United States v. Vargas

502 F.Supp.3d 820

UNITED STATES of America,

v.Nelson VARGAS, Defendant.

88-CR-325 (VEC)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed November 24, 2020

OPINION AND ORDER

VALERIE CAPRONI, United States District Judge:

Defendant Nelson Vargas, at 55 years old and having spent the past 32 years of his life incarcerated for his participation in a narcotics conspiracy, moves for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). In support of his motion, Mr. Vargas points to: (1) his draconian sentence, the product of an outdated and unconstitutional sentencing scheme; (2) his health, age, and the increased risk he faces from each due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic; (3) his desire to care for his ailing, elderly mother; and (4) his complete rehabilitation. While perhaps no single factor alone would be sufficient to justify his release, Mr. Vargas contends that, in combination, these circumstances rise to the level of extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting compassionate release. The Government opposes Mr. Vargas's motion arguing primarily that Mr. Vargas's averments do not fit within the acceptable categories determined by the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") as warranting early release. The Government does not appear to contest that Mr. Vargas, after spending over three decades in prison, has been rehabilitated, nor does the Government suggest that Mr. Vargas's release would pose any danger to the community.

Set to be released in June 2023, Mr. Vargas has served over 90% of his sentence, accounting for good-time credits. He has already served a sentence considerably longer than any defendant in similar circumstances today would likely receive in this district. Despite failing to break from his criminal past for essentially the first decade of his sentence, Mr. Vargas has turned himself into a model inmate. By all accounts, he has dedicated himself to making a positive impact upon his reentry to society; now, Mr. Vargas will receive the opportunity to do so. In considering the bases animating Mr. Vargas's request for compassionate release as well as the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the Court believes that a reduction of Mr. Vargas's sentence is warranted. Thus, Mr. Vargas's motion for compassionate release is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

On May 12, 1988, Mr. Vargas was arrested just days after his twenty-third birthday. See Presentence Report ("PSR") at 1. On December 20, 1989, a jury convicted Mr. Vargas of conspiring to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. See id. ¶¶ 1, 5. Mr. Vargas was one of five defendants charged and convicted for their roles in this conspiracy. Id. ¶¶ 1–5. While one of Mr. Vargas's codefendants appears to have spearheaded the negotiations and transactions, all five defendants were alleged to have been part of the Poison Gang, a heroin-dealing group based in lower Manhattan, and the Government contended that all defendants were "equally culpable." Id. ¶¶ 8, 12, 14. The quantity of heroin in the case (approximately 8 kilograms) subjected Vargas to a mandatory minimum term of incarceration of 10 years. Id. ¶ 19. At sentencing, the late Hon. David Edelstein accepted the Government's contention regarding Mr. Vargas's culpability, citing facts at trial demonstrating that Mr. Vargas personally delivered money to undercover agents and was present in a car with one or more codefendants in anticipation of receiving 12 units of high quality Chinese heroin from the undercover agents. See Statement of Reasons ("SOR"), Dkt. 142-1.

At the time of his arrest, Mr. Vargas was no stranger to the criminal justice system; despite having just barely reached the age of 23, Mr. Vargas could be characterized as having lived a life of crime. In 1982, at the age of 17, Mr. Vargas was arrested for Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree. See PSR ¶¶ 28–29. Less than one year later, after having been released on his own recognizance, Mr. Vargas was arrested for Criminal Possession of a Narcotic in the Fourth Degree. See id. ¶¶ 31–32. Finally, in December 1983, then 18 years old, Mr. Vargas was arrested for Manslaughter in the First Degree; according to the PSR, Mr. Vargas stabbed another low-level drug dealer as a form of punishment for having tarnished the reputation of the Poison Gang. See id. ¶¶ 34–36. Between March and June 1984, Mr. Vargas was convicted of and sentenced on each offense, and he was incarcerated until April 28, 1988. See id. ¶¶ 28, 31, 34, 37. Only two weeks after having been released on parole, Mr. Vargas was arrested as part of the instant narcotics conspiracy. Id. ¶ 37.

