United States v. Trujillo

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff, v. JOSE TRUJILLO, Defendant.

No. 1:23-cr-00748-KWR

United States District Court, D. New Mexico

November 29, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KEA W RIGGS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant Jose Trujillo's Motion to Suppress Evidence (Doc. 80). This Court held an evidentiary hearing on October 19, 2023, and received the official transcript on November 21, 2023. Having reviewed the pleadings and heard oral argument and testimony at the hearing, the Court finds that Defendant Trujillo's motion is not well taken, and therefore, is DENIED.

BACKGROUND^[1]

In the days prior to the January 3, 2023, traffic stop, Defendant Solomon Pena, the registered owner of the Nissan Maxima, the vehicle in question, lent his car to Defendant Jose Trujillo. Subsequently, in the early morning hours of January 3, 2023 while on patrol, Bernalillo County Sheriff's Deputy Officer Jonathan Skroch initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle operated by Defendant Jose Trujillo. Deputy Skroch initiated the stop based on what he claims to have observed an improperly displayed and possibly expired registration sticker on Defendant's vehicle. Doc. 108, 27:7-16.

After Deputy Skroch initiated the stop, Defendant Trujillo immediately pulled the vehicle into a private party's driveway. Deputy Skroch asked Defendant Trujillo why he did not have a current registration sticker, to which Defendant Trujillo stated he had borrowed the vehicle. Doc. 80, Ex. C at 1:29. Defendant Trujillo was unable to produce insurance documents, registration, and identification but provided his date of birth, name, and social security number. Doc. 80, Ex. A at 6; Ex. 1, at 6:03-22.

Upon running Defendant Trujillo's information through the National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”) database, Deputy Skroch told Defendant Trujillo there was possibly an active warrant for his arrest regarding a failure to appear for a criminal hearing. Deputy Skroch explained to Defendant Trujillo that if he confirmed it was an active arrest warrant, he would arrest him. In case the warrant was active, Deputy Skroch asked Defendant Trujillo if there was anything he wanted from the vehicle. Ex. 1 at 10:56. Defendant Trujillo replied that there was nothing he wanted to take with him and to “[j]ust tow it, man. I don't have nobody I can...”. Id., at 11:04. From this exchange, Deputy Skroch believed there was no one available to pick up the vehicle and that Defendant Trujillo wanted the car towed. Doc. 108, 36:15-21. Deputy Skroch confirmed the active warrant and again asked Defendant Trujillo if he wanted anything from the vehicle; Defendant declined. Ex. 1 at 17:04-14. Deputy Skroch informed Defendant Trujillo that he needed “to inventory [his] car to make sure there's nothing of value in there, though, we have to document that so if the tow company steals anything.” Id., at 17:20.

Defendant Trujillo stated, “[n]o, it's fine. I'd rather not.” Id., at 17:28. Deputy Skroch informed Defendant Trujillo that not inventorying the vehicle was not an option, and the vehicle would be inventoried. Id., at 17:34. In response to this, Defendant Trujillo asked, “you're gonna tow it?” to which Deputy Skroch replied, “[y]eah.” Defendant Trujillo replied, “[o]kay. Yeah, yeah, go ahead and tow it. Go ahead and tow it, man.” Id., at 17:38-42.

Deputy Skroch did not contact the complex owner or owner of the car, Defendant Solomon Pena, before impounding the vehicle. Deputy Skroch arranged for the towing of the vehicle and in preparation of impoundment, conducted an inventory search despite believing there was nothing of interest in the car. Id., at 19:24-22:30. During the inventory search, Deputy Skroch found two bags of suspected fentanyl pills in the center console, two firearms in the trunk, cash, and hundreds of small baggies. Ex. A, at 6. Deputy Skroch arrested Defendant Trujillo, who replied, “I did not condone any search. I did not condone to anything.. .No I did not condone to that. I said, no, you cannot. I said you could tow it. I did not say you could do inventory on it.” Ex. 1, at 22:40-44. Defendant Trujillo understands that one of the firearms was subsequently subject to ballistics tests, linking it to the shooting in Count Four. Doc. 80, at 5.

