United States v. Sykes

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. DORIAN SYKES, Defendant.

No. 03-80028

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

December 1, 2021

OPINION & ORDER (1) DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE (DKT. 262) AND (2) GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION (DKT. 272)

MARK A. GOLDSMITH, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Defendant Dorian Sykes has a lengthy criminal history, having been prosecuted in three separate cases in this District. In the first case, before Judge John Corbett O'Meara, Sykes pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting bank robbery, aiding and abetting the carrying and brandishing of a firearm during a crime of violence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Judgment at 1-2 (Dkt. 110).^[1] On February 15, 2005, Judge O'Meara sentenced Sykes to 174 months' imprisonment. Id. at 2. While Sykes was testifying during a plea hearing in the first case, he committed perjury. United States v. Sykes, No. 04-cr-80623, Indictment (Dkt. 1). Thus, a second case, also before Judge O'Meara, was initiated charging Sykes with perjury. See Id. On March 22, 2005, Judge O'Meara sentenced Sykes to 60 months for perjury, with 30 months running concurrently with his sentence in the instant case. See United States v Sykes, No. 04-cr-80623, Judgment (Dkt 18).^[2] In the third case, before Judge Paul Borman, Sykes was indicted for bank robbery, which he committed just several weeks after finishing his prison sentences for the first two cases. United States v. Sykes, No. 19-cr-20550, Indictment (Dkt. 8). Sykes's commission of the bank robbery also violated conditions of his supervised release in his two prior cases (i.e., the conditions prohibiting Sykes from committing another crime while on supervised release). See Am. Order with Petition for Violation of Supervised Release (Dkt. 239); United States v. Sykes, No. 04-cr-80623 Am. Order with Petition for Violation of Supervised Release (Dkt. 82).

In both of the supervised release violation cases, this Court sentenced Sykes to 60 months' imprisonment, to run concurrently with one another as well as the sentence imposed in No. 19-cr-20550. Supervised Release Violation Judgment at 1-2 (Dkt. 240); United States v. Sykes, No. 04-cr-80623, Supervised Release Violation Judgment at 1-2 (Dkt. 83). In No. 19-cr-20550, Judge Borman sentenced Sykes to 68 months' imprisonment for bank robbery, to run concurrently with the sentences imposed by this Court for the supervised release violations in Nos. 03-cr-80028 and 04-cr-80623. United States v. Sykes, No. 19-cr-20550, Judgment at 1-2 (Dkt. 155). Sykes is currently incarcerated at USP Coleman II. Accounting for good conduct time, his anticipated release date is July 7, 2024.

This matter is now before the Court on Sykes's motion for compassionate release (Dkt. 262).^[3]He filed a nearly identical motion in No. 19-cr-20550, which Judge Borman denied. United States v. Sykes, No. 19-cr-20550, Order Denying Mot. for Compassionate Release (Dkt. 215). Having considered all briefing and record materials submitted by the parties, the Court denies Sykes's motion for compassionate release.^[4], ^[5]

I. ANALYSIS

The First Step Act (FSA) modified the statute concerning the compassionate release of federal prisoners, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), such that district courts may entertain motions filed by incarcerated defendants seeking to reduce their sentences. United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 1003-1004 (6th Cir. 2020). Before granting a compassionate release motion, a district court must engage in a three-step inquiry: (i) the court must find that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant [a sentence] reduction”; (ii) it must ensure “that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission”; and (iii) it must “consider[] all relevant sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1101 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)). If all of those requirements are met, the district court “may reduce the term of imprisonment, ” but it need not do so. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Regarding the first step of the inquiry, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that, with respect to motions for compassionate release filed by imprisoned individuals, “extraordinary and compelling” reasons are not limited to those set forth in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. Jones, 980 F.3d at 1109. It has further held that “[u]ntil the Sentencing Commission updates § 1B1.13 to reflect the [FSA], district courts have full discretion in the interim to determine whether an ‘extraordinary and compelling' reason justifies compassionate release when an imprisoned person files a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion.” Id.

The Court considers (i) whether Sykes properly exhausted his claims, (ii) whether extraordinary and compelling circumstances compel Sykes release, and (iii) whether the § 3553(a) factors support Sykes's release.

