United States v. Valasquez

55 F.Supp.3d 391

UNITED STATES of America

v.Adam VALASQUEZ, Defendant.

No. 11–CR–639 JFB.

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed Oct. 27, 2014.

Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney, by Burton T. Ryan, Jr. and Charles P. Kelly, Assistant United States Attorneys, Central Islip, NY, for United States.

Edward P. Jenks, Mineola, NY, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge:

On May 1, 2014, a jury convicted defendant Adam Valasquez (“Valasquez” or “defendant”) of five crimes related to defendant's participation in a conspiracy to rob drug traffickers and business owners in New York City and Long Island.¹ Now pending before the Court is defendant's motion for a judgment of acquittal as to Count Eight—conspiracy to commit promotion money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). In essence, defendant maintains that the government failed to introduce sufficient evidence of an intent to promote the carrying on of Hobbs Act robberies and drug distribution. The government contended at trial, and argues now, that such intent could be inferred from evidence that the conspiracy involved stealing drugs, selling those drugs for money, and distributing the cash to coconspirators. For the reasons set forth below, after careful consideration of the parties' written submissions and the trial record, the Court denies the motion for a judgment of acquittal.

I. Background

A. Evidence Introduced at Trial

At trial, the government introduced evidence of defendant's participation in a conspiracy to rob drug dealers and business owners in New York City, Long Island, and New Jersey. Timothy Glass (“Glass”) testified that he, defendant, and others committed the following crimes in 2008 and 2009: theft of clothing from a warehouse in New Jersey in late 2008 (see Trial Transcript (“Tr.”) 423–42); armed robbery of marijuana dealer Christian Olic (“Olic”) at 152nd Street in Queens, New York in January 2009 (see id. at 442–62); armed robbery of a medical office on 188th Street in Queens, New York at the end of January 2009 (see id. at 464–73); theft of power tools and a pickup truck in Queens in February 2009 (see id. at 473–76); armed burglary of an apartment in Hoboken, New Jersey sometime in 2009 (see id. at 476–80); and armed robbery of the Glen Oaks Bar in Queens, New York in March 2009 (see id. at 480–88). Martin Lovly (“Lovly”), also a participant in the 152nd Street robbery, corroborated Glass's testimony that defendant was involved in that robbery. (See id. at 231–43.) Athanasios Michaelides (“Michaelides”), another coconspirator, testified that he observed defendant with Glass shortly after the 152nd Street robbery (see id. at 966–67), and that he saw defendant unloading the truck full of stolen clothing when Glass and his crew returned to Queens after breaking into the New Jersey warehouse (see id. at 971–72). Coconspirator Kermit Odums (“Odums”) also testified that he, defendant, and others committed an additional armed robbery of individuals at 99th Street in Queens in November 2009 (see id. at 853–86), and that he, defendant, and others participated in the burglary of an apartment in Brooklyn later that day (see id. at 886–92).

The jury also heard evidence concerning the division of the proceeds of these crimes. Glass testified that his crew, including defendant and Lovly, stole approximately two pounds of marijuana from Olic at the 152nd Street robbery. (See id. at 461–62.) Glass sold the marijuana to Michaelides for approximately $4000, and then Glass paid each participant in the 152nd Street robbery, including defendant, a portion of that money. (See id. at 462.) Glass did not pay the coconspirators evenly; Lovly testified that he received a greater share—about $1200—than defendant. (See id. at 367–77.) Glass also testified that, following his theft of power tools and a pickup truck in Queens in February 2009, he sold the power tools for cash, and then divided the cash among his crew (including defendant). (See id. at 473–76.)

B. Procedural Background

Following the presentation of the government's case-in-chief, defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a). (See id. at 1059.) The Court denied the motion as to Counts One through Seven, stating that “there is no question that there is sufficient proof with respect to each and every element of these, counts one through seven.” (Id. at 1060.) Pursuant to Rule 29(b), the Court reserved judgment as to Count Eight, the money laundering conspiracy count. (Id. at 1059.)