In light of these prior convictions, the Probation Department determined that Mr. Vargas was a career offender under § 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines. See PSR ¶¶ 41–43. At sentencing, Judge Edelstein agreed, rejecting both of Mr. Vargas's objections to his characterization as a career offender. See SOR. The classification of Mr. Vargas as a career offender increased his base offense level from 34 to 37 and increased his criminal history category from V to VI. PSR ¶ 45. The net effect of the career offender adjustments was to increase his guideline range from 235–293 months to 360 months to life imprisonment. Id. Judge Edelstein imposed a sentence within the mandatory Guidelines range and sentenced Mr. Vargas to 480 months, or 40 years. See Judgment, Dkt. 142-1.

In the ensuing years, Mr. Vargas made multiple unsuccessful attempts to challenge his conviction and sentence, including a direct appeal and two habeas petitions to vacate his sentence pursuant to § 2255. See United States v. Vargas , 969 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1992) (unpublished table decision); Vargas v. United States , No. 01-CV-5527-VM (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2002); Vargas v. United States , No. 09-CV-3466-LBS (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2009).¹

Facing 40 years’ imprisonment, Mr. Vargas began his term of incarceration making little break from his criminal past. Between 1993 and 2004, Mr. Vargas accrued 15 disciplinary infractions, ranging from refusing to obey an order, to possessing and testing positive for narcotics, to serious assault. See Disc. Record at 2–6, Dkt. 144-1. In the ensuing 16 years, however, Mr. Vargas has largely steered clear of disciplinary issues. Mr. Vargas incurred two minor infractions in 2011 for failing to submit to a drug test within the time limit and possession of an unauthorized item, and he committed an additional minor infraction in 2015 for disruptive conduct that Mr. Vargas claimed was the product of a misunderstanding. See id. at 1–2. Mr. Vargas has not been disciplined in over five years. Throughout his period of incarceration, Mr. Vargas has availed himself of many educational opportunities, earning his GED in 1992 and thereafter completing nearly 30 courses, including practical coursework such as Dental Lab Vocational Training and Aids and Disease Prevention. See Educ. Record, Dkt. 142-3. According to those responsible for his rehabilitation, notably his Correctional Counselor, gone is the drug-abusing, violent inmate of Mr. Vargas's youth. As of today, Mr. Vargas is assessed to be a man of "above average respect" for others and is "known as a very religious and God-Fearing man, who has taken every available educational, and self-improvement program" at USP Atlanta. Dkt. 142-2.

On April 16, 2020, Mr. Vargas wrote to BOP requesting home confinement or compassionate release. See Dkt. 142-4. Having received no response from BOP, on June 18, 2020, Mr. Vargas's attorney submitted a renewed request to the warden of USP Atlanta. See Dkt. 142-5. By letter dated July 23, 2020, BOP denied Mr. Vargas's request, noting that his bases for requesting compassionate release did not fit within the permissible categories. See Dkt. 142-6. Having exhausted his administrative remedies, on August 20, 2020, Mr. Vargas moved this Court for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A). See Def. Mot., Dkt. 142.

In opposing Mr. Vargas's motion, the Government relied almost entirely on the argument that Mr. Vargas's "bases for compassionate release other than rehabilitation are legally not cognizable," as they did not fall within the defined categories set out in the Sentencing Commission's relevant policy statements. See Gov't Resp. at 4, 7, Dkt. 144. Of the justifications urged by Mr. Vargas, the Government opposed on the merits only the assertions concerning his health. See id. at 5–6. After the Government had filed its opposition but before Mr. Vargas replied, the Second Circuit decided United States v. Brooker , which held that a district court may consider any potentially extraordinary and compelling reasons proffered by a defendant in support of his motion for compassionate release. 976 F.3d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 2020). In writing to update the Court of the Brooker decision, the Government offered no new bases for opposing Defendant's motion, instead relying on its initial brief. See Gov't Ltr., Dkt. 145.

DISCUSSION

I. Compassionate Release Standard

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a court is authorized to modify a previously imposed term of imprisonment in only very limited circumstances. From its original enactment in 1984 until 2018, this provision provided BOP with "exclusive power over all avenues of compassionate release." Brooker , 976 F.3d at 231. As amended by the First Step Act of 2018 ("FSA"), however, § 3582(c)(1)(A) now permits a defendant to bring a motion for compassionate release on his own behalf, after he "has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) ; United States v. Fisher , No. 83-CR-150, 493 F.Supp.3d 231, 234–35 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2020).

Today, assuming the defendant has satisfied the exhaustion requirement, the court "may reduce the term of imprisonment ..., after considering the...