bringing the car back." MVR 8:29-40. When Tessitore sought to confirm that Stewart's aunt lived in Cleveland, Stewart answered, "Yeah, she goes back and forth—she has a nursing home." MVR 8:47-51. On further questioning, Stewart explained that his aunt owned a nursing home. That prompted Tessitore to ask whether the nursing home was in New York or Cleveland. Stewart responded: "In Cleveland. It's so hard to own anything in New York!" MVR 8:58-9:02.

Tessitore then inquired about Stewart's time in New York, asking where Stewart had stayed while his daughter was at college. Stewart replied: "She stays at the university. She's on a track scholarship." MVR 9:33-37. Tessitore reiterated the question: "Yeah, that's where she stays. Where'd you stay out in New York?" MVR 9:37-40. Stewart answered: "I have family in New York." MVR 9:40-42.

At this point during the traffic stop, Tessitore stopped asking questions for a few minutes as he sent and received information on the police car system. When he started questioning Stewart again, Tessitore asked about Stewart's and his aunt's addresses. Tessitore continued entering information in relative silence until eventually telling Stewart: "I'll write you up a warning then, okay?" MVR 15:28-15:30.

Soon afterward, Tessitore called for backup while continuing to talk to Stewart. Fifteen minutes later, Tessitore handed Stewart his written warning. Tessitore then asked for permission to search Stewart's vehicle, but Stewart refused. Tessitore explained that Stewart would have to wait for a narcotics canine to arrive. Around an hour and 15 minutes into the stop, Corporal Anthony Doblovasky arrived with his drug-detection dog. As Doblovasky led the dog around the vehicle, he told Stewart that the dog "likes your car a lot." 1:24:14-16. Upon searching the vehicle, Tessitore and Doblovasky discovered 20 kilograms of cocaine in a hidden compartment.

Stewart was charged with possession of five kilograms or more of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and § 841(b)(1)(A). He moved to suppress the cocaine as the fruit of an unlawful search. The District Court denied Stewart's motion, concluding that Tessitore did not extend the traffic stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Stewart, 2021 WL 2478440, at *12, *18 (M.D. Pa. June 17, 2021). Stewart then entered a conditional guilty plea, which preserved his right to appeal the order denying his suppression motion. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). The District Court sentenced Stewart to 51 months' imprisonment and 3 years' supervised release. Stewart timely appealed.¹

II

We review the District Court's legal determinations de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Garner, 961 F.3d 264, 269 (3d Cir. 2020). Because the District Court denied the suppression motion, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the Government. Id.

III

Stewart does not contest the legality of the initial traffic stop—he challenges only the extension of the stop. "[A] traffic stop can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a warning ticket." Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354-55, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (cleaned up). "[A]n officer's mission includes ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop," such as "checking the driver's license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile's registration and proof of insurance." Id. at 355, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (cleaned up). But under the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez, an officer may not "prolong[ ] the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual." Id. As we have explained, "[a]n unreasonable extension"—and thus a Fourth Amendment violation—"occurs when an officer, without reasonable suspicion, diverts from a stop's traffic-based purpose to investigate other crimes." United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2018).

Our inquiry under Rodriguez proceeds in two steps. See United States v. Hurtt, 31 F.4th 152, 159 (3d Cir. 2022). First, we determine the moment when the stop was measurably extended, which we have called the "Rodriguez moment." Green, 897 F.3d at 179. Second, we determine whether the facts available to the officer up to that moment established reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. The extension of the traffic stop is lawful only if, at the time of the extension, the officer already had reasonable suspicion. See Garner, 961 F.3d at 271.

A

We first consider when Trooper Tessitore extended the stop. In the brief supporting his suppression motion and in his opening brief here, Stewart discussed three possible moments when Tessitore might have done so. Stewart's earliest proposed Rodriguez moment comes 15 minutes and 30 seconds into the video, when Tessitore tells Stewart that he will issue him a warning.

The District Court assumed that this was the correct Rodriguez moment. See Stewart, 2021 WL 2478440, at *8. And the Government conceded that "it's fair to peg" the Rodriguez moment to around the 15-minute mark, when Tessitore said he would issue Stewart a warning. Oral Arg. 20:12-13. Our review of the video record leads us likewise to conclude that, at least until that time, Tessitore remained on-mission for the traffic stop. Tessitore was completing tasks related to Stewart's traffic violation, and his questions—which focused on Stewart's travel plans—were within the scope of the traffic stop. See Garner, 961 F.3d at 271. We therefore assume, without deciding, that the stop was extended at the 15-minute-30-second mark. See Green, 897 F.3d at 179.

B

We turn now to whether Trooper Tessitore had reasonable suspicion by the time the "Rodriguez moment" occurred. To do so, "we consider 'the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.' " Garner, 961 F.3d at 271 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)).

Although this standard "requires more than a 'hunch,' " id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)), it is relatively deferential to the detaining officer. We "recognize the particular ability of law enforcement officers, based on training and experience, 'to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person.' " Green, 897 F.3d at 183 (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S....