The Court submitted all eight counts of the superseding indictment to the jury. On May 1, 2014, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as to Count One (Hobbs Act robbery conspiracy from April 2008 through April 2010), Count Three (robbery of Olic at 152nd Street in Queens), Count Four (brandishing a firearm during the 152nd Street robbery), Count Seven (conspiracy to distribute marijuana), and Count Eight (conspiracy to commit promotion money laundering). The jury acquitted defendant as to Count Two (the theft of clothing from the New Jersey warehouse), Count Five (the robbery of the medical office in Queens), and Count Six (the firearm charge premised upon Count Five).

Defendant renewed his motion for a judgment of acquittal as to Count Eight on June 9, 2014. The government submitted a letter brief in opposition to the motion on July 11, 2014. This matter is fully submitted, and the Court has fully considered the submissions of the parties and all evidence introduced at trial.

II. Standard of Review

“Motions under Rule 29(c) are governed by the same standard as motions under Rule 29(a).” United States v. Martinez, 978 F.Supp.2d 177, 185 (E.D.N.Y.2013). Pursuant to Rule 29(a), a district court shall enter a judgment of acquittal as to “any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(a). Rule 29(c) permits a defendant to “move for a judgment of acquittal, or renew such a motion, within 14 days after a guilty verdict or after the court discharges the jury, whichever is later.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(c).

“ ‘A defendant bears a heavy burden in seeking to overturn a conviction on grounds that the evidence was insufficient.’ ” United States v. Lorenzo, 534 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Cruz, 363 F.3d 187, 197 (2d Cir.2004) ); see, e.g., United States v. Pipola, 83 F.3d 556, 564 (2d Cir.1996) (noting “heavy burden” in challenging sufficiency of evidence); United States v. Tillem, 906 F.2d 814, 821 (2d Cir.1990) (stating that defendants challenging the sufficiency of evidence “rarely carry the day”). This is because the standard under Rule 29, as articulated by the United States Supreme Court, is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original); see, e.g., Lorenzo, 534 F.3d at 159 ; United States v. Finnerty, 533 F.3d 143, 148 (2d Cir.2008) ; United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir.2006) ; United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir.2006). “Put another way, ‘[a] court may enter a judgment of acquittal only if the evidence that the defendant committed the crime alleged is nonexistent or so meager that no reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Temple, 447 F.3d at 136 (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. Guadagna, 183 F.3d 122, 130 (2d Cir.1999) ).

It is important to emphasize that, in evaluating the evidence under this standard, “courts must be careful to avoid usurping the role of the jury when confronted with a motion for acquittal.” United States v. Jackson, 335 F.3d 170, 180 (2d Cir.2003) ; see also United States v. Florez, 447 F.3d 145, 154–55 (2d Cir.2006) (“In assessing sufficiency, we are obliged to view the evidence in its totality and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, mindful that the task of choosing among permissible competing inferences is for the jury, not a reviewing court.”); Guadagna, 183 F.3d at 130 (“Rule 29(c) does not provide the trial court with an opportunity to substitute its own determination of the weight of the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn for that of the jury.” (internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted)).

“The traditional deference accorded to a jury's verdict ‘is especially important when reviewing a conviction for conspiracy ... because a conspiracy by its very nature is a secretive operation, and it is a rare case where all aspects of a conspiracy can be laid bare in court with the precision of a surgeon's scalpel.’ ” Jackson, 335 F.3d at 180 (quoting United States v. Pitre, 960 F.2d 1112, 1121 (2d Cir.1992) ).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution means “drawing all inferences in the government's favor and deferring to the jury's assessments of the witnesses' credibility.” United States v. Arena, 180 F.3d 380, 391 (2d Cir.1999) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted), overruled on other grounds by Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 123 S.Ct. 1057, 154 L.Ed.2d 991 (2003) ; accord United States v. James, 239 F.3d 120, 124 (2d Cir.2000) (“[T]he credibility of witnesses is the province of the jury, and we simply cannot replace the jury's credibility determinations with our own.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). In examining the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court also should not analyze pieces of evidence in isolation, but rather must consider the evidence in its totality. See United States v. Rosenthal, 9 F.3d 1016, 1024 (2d Cir.1993) ; see also Guadagna, 183 F.3d at 130 (holding that sufficiency test “must be applied to the totality of the government's case and not to each element, as each fact may gain color from others”). Finally, “[d]irect evidence is not...