United States v. Thomas

61 F.Supp.3d 1221

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff

v.David Savoy THOMAS, Defendant.

No. 13–CR–3897–MV–1.

United States District Court, D. New Mexico.

Signed Nov. 21, 2014.

Norman Cairns, U.S. Attorney's Office, Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MARTHA VÁZQUEZ, District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on two of Defendant David Savoy Thomas's motions pending in this case: first, to dismiss Counts I & II of the Indictment [Doc. 26] and, in the alternative, to sever Count I of the Indictment [Doc. 25]. The Court, having considered the motions, briefs, relevant law, and being otherwise fully informed, finds that both of the motions are not well-taken and therefore will be denied.

BACKGROUND

Defendant David Savoy Thomas is charged in a five count Indictment with four counts of Hobbs Act robbery and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence. Doc. 28 at 1. Each of these charges arises out of a series of robberies committed at businesses located near the corner of Lomas Boulevard NE and San Pedro Drive NE in Albuquerque, New Mexico.

The first incident occurred on May 1, 2010. A man, allegedly Thomas, entered a McDonald's store, pushed an employee “away from the register” and took “$60 from the till.” Id., at 2. Sometime after the robbery, Albuquerque Police Department detectives investigating the incident viewed video captured by the McDonald's surveillance cameras, but never sought to “preserve or collect the video recording.” Doc. 26 ¶ 2. Consequently, the video was likely erased years ago; Thomas represents that an investigator with the Federal Public Defender is attempting to locate an archived copy, but it is unlikely that one will be found. Id. ¶ 3.

Three years after the McDonald's robbery, a man matching Thomas's description committed three robberies at two stores located in a shopping center across the street from the McDonald's at Lomas and San Pedro.

On August 10, 2013, a man armed with a knife robbed the clerk on duty at the Family Dollar store in the shopping center, taking $120 before fleeing the scene. Doc. 28 at 2. The clerk described the man as a “light-complected black man with freckles.” Id. Detectives from the Albuquerque Police Department were unable, despite apparent attempts, to secure a useable copy of the video from the Family Dollar's security camera; a detective even “tried to record the video from the video screen at the Family Dollar Store using the camera in his phone, but the video was already of such poor quality that the phone recorded copy was useless.” Id., at 3. Defense investigators have since learned that, as with the McDonald's video, this footage likely no longer exists. Doc. 26 ¶ 6.

Six days later, on August 16, 2013, a man wearing a wig, but otherwise matching the same description, attempted to rob the same Family Dollar; he approached the clerk with a knife, pulled the clerk onto the counter by her shirt, and, after a struggle, fled without completing the robbery. Doc. 28 at 2. The Albuquerque Police Department later presented the clerk, Amy Lynn, with a photo array containing six images, from which she identified Thomas as the robber. Id. Neither party mentions whether video of this incident exists.

On October 19, 2013, a man again matching the same description entered the Check 'n Go located in the same shopping center as the Family Dollar, allegedly brandished a handgun and threatened to kill the clerk. Id., at 3. After waiting for the clerk to open the time-locked safe, the man left the store with $3,723 in cash. Id. The clerk, Erica Lucero, later identified the robber as the same man who robbed the Family Dollar, evidently recognizing him from photos of the Family Dollar suspect posted around the shopping center. See Doc. 27 ¶ 5; Doc. 28 at 3. The FBI successfully obtained recordings from the Check 'n Go's security cameras. Doc. 28 at 3.

