United States v. Trenkler

537 F.Supp.3d 91

UNITED STATES of America

v.Alfred W. TRENKLER, Defendant.

Cr. No. 92-10369 WES

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

Signed May 6, 2021

James F. Lang, Kristen A. Kearney, Robert E. Richardson, David G. Tobin, Dina M. Chaitowitz, United States Attorney's Office, Boston, MA, Michael J. Pelgro, Middlesex District Attorney's Office, Woburn, MA, for United States of America.

OPINION AND ORDER

William E. Smith¹ , District Judge Defendant Alfred Trenkler is a sixty-five-year-old federal inmate serving a life sentence for convictions stemming from his role in an October 28, 1991 bombing in Roslindale, Massachusetts that killed one Boston Police Department Bomb Squad officer and maimed a second officer. On November 29, 1993, a jury convicted Trenkler of illegal receipt and use of explosive materials and attempted malicious destruction of property by means of explosives, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 844(d), 844(i) (Counts 2 and 3), and conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count 1). See Jury Verdict, ECF No. 487. Trenkler is currently incarcerated at the U.S. Penitentiary in Tucson, Arizona ("USP Tucson").

Defendant moves for compassionate release, asserting that extraordinary and compelling circumstances warrant his release based on (1) the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly in light of his documented heart condition and the outbreak that has left at least 1009 inmates infected with COVID-19 over the past year at USP Tucson² ; and (2) what Trenkler characterizes as a series of miscarriages of justice that call into question his convictions and sentence. See generally Def.’s Emergency Mot. for Compassionate Release Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) and Mem. of Law in Supp. ("Def.’s Mot."), ECF No. 744.³ For the reasons set forth below, Trenkler's Motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The Court reduces Trenkler's sentence to a term of 41 years, followed by a term of supervised release of 3 years on Count 1, 5 years on Count 2, and 5 years on Count 3, all to run concurrently.

I. BACKGROUND

On November 29, 1993, following an eighteen-day trial, a jury convicted Trenkler on the three counts charged. See Jury Verdict. The government's theory at trial was that Trenkler, along with his co-defendant, Thomas Shay, Jr., conspired to build and place a bomb under a vehicle belonging to Shay, Jr.’s father, Thomas Shay, Sr., with the intent to kill Shay, Sr. United States v. Trenkler, 61 F.3d 45, 47-48 (1st Cir. 1995) (" Trenkler I"). The bomb accidentally detonated after officers from the Boston Police Department Bomb Squad were called to the scene by Shay, Sr., resulting in a horrendous scene that took the life of one officer and severely injured another. Id. at 48 ; see also Trenkler Jury Trial Day 2 Tr. 48-52, Ex. 1 to Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 763-1. Shay, Jr.’s motive, the government argued, was the prospect of inheriting $400,000 in insurance proceeds that Shay, Sr. stood to recover from a pending lawsuit. Trenkler Jury Trial Day 2 Tr. 15. The government speculated that Trenkler participated in the scheme in hopes of either seducing Shay, Jr. as a lover or recovering some of the insurance proceeds for himself.⁴ Id. at 25.

At trial, the government introduced circumstantial evidence tying Trenkler to the bomb. This included evidence that Trenkler fashioned a remote-control explosive device in Quincy, Massachusetts in 1986 (the "Quincy device") with similar features, Trenkler I, 61 F.3d at 48 ; printouts from a law enforcement database (the "EXIS database") that purported to demonstrate that the Quincy device was a close match to the Roslindale bomb, id. at 57-61 ; Trenkler's statement to an officer investigating the Roslindale bomb that "if we did it, then only we know about it ... how will you ever find out ... if neither one of us talk[ ]?", id. at 60 (alteration in original); evidence that Trenkler had electronics and explosives knowledge, id.; Trenkler's relationship with Shay, Jr., id.; and Trenkler's jail-cell confession to cellmate David Lindholm, id. Lindholm and Trenkler shared a jail cell at Plymouth House of Corrections in December 1992. During the four days they roomed together, Lindholm testified, the two inmates "gradually ‘bonded’ upon discovering that they came from the same home town and had similar backgrounds." Id. at 50. Lindholm further testified that, while Trenkler initially denied his guilt, in time he admitted to building the Roslindale bomb. Id. at 51. Other than Trenkler's confession to Lindholm, there was no direct evidence supporting Trenkler's conviction. See Trenkler Sentencing Hr'g Tr. (Mar. 8, 1994) at 59, Ex. 1 to Gov't Opp'n, ECF No. 758-1 (noting the lack of direct evidence).

