United States v. Tyson

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. SHAWN TYSON and NATASHA NATILE FRANCE, Defendants.

Criminal Action No. 1:19-cr-103-TCB

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division

August 22, 2022

ORDER

TIMOTHY C. BATTEN, SR. CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This case comes before the Court on Magistrate Judge J. Elizabeth McBath's final report and recommendation (the “R&R”) [311], which recommends denying Defendant Shawn Tyson's motion [251] to dismiss counts ten, twelve, and fourteen; his motion [252] to suppress evidence; his motion [253] to sever count fifteen; and his adopted motion [285] to suppress evidence. It also recommends denying Defendant Natasha France's motion [266] to dismiss counts ten and twelve. France and Tyson have filed objections [314, 315] to the R&R.

I. Background^[1]

Defendants France and Tyson face firearm-related charges after a joint investigation in the Northern District of Georgia and the District of the Virgin Islands.

Relevant to this R&R, the indictment in the District of the Virgin Islands led to the issuance of an arrest warrant for Tyson. Agents traveled to his residence to execute the warrant, but he was not home. Instead, Kareem McKenzie answered. McKenzie explained that he rented space in the residence from Tyson. After agents asked to enter the residence to ensure Tyson was not present, McKenzie gave his consent for the agents to do so.

After agents entered the residence, McKenzie explained to agents more about the home, including where McKenzie slept and where Tyson's bedroom was located. Agents saw that Tyson's bedroom door was locked and did not attempt to enter. But agents did enter an open bedroom. Agents thereafter found evidence of a firearm workshop within that open bedroom.

Later-after the investigation finished-France and Tyson were prosecuted in the District of the Virgin Islands. France pleaded guilty to eight counts relating to (1) the unlicensed transfer of firearms to Tyson; (2) the mailing of non-mailable firearm parts in cohort with Tyson; and (3) the delivery of firearms to a common carrier without written notice that the packages contained firearms. France was thereafter sentenced to forty-one months imprisonment with three years of supervised release to follow.

Tyson went to trial. He argued that the government had the wrong person. Notwithstanding his defense of misidentification, the jury found him guilty of mailing a firearm on November 14, 2018, but found him not guilty of delivering a firearm to a common carrier without proper notice on that same date. The jury found him guilty on one additional count and not guilty on five additional counts. He was sentenced to 120 months imprisonment with three years of supervised release to follow.

After the proceedings in the District of the Virgin Islands, a federal grand jury in the Northern District of Georgia indicted France and Tyson. Relevant to this R&R, both Defendants face charges for (1) making false statements to licensed firearm dealers, and (2) causing the United States Postal Service to not file a required shippers export declaration. Tyson also faces a charge for the unlawful possession of a firearm as a convicted felon.

II. Legal Standard

A district judge has a duty to conduct a “careful and complete” review of a magistrate judge's R&R. Williams v. Wainwright, 681 F.2d 732, 732 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (quoting Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 408 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982)). This review may take different forms, however, depending on whether there are objections to the R&R. The district judge must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the [R&R] to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). In contrast, those portions of the R&R to which no objection is made need only be reviewed for “clear error.” Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 Fed.Appx. 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (quoting Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005)).^[2]

“Parties filing objections must specifically identify those findings objected to. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections need not be considered by the district court.” Nettles, 677 F.2d at 410 n.8. “This rule facilitates the opportunity for district judges to spend more time on matters actually contested and produces a result compatible with the purposes of the Magistrates Act.” Id. at 410.

After conducting a complete and careful review of the R&R, the district judge “may accept, reject, or modify” the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Williams, 681 F.2d at 732. The district judge “may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

III. Discussion

A. Recusal

Tyson first objects to the R&R on the grounds that Magistrate Judge McBath has a conflict of interest because she worked as an Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) in the Northern District of Georgia while Tyson's case was pending.^[3] He invokes 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).

Section 455(a) provides that “[a]ny . . . judge . . . of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). “The purpose of this provision is to promote confidence in the judiciary by avoiding even the appearance of impropriety.” United States v. Davis, 789 Fed.Appx. 105, 111 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2003)).

Under § 455(a), the issue is “whether an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed of the facts . . . would entertain a significant doubt about the judge's impartiality.” See Patti, 337 F.3d at 1321 (quoting Parker v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1510, 1524 (11th Cir. 1988)). “It takes more than speculation or suspicion of [impartiality] to require recusal” under § 455(a). Diaz v. King, 687 Fed.Appx. 709, 713 (10th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1993)).

Here, Tyson has not shown that recusal was warranted. While Judge McBath did work as an AUSA in the Atlanta office, Tyson has not shown that she was involved in the case in any capacity, which does not warrant recusal. See Davis, 789 Fed.Appx. at 111-12 (holding no reasonable person would question the impartiality of the magistrate judge who previously worked as an AUSA and had no personal involvement in or knowledge of defendant's case).

Nor has Tyson shown that Judge McBath held a supervisory role over his case such that knowledge of the case could be attributed to her. See, e.g., Lease v. Fishel, 712 F.Supp.2d 359, 374 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (distinguishing between a supervisory role as the United States Attorney and a role as an AUSA). Indeed, Judge McBath's government service included the criminal appeals and white-collar fraud divisions, divisions distinct from those participating in Tyson's case.

Therefore, the Court will overrule Tyson's objection.^[4]

B. Double Jeopardy

France and Tyson separately object to the R&R's holding that the prosecution of both Defendants in the Northern District of Georgia does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. France argues that the charges brought against her contain the same elements as the charges to which she pled guilty in the District of the Virgin Islands. Tyson argues that his verdict of not guilty on some counts in the District of the Virgin Islands precludes prosecution in the Northern District of Georgia. The Court will overrule both objections.

First, the R&R correctly found that the prosecution of France does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), the Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit prosecution under multiple charges for the same conduct when each charge requires “proof of a fact which the other [charge] does not.” See id. at 304 (citing Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911)). See generally United States v. Lee, 29 F.4th 665, 670 (11th Cir. 2022) (stating that the Blockburger test is ultimately a rule of “statutory construction”). Therefore, the relevant inquiry is whether France faces prosecution for charges that include the same “statutory elements” present in the previous charges. See Currier v. Virginia, 138 S.Ct. 2144, 2153 (2018).

France is first charged under 18 U.S.C. § 305, which requires the prosecution to show that France “knowingly fail[ed] to file or knowingly submit[ted] false or misleading export information through the Shippers Export Declaration ....” France did plead guilty to offenses during the course of the prosecution completed in the District of the Virgin Islands. But none of the charges relates to the non-disclosure (or fraudulent disclosure) of export information through the shippers export declaration.^[5] Therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the prosecution of France under 18 U.S.C. § 305.

France is also charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6).^[6] That criminal statute requires the prosecution to show that France “knowingly” made any “false or fictitious oral or written statement” in order to “deceive” a licensed firearm dealer during the course of attempted acquisition. The closest statutory analogue to which France pled guilty in the District for the Virgin Islands is 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(5), which criminalizes the unlicensed transport or delivery of a firearm to a person who the transferor has reasonable cause to know does not reside in the same state as the transferor. But § 922(a)(5) deals with unlicensed transport of firearms whereas § 922(a)(6) deals with the acquisition of firearms. Stated otherwise, the two crimes might relate in conduct but not elemental proof.

Therefore the Double...