DISCUSSION

As a threshold matter, given the decidedly local nature of these crimes, the Court is compelled to evaluate whether or not the jurisdiction of the federal courts may stretch this far, even though this issue has not been raised by the parties. See 1mage Software, Inc. v. Reynolds and Reynolds Co., 459 F.3d 1044, 1048 (10th Cir.2006) (“[f]ederal courts ‘have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party,’ and thus a court may sua sponte raise the question of whether there is subject matter jurisdiction ‘at any stage in the litigation.’ ”) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006) ). See also Campos v. Las Cruces Nursing Ctr., 828 F.Supp.2d 1256, 1265 (D.N.M.2011) (Browning, J.) (“The Court is responsible for ensuring, even sua sponte, that it has subject-matter jurisdiction before considering a case.”). Under the prevailing interpretation of the Hobbs Act, even the relatively modest monetary sums at issue here establish a sufficient connection to interstate commerce under the “depletion theory” to qualify these robberies for federal prosecution. See, e.g., United States. v. Rutland, 705 F.3d 1238, 1245 (10th Cir.2013) (explaining that jurisdiction “is usually a simple inquiry since most Hobbs Act cases involve the robbery of a business, and businesses usually are either engaged directly in interstate commerce or purchase or sell goods shipped in interstate commerce”); United States v. Curtis, 344 F.3d 1057, 1070 (10th Cir.2003) (“proving that a robbery depleted the assets of a business engaged in interstate commerce will suffice.”).

I. Motion to Dismiss Counts I & II of the Indictment

Consistent with a defendant's right of access to evidence under Brady v. Maryland and its progeny, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments impose a duty on law enforcement entities to preserve evidence that “might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense.” California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984). To qualify for preservation under Trombetta, “evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” Id., at 489, 104 S.Ct. 2528. See also United States v. Hood, 615 F.3d 1293, 1299 (10th Cir.2010) (describing the two-pronged analysis set forth in Trombetta ).

However, where the evidence at issue is merely potentially exculpatory, the Supreme Court has imposed the additional requirement that a defendant demonstrate “bad faith on the part of the police” in order to establish “a denial of due process of law.” Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). That is, when “no more can be said [of the evidence] than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant” a showing of bad faith in the government's failure to preserve the evidence is required. Id. at 57, 109 S.Ct. 333. See also United States v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904, 909–10 (10th Cir.1994) (explaining that “if the exculpatory value of the evidence is indeterminate and all that can be confirmed is that the evidence was ‘potentially useful’ for the defense, then a defendant must show that the government acted in bad faith in destroying the evidence”).

Predictably, the parties dispute whether Trombetta or Youngblood controls. However, irrespective of which standard obtains, Thomas's motion to dismiss must be denied. As raised by the government in its opposition, both Trombetta and Youngblood address the failure of law enforcement officials to preserve evidence under their control, such that neither is apposite here. Doc. 28 at 5–6. Indeed, research has not revealed any case in which a court held that the government owed a duty to preserve evidence that it had never possessed. The Tenth Circuit reached this same conclusion in United States v. Hartman, stating, “[e]ven had the video had exculpatory value, it is not clear under the precedents cited that the government has any duty to preserve evidence not in its control.” 194 Fed.Appx. 537, 542 (10th Cir.2006). See also Champ v. Zavaras, 431 Fed.Appx. 641, 648 (10th Cir.2011) (noting, in affirming the denial of a habeas petition, that petitioner had not cited “any case law demonstrating that the government can be held to violate due process by failing to preserve evidence that it never possessed or necessarily had access to”).

Rather, it is a tacit assumption of the jurisprudence in this area that, at some point, the government controlled or possessed the evidence in question. See, e.g., Magraw v. Roden, 743 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.2014) (“A pair of Supreme Court decisions speak to the dimensions of a defendant's rights when requested evidence, formerly in the government's possession, is lost, destroyed, or otherwise unavailable.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Malone, No. 90–50538, 1991 WL 230191, at *4 (9th Cir. Nov. 8, 1991) (“The consequence of the government's destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence in its custody is controlled by California v. Trombetta. ”) (emphasis added); United States v. McClure, No. 90–5001, 1990 WL 180122, at *3 (4th Cir. Nov. 21, 1990) (affirming a district court ruling that evidence was not Brady material in part because “the government did not possess the tape” and noting that merely “reviewing the evidence had not amounted to taking possession” of it). See also Fed.R.Crim.P. 16 (requiring disclosure of items “within the government's possession, custody, or control ...”).

This reading comports with an understanding of Trombetta and Youngblood as the logical and prophylactic extensions of Brady and its progeny. That is, because Brady provides for “a due process right to review all evidence in the government's possession that is material to [ ] guilt or punishment,” Trombetta and Youngblood...