On March 8, 1994, the district court⁵ sentenced Trenkler to concurrent terms of life imprisonment on Counts 2 and 3 (receipt of explosive materials and attempted malicious destruction of property by means of explosives), as well as a concurrent term of 60 months on Count 1 (conspiracy).⁶ See ECF No. 552. In formulating the basis for Trenkler's sentence, the district court found that Trenkler had intended to kill Shay, Sr. when Trenkler placed the bomb under the driver's seat of Shay, Sr.’s car. See Trenkler Sentencing Hr'g Tr. (Mar. 8, 1994) at 27-28.

Throughout the history of this case, Trenkler has maintained his innocence and pursued nearly every plausible avenue of relief. See Trenkler Disposition (Mar. 8, 1994) Tr. 31-59, ECF No. 763-2 (Trenkler proclaiming his innocence during his allocution). In July 1995, the First Circuit affirmed Trenkler's conviction on direct appeal. See Trenkler I, 61 F.3d at 59. The court held that the district court had erred in admitting evidence from the EXIS database to establish the identity of the bombmaker, because that evidence was unreliable. Id. Over Judge Torruella's strong dissent, the panel concluded the error was harmless and affirmed Trenkler's conviction. Id. at 59-60, 62. Thereafter, Trenkler filed several motions for new trial and to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. None resulted in relief.

In 1998, the First Circuit affirmed the trial court's denial of Trenkler's motion for new trial, see United States v. Trenkler, No. 97-1239, 1998 WL 10265 (1st Cir. Jan. 6, 1998) (" Trenkler II"), and in 2001, the First Circuit affirmed the denial of Trenkler's motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Trenkler v. United States, 268 F.3d 16 (2001) (" Trenkler III"). The Third Circuit, in 2003, affirmed the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania's denial of Trenkler's petition for writ of habeas corpus while Trenkler was incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary at Allenwood. See Trenkler v. Pugh, 83 Fed. App'x 468 (2003) (" Trenkler IV").

Undeterred by these setbacks, Trenkler conducted his own legal research and, in 2005, discovered a new issue, which he raised in a letter to the district court. See Ltr from A. Trenkler to U.S. District Judge Zobel, ECF No. 668. The district court, recognizing that Trenkler's discovery was important, appointed counsel. In 2007, Trenkler filed a petition for writ of coram nobis. In his petition, Trenkler asserted – for the first time – that at the time of his sentencing, 18 U.S.C. §§ 844(d) and (i) provided for the imposition of a life sentence only "if the jury shall in its discretion so direct." See Trenkler v. United States, No. 06-12072-RWZ, 2007 WL 551620 (D. Mass. Feb. 20, 2007) (" Trenkler V") (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 34, as incorporated by 18 U.S.C. § 844 (1993) ). Apparently, no one – not defense counsel, the government, U.S. Probation, nor the district court – was aware of this statutory edict, and it was never raised prior to or at sentencing. Id. at *2-3. As a result, Judge Zobel had sentenced Trenkler in 1994 to life imprisonment with no input from the jury.⁷

Trenkler's appellate and post-conviction relief attorneys had also missed the issue over the ensuing years. Judge Zobel, acknowledging this fundamental oversight, concluded that she had imposed a sentence that only a jury could impose under the statute, and that such circumstances were sufficiently "extraordinary" to warrant coram nobis relief. Id. at *6. She set aside Trenkler's sentence and set the matter down for resentencing, where Trenkler, the surviving victim, and the victims’ families were all present.

At resentencing, Judge Zobel noted the jury verdict included an explicit finding that the offense conduct had directly and proximately caused the death of one police officer and the serious personal injury of a second and, that while she had found this translated into first degree murder in the first sentencing, she was now prohibited from making such a finding. She further stated that in reaching a guilty verdict on Count 2 the jury was asked whether Trenkler had used explosive material to kill, injure, or intimidate Shay, Sr., or to cause property damage. By answering that broad question in the affirmative, the verdict on Count 2 could only support a finding that Trenkler had the intent to cause property damage, with death resulting. Trenkler Resentencing Hr'g (Apr. 4, 2007) Tr. 60:8-15, 60:18-22, 61:13-18, 62:2-5, ECF No. 758-5. Judge Zobel then imposed a term of 37 years, which she noted was Trenkler's life expectancy at the time of his original sentencing, on Counts 2 and 3, and a term of 5 years on Count 1, all to be served concurrently. Id. at 62:17-19.⁸

But Trenkler's partial victory was fleeting. The First Circuit reversed the district court's order granting the writ of coram nobis, quashed the writ, vacated the amended judgment, and reinstated the life sentences, concluding that Trenkler's petition for a writ of coram nobis was in effect a veiled and untimely motion to vacate his sentence under § 2255. Trenkler v. United States, 536 F.3d 85, 97-98 (1st Cir. 2008) (" Trenkler VI"). As such, the court reasoned, the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Trenkler's claim where he had not established a "complete...