United States v. Taylor

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MARCUS ROOSEVELT TAYLOR

Crim. No. CCB-17-106

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

July 12, 2021

MEMORANDUM

In 2018, Marcus Roosevelt Taylor was sentenced to 216 months imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release, for offenses related to his participation, along with several other members of the Baltimore Police Department ("BPD")'s Gun Trace Task Force (GTTF), in a racketeering conspiracy which involved robbing citizens in the course of the officers' police duties. The matter of restitution in this case remains unresolved, largely due to Taylor's premature appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals of the court's August 30, 2019, order granting the government's motion for restitution as to all defendants. (ECF 520). The Fourth Circuit has granted the parties' joint request to remand the case for the purpose of "finalizing and perfecting" the order of restitution. The parties having had the opportunity to brief any outstanding issues as to restitution, the court will now address those issues and finalize the order of restitution as to Taylor. For the reasons stated herein, the court will order restitution in the amount of $228,304.

BACKGROUND

Taylor was tried before a jury and convicted of three counts related to a racketeering conspiracy and various racketeering offenses, including Hobbs Act robbery, on February 13, 2018. (ECF 342, Jury Verdict). Two substantive acts for which Taylor was found liable are relevant here.¹

On January 24, 2014, Taylor and other BPD officers entered the home of Shawn Whiting and stole money, personal property, and contraband from his home. Taylor's co-defendant Maurice Ward testified that he and other officers, including Taylor, planned to rob Whiting while executing a search warrant at his home, and that Taylor found a large sum of money in Whiting's bedroom closet. (JA 101-10, 205-07).² Whiting testified that $15,970 was taken from his bedroom closet, $5,500 from his jacket, and $2,500 from his nightstand. He further testified that officers took one Gucci bag, one pair of Gucci shoes, Dolce & Gabbana cologne, one pair of special edition Air Jordan shoes, one pair of white, glow-in-the-dark Nike Airs, two PlayStation controllers, and numerous PlayStation games. (JA 236-39, 251-52, 299).

On March 22, 2016, BPD officers, including Taylor, surrounded the parked car of Oreese Stevenson, apprehended him, learned of his home address, and took from him money, contraband, and his house key. The officers then went to Stevenson's home and broke into a safe in Stevenson's basement from which they stole $200,000. The officers also took a watch valued at about $4,000. Officers Evodio Hendrix, Maurice Ward, and Wayne Jenkins admitted pursuant to their plea agreements in this case that they stole those amounts from Stevenson's house. (ECFs 158, 161, 254). Stevenson corroborated those amounts at Taylor's trial and also testified that the officers stole an additional $40,000 from two bags located in his home. (JA 775-77).

The court held Taylor's sentencing hearing on June 7, 2018, during which the parties and the court agreed to defer the matter of restitution. On June 13, 2018, the court sentenced Taylor to 216 months imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release, and imposed a $300 criminal assessment. (ECF 416, Judgment). The following day, Taylor filed a notice of appeal on the meritsof the conviction. (ECF 426). The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment in an order dated November 5, 2019. See United States v. Taylor, 942 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2019).

Following the appeal, the government submitted a motion for restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act ("MVRA"), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, seeking to repay victims of various robberies committed by the defendants. (ECF 500). As to Taylor, the government argued that the evidence at trial, incorporated into Taylor's presentence report, demonstrated the amount of money taken during the Whiting and Stevenson robberies. (ECF 500 at 3-4). Taylor opposed the motion, arguing (1) that neither Whiting nor Stevenson were victims as defined by the MVRA because the money stolen from them was proceeds from their illegal drug activities and (2) that the government had failed to adequately prove the amount of restitution requested. (ECF 506). On reply, the government contended that victim status under the MVRA is not dependent on whether property taken is derived from lawful activity. (ECF 513). On Friday, August 30, 2019, the court granted the government's motion for restitution, finding that the motion was unopposed except by Taylor and one of his co-defendants, Maurice Ward, and that "the restitution requested is well supported by the facts in Ward's plea agreement and the jury verdict as to Taylor." (ECF 520). The court further ordered that Amended Judgments would issue. (Id.). Three days later, on Monday September 2, 2019, a court holiday in observance of Labor Day, Taylor filed a notice of appeal as to the restitution order. (ECF 521). At this point, the court had not had an opportunity to finalize the order of restitution as to any of the defendants nor to issue Amended Judgments.

