United States v. Torres

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. JOSE TORRES, Defendant.

No. 2:20-cr-00418 (BRM)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

April 16, 2024

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION (SEALED)

HON BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI, United States District Judge

Before the Court is Defendant Jose Torres's (“Defendant”) renewed^[1] Motion for Judgment of Acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 (“Rule 29”), or, in the alternative, Motion for a New Trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 (“Rule 33”). (ECF No. 386.) The United States of America (the “Government”) filed an Opposition. (ECF No. 390.) Having reviewed the submissions filed in connection with Defendant's Rule 29 and Rule 33 motions (ECF No. 386) and having declined to hold oral argument, for the reasons set forth below and on the record during trial and for good cause having been shown, Defendant's Rule 29 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, or, in the alternative Rule 33 Motion for a New Trial (ECF No. 386) is DENIED.

I. Background

The Court incorporates by reference the underlying facts set forth in the Court's July 8, 2022 Opinion. (ECF No. 162.) In the Second Superseding Indictment, Defendant was charged with four counts^[2] of knowingly persuading, inducing, and enticing an individual to travel in interstate commerce to engage in prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a).^[3] (ECF No. 374.) Defendant's criminal jury trial commenced on October 3, 2023 and concluded on October 11, 2023. (See ECF Nos. 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385.) The jury found Defendant guilty on all four counts in the Second Superseding Indictment. (See ECF Nos. 372, 373.) Defendant's criminal sentencing is currently scheduled for June 5, 2024.^[4]

During trial, Defendant, through counsel, made a blanket Rule 29 application and moved for a judgment of acquittal following the close of the Government's evidence. (See ECF No. 384 at 393-94.) Following oral argument on this motion, the Court denied Defendant's Rule 29 motion made during trial. (Id. at 393-402.) On October 23, 2023, Defendant filed a renewed Rule 29 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, or, in the alternative, a Rule 33 Motion for a New Trial. (ECF No. 386.) On November 6, 2023, the Government opposed Defendant's Rule 29 and Rule 33 motions. (ECF No. 390.)

II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c)(1) provides “[a] defendant may move for a judgment of acquittal, or renew such a motion, within 14 days after a guilty verdict or after the court discharges the jury, whichever is later.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(1). In evaluating Rule 29 motions, courts “consider whether the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the government, supports the jury's verdict.” United States v. Fattah, 914 F.3d 112, 182-83 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Dixon, 658 F.2d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 1981)). “When the sufficiency of the evidence at trial is challenged, [courts] must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.” United States v. Anderson, 108 F.3d 478, 480 (3d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). Courts “must uphold the jury's verdict unless no reasonable juror could accept the evidence as sufficient to support the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Fattah, 914 F.3d at 18283 (citing United States v. Coleman, 811 F.2d 804, 807 (3d Cir. 1987)). “Courts must be ever vigilant in the context of [Rule] 29 not to usurp the role of the jury by weighing credibility and assigning weight to the evidence, or by substituting its judgment for that of the jury.” United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 2005).

“In conducting the sufficiency inquiry, [courts] do not view the government's evidence in isolation, but rather, in conjunction and as a whole.” Id. at 134. “The court must determine ‘whether all the pieces of evidence, taken together, make a strong enough case to let a jury find [the defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Coleman, 811 F.2d at 807). “In reviewing a jury verdict for sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[courts] determine whether there is substantial evidence that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, would allow a rational trier of fact to convict.” United States v. Lore, 430 F.3d 190, 203-04 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 238 (3d Cir. 2000)). “A finding of insufficiency should be confined to cases where the prosecution's failure is clear.” United States v. Ollie, 624 Fed.Appx. 807, 811 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Brodie, 403 F.3d at 133). Therefore, “[t]he burden on a defendant who raises a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is extremely high.” United States v. Rivers, No. 18-00577, 2019 WL 4565223, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 20, 2019) (quoting Lore, 430 F.3d at 203).