Defendant Trujillo faces several charges, including: (1) conspiracy, in violation of 18 USC § 371; (2-5) interference with federally protected activities, in violation of 18 USC § 245(b)(1)(A) and 2; (6-8) using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of such a crime, discharging said firearm, in violation of 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) and 2; (9) using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of such crime, discharging said firearm, in violation of 18 USC §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) and (B)(ii); (10) possession with intent to distribute 40 grams and more of fentanyl, in violation of 21 USC §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B); and (11) using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of such crime, in violation of 21 USC §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and (B)(ii).

Defendant Trujillo now seeks the suppression of all evidence obtained from the traffic stop and subsequent search. Defendant Trujillo alleges that the impoundment and inventory search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. He contends that under United States v. Sanders, 796 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2015), the vehicle posed no threat to public safety and was parked on private property when it was searched and impounded. Impoundment on private property by police is constitutional only when there is both a standardized policy and reasonable community caretaking justification. Here, neither were present and therefore, both the impoundment and inventory search were unlawful.

DISCUSSION

I. The Traffic Stop Was Lawful

Defendant Trujillo does not challenge the lawfulness of the stop, but rather notes that evidence produced in discovery has shown the vehicle was properly registered at the time of the stop. The Court concludes the traffic stop was lawful. NMSA 1978, § 66-3-18 states:

(A) The registration plate shall be attached to the rear of the vehicle for which it is issued.. .It shall be in a place and position so as to be clearly visible, and it shall be maintained free from foreign material and in a condition to be clearly legible.

(C) No vehicle while being operate on the highways of this state shall have displayed either on the front or the rear of the vehicle any registration plate, including validating sticker, other than one issues or validated for the current registration period[.]

New Mexico law requires vehicle registration plates to be attached to the rear of the vehicle and clearly visible and legible. Id. Expired registration plates or validating stickers are not permitted to be displayed; violations constitute a misdemeanor. Id. An observation of a violation of this type naturally produces a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a traffic infraction is occurring, thus justifying a traffic stop.

Similar instances of traffic stops for expired or obstructed vehicle registration stickers have been previously upheld as valid under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. DeGasso, 369 F.3d 1139, 1141, 1143 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Ledesma, 447 F.3d 1307 (10th Cir. 2006); State v. Jacquez, 2009-NMCA-124, ¶¶ 5, 9, 147 N.M. 313, 222 P.3d 685; United States v. Trestyn, 646 F.3d 732 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Edgerton, 438 F.3d 1043 (10th Cir. 2006).

Deputy Skroch initiated the stop based on his observations of a suspected traffic violation on the evening in question. Deputy Skroch noticed a vanity plate partially obstructing the registration sticker, which began with a “1.” Doc. 108, 27:7-16. Not only was the registration sticker partially obstructed, but the “1” indicated the sticker expired prior to 2020, which would be in violation of NMSA 1978, § 66-3-18. Id. Whether or not the vehicle was properly registered at the time of the stop, as Defendant Trujillo argues, is itself a red herring. Defendant Trujillo has not contested the validity of the initial stop and therefore, this Court finds the traffic stop lawful.

II. Defendant Trujillo Has Standing to Contest the Vehicle Search and Impoundment

Defendant Trujillo asserts that he borrowed the vehicle with Defendant Pena's consent. As the operator of the vehicle, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the car and its contents and therefore, has standing to challenge its search.

The Fourth Amendment protects people against unreasonable searches of “their persons, houses, papers, and effects.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Soldal v. Cook County, 113 S.Ct. 538, 544 (1992). In deciding whether a defendant has standing to seek the exclusion of evidence, two factors are relevant: first, whether defendant has manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched, and second, whether his expectation is one that society would recognize as objectively reasonable. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); U.S. v. Erwin, 875 F.2d 268, 270 (10th Cir. 1989).

To have standing to challenge the search of a vehicle, a defendant bears the burden to demonstrate that he or she had a “legitimate possessory interest in or [a] lawful control over the car.” United States v. Valdez Hocker, 333 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2003), citing United States v. Allen, 235 F.3d 482, 489 (10th Cir. 2000).

To address issues of standing, courts often look to factors such as, “(1) whether the defendant asserted ownership over the items seized from...