A. Exhaustion

Before an inmate moves for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1), the inmate must either exhaust his or her administrative remedies with the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) or wait 30 days from when the inmate filed a request with his or her warden. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 832 (6th Cir. 2020).

On July 14, 2021, Sykes sent a request to the warden of his institution, seeking compassionate release on two grounds: (i) the institution's alleged failure to “implement the First Step Act of 2018” and (ii) Sykes's “symptoms consistent with . . . HPLORI [sic].” Mot. at PageID.1480. Sykes filed the instant motion over 30 days later, on August 30, 2021, seeking compassionate release on three grounds: (i) USP Coleman II's failure to implement the FSA, (ii) the alleged presence of an infection known as Helicobacter pylori (H. pylori) at this prison, and (iii) Sykes's fears of contracting COVID-19.^[6] The Government contends that Sykes failed to comply with § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s exhaustion requirement as to his request for release based on his COVID-19 fears. According to the Government, § 3582(c)(1)(A) requires issue-specific exhaustion, i.e., exhaustion of each ground for compassionate release. It asserts that because Sykes did not explicitly mention his fear of COVID-19 in his request to the warden, he cannot now raise it before this Court.^[7] This argument is unpersuasive. The Sixth Circuit has never held that issue-specific exhaustion is required in the compassionate release context. Nor does the statutory text contain an issue exhaustion requirement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1); United States v. Williams, 473 F.Supp.3d 772, 775 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (noting that issue exhaustion “is not mandated in any plain terms of the statute”). Further, several courts within this District have rejected the notion that issue-specific exhaustion is required in the compassionate release context. See, e.g., United States v. Sherrod, No. 19-20139, 2021 WL 3473236, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 6, 2021) (“[T]his Court will join the majority of district courts in holding that issue exhaustion is not required.”); United States v. Ferguson, No. 10-20403, 2021 WL 1685944, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 29, 2021) (“The Court is persuaded by the reasoning of the courts which have held § 3582(c)(1)(A) does not require issue exhaustion.”).

Ultimately, the Court need not decide whether § 3582(c)(1)(A) requires issue-specific exhaustion. Even assuming that Sykes fully complied with the mandatory exhaustion requirement, his motion for compassionate release fails on the merits, as discussed below.

B. Extraordinary and Compelling Circumstances

Sykes argues that the following are extraordinary and compelling reasons to release him: (i) USP Coleman II's failure to implement the FSA, (ii) the alleged presence of H. pylori at this prison, and (iii) Sykes's fears of contracting COVID-19. The Court addresses each asserted reason in turn.

i. Implementation of the FSA

Sykes raises an equal protection claim, arguing that USP Coleman II has refused to implement the FSA at the prison. Mot. at 6 (arguing that USP Coleman II's alleged refusal to implement the FSA “violates Defendant's Equal Protection of Law”); see also Def. Resp. to Gov't Notice of Supp. Authority at 3 (Dkt. 277) (describing this argument as an “equal protection claim”). However, a motion for compassionate release is not the appropriate vehicle to raise an equal protection claim. See, e.g., United States v. Fitzgerald, 373 Fed.Appx. 935, 936 (11th Cir. 2010) (“As for Fitzgerald's equal protection argument, we have explained that a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding does not constitute a de novo resentencing and does not permit the district court to address extraneous resentencing issues such as constitutional claims.”) (punctuation modified). Accordingly, the Court declines to consider Sykes's equal protection argument.

ii. H. pylori

Sykes asserts that there is an outbreak of H. pylori at USP Coleman II due to contamination in its water supply, and that Sykes has been “experiencing symptoms consistent with having HPlori [sic].” Mot. at 4-5.^[8] H. pylori is a non-lethal stomach infection that can be treated with antibiotics.^[9] Courts generally exercise their discretion to find that a defendant's fear of a non-severe, non-lethal illness that can be effectively treated in prison-such as H. pylori-is neither extraordinary nor compelling. See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, No. CR13-0238-JCC, 2021 WL 2856673, at *2 (W.D. Wa. July 8, 2021) (holding that a defendant's medical conditions causing chest pain and heart burn-which appear to have included H. pylori-were not extraordinary and compelling because they were not “so severe that he cannot provide self-care within the...