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a), however, provides “[u]pon the defendant's motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” United States v. Nwokedi, No. 15-00177, 2016 WL 7015626, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 1, 2016) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a)). “Unlike an insufficiency of the evidence claim, when a district court evaluates a Rule 33 motion it does not view the evidence favorably to the Government, but instead exercises its own judgment in assessing the Government's case.” United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 1004 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 150 (3d Cir. 2002)). But “even if a district court believes that the jury verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, it can order a new trial ‘only if it believes that there is a serious danger that a miscarriage of justice has occurred-that is, that an innocent person has been convicted.'” Id. at 1004-05 (quoting Johnson, 302 F.3d at 150). Rule 33 motions for a new trial “are not favored and should be ‘granted sparingly and only in exceptional cases.'” Id. at 1005 (quoting Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Derricks, 810 F.2d 50, 55 (3d Cir. 1987)); see also United States v. Lowell, 490 F.Supp. 897, 904 (D.N.J. 1980), aff'd, 649 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1981) (“Motions under Rule 33 are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and are granted sparingly.” (citations omitted)).

III. Decision

Defendant was charged with four counts of knowingly persuading, inducing, or enticing four women-Lindsey B. (Count 1), Katherine L. (Count 2), Chelsea L. (Count 3), and Anna T. (Count 4)-to travel in interstate commerce for the purpose of engaging in prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a), and was convicted on all four counts following a jury trial. (See ECF Nos. 372, 373, 374.) Defendant argues the Court should issue a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29 for insufficiency of the evidence, or, in the alternative, should order a new trial pursuant to Rule 33 based on improperly admitting evidence that was irrelevant to the elements of the charged offenses and/or was unduly prejudicial to Defendant under Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b). (ECF No. 386-1.) In opposition, the Government contends Defendant's Rule 29 and Rule 33 motions fail both as a matter of law and as a factual matter, and therefore should be denied. (ECF No. 390.) The Government asserts that (1) ample evidence, including Defendant's own testimony, supports the jury verdict and proves every element of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) the evidence Defendant complains was improperly admitted was probative of Defendant's intent and was both intrinsic and admissible under the applicable Federal Rules of Evidence; accordingly, the evidence was properly admitted, and any prejudicial effect to Defendant was outweighed by the probative value of this evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. (Id.)

The Court first addresses Defendant's renewed Rule 29 Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal and then addresses Defendant's alternative Rule 33 Motion for a New Trial.

A. Defendant's Renewed Rule 29 Motion

Defendant argues the Court should issue a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29(c)(1) because “the jury ignored the nature of the four women's enticing” and instead “considered only [Defendant's] intentional responses to the[ir] advertisements.” (ECF No. 386-1 at 1; see also Id. at 1-5.) Defendant contends the women were the ones who enticed him, not the other way around, and therefore “the jury unreasonably concluded that the four women would not have travelled to [Defendant] even if he had not offered more than their normal rate.” (Id.)

Specifically, as to Lindsey B. (Count 1), Defendant argues the evidence showed: (1) Lindsey's Backpage advertisement “lured [Defendant] with descriptions such as ‘stunning, 100 percent natural, 24-year Cali bombshell'” and had a “time limitation of ‘Today only'”; (2) Lindsey stated her minimum overnight fee was $10,000 and Defendant “agreed to that and offered no higher ‘reward'”; and (3) Lindsey's Backpage advertisement also “indicated that, despite her preference for New York, she would have traveled to Pennsylvania, Connecticut or somewhere else in New Jersey for the minimum overnight fee[.]” (Id. at 2.)

As to Katherine L. (Count 2), Defendant contends the evidence showed: Defendant's call to High Society^[5] was transferred to Katherine; and Katherine testified the purpose of her Eros advertisement “was to ‘persuade clients to hire' her, such as [Defendant].” (Id. at 2-3.) Defendant also contends “the jury was not able to determine whether $20,000, including High Society's ‘cut' in the fee, was above her normal rates” because her ad was not available at trial. (Id. at 3.)

As to Chelsea L. (Count 3), Defendant asserts the evidence showed Chelsea's Eros advertisement stated she was “‘a 23-year-old Eli, a Yale Grad . . ....