United States v. St. George

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DAVID ST. GEORGE

CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 19-10059-RGS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

March 8, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

STEARNS, D.J.

Defendant David St. George is charged with distributing, receiving, and possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A), and 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2). St. George seeks to suppress incriminating statements that he made to federal investigators during the execution of a search warrant on September 25, 2018, arguing that his waiver of his Miranda rights was not voluntary under the circumstances.¹ The court held an in-person evidentiary hearing on September 22, 2020, and heard testimony from the investigators and St. George. Following the hearing, the court gave leave to the parties to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Briefing now completed, the court will deny the motion to suppress.

Based on the credible testimony and exhibits offered into evidence, I find the following material facts.

1. Just before sunrise, at 6:12 a.m. on September 25, 2018, eleven agents of Homeland Securities Investigations (HSI), the investigative arm of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, arrived at defendant St. George's home in Arlington, Massachusetts escorted by three or four Town of Arlington police officers, prepared to execute a search warrant.² The team was led by HSI Special Agent Connolly. After knocking and announcing their presence several times without a response, three HSI officers and a uniformed Arlington police officer entered through a side door found by HIS Special Agent Defreitas to be unlocked. The door opened onto the kitchen of the home. There they encountered a "surprised" St. George dressed in his bathrobe. Tr. at 78, 100. St. George testified that when he awoke to hear the police knocking just after 6:00 a.m., he assumed that a taxi driver with whom he had scheduled a 6:45 a.m. pickup had mistakenly arrived early. Tr. at 99.

2. Agent Connolly introduced herself to St. George and explained that the officers were present to execute a federal search warrant. She also stated that there would be an opportunity to discuss the warrant in a few minutes time. Agent Connolly described St. George as nervous but calm. Tr. at 19.³ She remained with St. George while explaining to him the purpose of the "protective sweep" of the home that the agents were about to undertake.⁴

3. After concluding the "sweep," Agent Connolly and St. George were joined by Agent Defreitas who suggested that they interview St. George in the den adjoining the kitchen.⁵ Upon entering the den, St. George took a seat on the left side of a large sofa on the far wall of the den while the two agents seated themselves on kitchen chairs.⁶ No other agents were in the den and no weapons were drawn or visibly displayed. Agents Connolly and Defreitas also removed the military-style ballistics vests they had worn when entering the house.

4. Agent Connolly began the conversation by explaining to St. George that he was not under arrest and did not have to stay and speak with the officers, but that she wanted to discuss the circumstances of the warrant with him. She also told St. George that he was free to leave if he so chose.⁷ She then produced a Statement of Rights (Miranda) form which she asked St. George to read and, if he was willing to speak, to sign. After reading the form, St. George said, "My God, this is the Miranda warning. This is exactly what they tell you never to sign," Tr. at 105, and that "I've got no one here to advise me." Tr. at 106.⁸ Agent Connolly replied that "this isn't like what you see on TV or in movies or read in books," and explained that the agents were simply seeking an assurance that he understood his rights before any questioning began. Tr. at 42. She also told St. George that he did not have to talk to them and could stop talking whenever he wished. Tr. at 32-33. St. George then signed the Miranda waiver. Ex. 5.⁹ At that point, Agent Connolly stepped out of the room to turn on a hidden cassette recorder to document the interview that followed.

5. After discussing in general terms St. George's ownership and use of computers, Agent Connolly asked about his email accounts. St. George volunteered the addresses of his public personal accounts and then added that he had a few anonymous accounts that he used to visit "porn" sites. Tr. at 34. This was the first time that the subject of pornography had been broached by any of the participants. The interrogation lasted approximately one hour. During the questioning, St. George agreed to allow the agents access to his email accounts and signed a permission form to that effect. St. George testified that the agents' tone was consistently collegial and respectful. Tr. at 115. At no point during the interview was St. George handcuffed or physically restrained. Nor did the agents object when St. George asked for a break to use the bathroom.

6. The entire process at St. George's home took a bit less than four hours. At the conclusion of the search, St. George was placed under arrest.

7. St. George is 73 years old. He has a college degree and has earned substantial post-graduate credit towards a Ph.D. at Brandeis University. He studied music at the Conservatory of Munich and taught music theory at Brandeis. At the time of his arrest, he was in his 45^th year as the artistic administrator of the Boston Philharmonic Orchestra. During his last four years with the Boston Philharmonic, he taught aspiring musicians playing in the Philharmonic's youth orchestra.

RULINGS OF LAW

1. The Fifth Amendment provides that "no person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." While "admissions of guilt by wrongdoers, if not coerced, are inherently desirable," United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977), the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), "presumed that interrogation in certain custodial circumstances is inherently coercive and held that statements made under those circumstances are inadmissible unless the suspect is specifically informed of his Miranda rights and freely decides to forgo those rights." New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (per curiam). The Miranda rights warnings, while not constitutionally compelled, have a "constitutional underpinning." Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 440 n.5, 444 (2000).

2. The voluntariness of a confession and the validity of a waiver are separate issues; a statement may be voluntary and yet not be the product of a knowing and intelligent waiver of a constitutional right. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 483-484 (1981). Conversely, a waiver may be informed and intelligent and an ensuing confession nonetheless involuntary. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 712 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part) ("It is entirely possible to extract a compelled statement despite the most precise and accurate of warnings."). The test for determining whether a suspect has effectively waived his rights under Miranda has been stated as follows: "First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). A "heavy" burden rests with the government to show a knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights. Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 470-471 (1980) (per curiam).

3. A custodial suspect who invokes the right to counsel at any time during an interrogation may not be questioned further until a lawyer is made available or unless the suspect himself initiates further communication with police. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-485. The invocation of the right to counsel, however, must be clear and unambiguous. While a suspect invoking Edwards "need not 'speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don' . . . he must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney." Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994). A suspect's right to cut off questioning similarly must be "scrupulously honored." Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975). But like the right to counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination is not self-executing; a witness who desires to claim its protections cannot simply stand mute but must in some affirmative sense invoke it. Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178, 186-187 (2013) (plurality opinion). In Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010), the Court found "no principled reason to adopt different standards for determining when an accused has invoked the Miranda right to remain silent and the Miranda right to counsel at issue in Davis." Id. at 381. Justice Kennedy, the author of the majority opinion, cited the same benefits inhering in a requirement that an invocation of the Miranda right to silence be unambiguous as were posited in Davis - avoiding difficulties of proof and giving clear guidance to police. Id.

4. The voluntariness of a confession and the validity of a waiver are decided "in light of the totality of the circumstances." Procunier v. Atchley, 400 U.S. 446, 453 (1971) (voluntariness); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-375 (1979) (waiver). Relevant factors that courts have considered include promises or other inducements, the defendant's age; education; intelligence and emotional stability; his physical and mental condition; and the details of the interrogation, including its length, intensity, and any degree of trickery or deceit on the part of the interrogators.

5. The Miranda duty to warn applies only to "custodial...