After Taylor filed an opening brief in the Fourth Circuit, the parties agreed that the notice of appeal had been prematurely filed and filed a consent motion requesting that the Fourth Circuit remand the case for the order of restitution to be "perfected and finalized" and to stay the briefing on appeal. See Case No. 19-7246, ECF 23. The Fourth Circuit granted the motion on August 12, 2020. (ECF 578). On remand, the court granted the parties' request for supplemental briefing to allow theparties to resolve any outstanding issues as to restitution. (ECF 587). Taylor has filed a memorandum opposing the imposition of restitution which incorporates by reference the arguments he made in his opening brief to the Fourth Circuit, the government has filed an amended motion for restitution which presents arguments modifying its earlier request and responds to Taylor's arguments, and Taylor has replied. (ECF 597, 629, 637).

DISCUSSION

The MVRA requires that restitution be paid for certain offenses against property in which an identifiable victim or victims have suffered a physical injury or pecuniary loss. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1). The statute defines a "victim" as "a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense for which restitution may be ordered including, in the case of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity, any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. . . . " Id. § 3663A(a)(2). Restitution under MVRA is mandatory—if the defendant has committed a covered offense and caused physical injury or pecuniary loss to a victim, the court is required to order full restitution irrespective of an individual's ability to pay. See id. §§ 3663A(a)(1), (c), 3664(f)(1)(A); United States v. Ritchie, 858 F.3d 201, 207, 216 (4th Cir. 2017). When restitution is ordered under the MVRA, the court must follow the procedures for calculating and ordering restitution set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3664. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(d).

Taylor objects to MVRA restitution in this case on three bases. First, he argues that the court's earlier order of restitution failed to make a record sufficient to comply with the procedural requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3664. Second, he repeats his argument that Whiting and Stevenson are not entitled to restitution because they may have obtained property taken during the robberies through illegal drug activities. Third, Taylor contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the amount of restitution the government seeks. The court addresses each argument in turn.

I. Requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3664

18 U.S.C. § 3664 includes a number of procedural requirements for orders of restitution. As relevant here, before issuing an order of restitution, the court must "order the probation officer to obtain and include in its presentence report . . . information sufficient for the court to exercise its discretion in fashioning a restitution order." Id. § 3664(a); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1)(B) ("If the law permits restitution, the probation officer must conduct an investigation and submit a report that contains sufficient information for the court to order restitution."). "[T]o the extent practicable" the report must include "a complete accounting of the losses to each victim . . . and information relating to the economic circumstances of each defendant." § 3664(a). The defendant themself is responsible for preparing and filing with the probation officer "an affidavit fully describing the financial resources of the defendant" in service of preparing the presentence report. Id. § 3664(d)(3).

Upon the determination of the amount of restitution owed to each victim, the court must specify in the restitution order "the manner in which, and the schedule according to which, the restitution is to be paid" and in doing so must consider "(A) the financial resources and other assets of the defendant, including whether any of these assets are jointly controlled; (B) projected earnings and other income of the defendant; and (C) any financial obligations of the defendant; including obligations to dependents." Id. § 3664(f)(2). The court must make factual findings "keying the payment schedule to these factors and demonstrating the feasibility of the schedule." United States v. Leftwich, 628 F.3d 665, 668 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Dawkins, 202 F.3d 711, 717 (4th Cir. 2000)).

Taylor argues that the probation officer "made no investigation or analysis of the actual losses to any of the victims; made no recommendation to the court on the amount of restitution that should be made; and made no attempt to relate to the court [his] economic...