Sign Up for Vincent AI
United States v. Varela
Counsel: Alexander M. M. Uballez United States Attorney Timothy S. Vasquez Assistant United States Attorney Albuquerque, New Mexico Attorneys for the Plaintiff
Marshall Ray Law Offices of Marshall J. Ray, LLC Albuquerque New Mexico -- and --Robert J. Gorence Gorence Law Firm, LLC Albuquerque, New Mexico Attorneys for the Defendant
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Motion for Early Termination of Supervised Release, filed June 6, 2024 (Doc. 958)(“Motion”). The Court held a hearing on September 27, 2024. See Clerk's Minutes for September 27, 2024, Hearing at 1, filed September 27, 2024 (Doc. 961); Draft Transcript of Hearing at 1, taken September 27, 2024(“Tr.”).[1] The primary issues are: (i) whether the Court has the power to terminate early Defendant Homero Varela's five-year term of supervised release which is a mandatory minimum under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), and 21 U.S.C. §841(b)(1)(B); and (ii) if the Court has the power to terminate early a mandatory minimum term of supervised release, whether the Court should do so here. Because the Court has the power to terminate early a term of supervised release after completing one year under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), and Varela meets § 3583(e)'s factors justifying the Court's exercise of that power, the Court grants early termination of supervised release.
Varela's case involves a wiretap and confidential-informant investigation from May, 2011, to January, 2012, of Varela and others associated in the Varela's Drug Trafficking Organization (“Varela DTO”) based in Albuquerque, New Mexico. United States Probation Office's Presentence Investigation Report ¶ 17, at 7, disclosed March 2, 2013, filed October 3, 2024 (Doc. 962)(“PSR”). The investigation reveals that Varela is an associate of the Sinaloa Drug Cartel in Mexico, and his main source of supply is a member of the Sinaloa Cartel known as “Jaime.” PSR ¶ 17, at 7. Varela received drugs from his sources of supply and redistributed them in the Albuquerque area. See PSR ¶ 17, at 7. Agents identified fourteen members of the Varela DTO. See PSR ¶ 17, at 7. Agents also seized the following: 22.94 net kilograms of cocaine, 240.21 net kilograms of marijuana, 1.3122 net kilograms of methamphetamine, 19 firearms, and $112,270 in cash. See PSR ¶ 18, at 7. Finally, Varela and Varela DTO members engaged in money laundering for the organization. See PSR ¶ 18, at 7.
Varela was arrested once in 2002 and twice in 2009 for battery against Blanca Villegas, who was his girlfriend at the time of the first arrest and eventually became his wife. PSR ¶¶ 15860, 47-48. All of the charges were dismissed. PSR ¶¶ 158-60, 47-48.
On January 29, 2013, Varela pled guilty to: (i) Conspiracy to Distribute or Manufacture a Controlled Substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) and 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B); (ii) Conspiracy to Launder Money, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h); and (iii) Money Laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957. See Judgment in a Criminal Case at 1-2, filed August 29, 2013 (Doc. 508)(“Judgment”). The PSR assigned Varela a criminal history category of I, reflecting no prior criminal convictions. PSR ¶¶ 153-55, at 46. The Court sentenced Varela to 135-months imprisonment and 5-years supervised release. See Judgment at 3-4.[2] Varela's term of supervised release began on September 2, 2021, and will terminate on September 2, 2026. See Motion at 1. He currently has completed over 36 months -- out of a total 60 months -- of supervised release. See Tr. at 10:11:13 (USPO Romero).
Varela filed a motion for early termination of his term of supervised release, noting that he has been fully compliant with the conditions of supervision. See Motion at 1. He argues that early termination is warranted because he poses no risk to public safety, has no history of violence, and has “demonstrated his rehabilitation and eagerness to move on with his life.” Motion at 3. Finally, Varela asserts that he has met the requisite threshold of one year of supervised release, after which a district court can discretionarily terminate a term of supervised release early. See Motion at 23; 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).
The United States opposes the motion, contending that Varela's five-year term of supervised release is a mandatory minimum sentence for his offense: conspiracy to distribute controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). The United States further argues that even if the Court has the power to terminate a mandatory minimum term of supervised release, it should not do so here, because Varela has met the “minimal baseline” of complying with conditions of release, and because his criminal activity is serious. See Response at 7-8.
At the Hearing, the United States Probation Office (“USPO”) supports early termination of Varela's supervised release. See Tr. at 21:13:16 (Court, USPO Escobedo). The USPO notes that, under the Guide to Judicial Policy, Varela meets the criteria for early termination because he “does not present a risk to the public,” has no court-reported violations for the past twelve months, and “demonstrates the ability to self-manage beyond a period of supervision.” Tr. at 21:3-12 (USPO Escobedo). Varela's counsel requests that, were the Court to deny Varela's motion, the Court should consider alternative modifications to his supervised release so he can travel for work related to his family's horse-breeding business. Tr. at 11:16-18 (Varela); Id. at 15:17-21 (Ray).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit states:
The primary goal of supervised release is to ease the defendant's transition into the community after the service of a long prison term for a particularly serious offense, or to provide rehabilitation to a defendant who has spent a fairly short period of time in prison for punishment or other purposes but still needs supervision and training programs after release.
United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1199 (11th Cir. 2008)(quoting United States v. Armendariz, 451 F.3d 352, 362 n.6 (5th Cir. 2006)(citing S. Rep. No. 98-225 at 124 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182)). United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000)(citing S.Rep. No. 98225, at 124). Congress prohibits incarcerating an offender for rehabilitation purposes, but a court may consider an offender's need for rehabilitation in prescribing supervised-release conditions. See United States v. Burgos, 276 F.3d 1284, 1290 n.6 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Vigil, No. CR 05-2051 JB, 2010 WL 2301708, at *9 (Browning, J.).
The sentencing court, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), which specifically refers the court to consider the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), may “terminate a term of supervised release and discharge the defendant released at any time after the expiration of one year of supervised release . . . if it is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). “Whether to grant a motion to terminate a term of supervised release under § 3583(e)(1) is a matter of district court discretion.” Rhodes v. Judiscak, 676 F.3d 931, 933 (10th Cir. 2011)(citing United States v. Lowe, 632 F.3d 996, 998 (7th Cir. 2011)). “Abuse of discretion occurs when the district court commits a serious error of judgment, such as the failure to consider an essential factor.” United States v. Lowe, 632 F.3d at 997.
In accord with 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), the district court must consider the factors that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sets forth before terminating a term of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). The first factor that the Court examines is “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The second factor is “the need for the sentence imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). In analyzing the second factor, the district court considers what sentence adequately reflects the offense's seriousness, promotes respect for the law, provides just punishment for the offense, adequately deters criminal conduct, protects the public, and provides the defendant with educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D). After considering the factors that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sets forth, the district court examines whether the defendant's conduct warrants early termination and whether the early termination of supervised release is in the interest ofjustice. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). Finally, the district court exercises its discretion in granting or denying a defendant's motion for early termination of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).
The Guide to Judiciary Policy[3] provides criteria that a court should consider before ending supervision early. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 8, Part E, § 360.20. Courts should consider two criteria for early termination for a person within the first 18 months of supervised release, and six criteria for a person who has completed 18 months, for whom there is a presumption in favor of early termination:
Experience vLex's unparalleled legal AI
Access millions of documents and let Vincent AI power your research, drafting, and document analysis — all in one platform.
Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting