United States v. Velez

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MIGUEL ANGEL VARGAS VELEZ (3)

CRIMINAL No. 4:21-CR-254-SDJ

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Sherman Division

April 26, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SEAN D. JORDAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court are Defendant Miguel Angel Vargas Velez's Consolidated Post-Trial Motions Pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 29 & 33. (Dkt. #224). The Government has responded in opposition. (Dkt. #231). Miguel Angel Vargas Velez (“Vargas Velez”) has not filed a reply, and his deadline to do so has passed. Having considered the motions, the record, and the applicable law, the Court concludes that the motions should be DENIED.

I. Background

On December 7, 2022, in the Third Superseding Indictment, Vargas Velez was charged with a single count of Conspiracy to Manufacture or Distribute or Conspiracy to Possess with the Intent to Manufacture or Distribute Methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (“Section 846”). (Dkt. #183 at 1). The conspiracy was alleged to have occurred from approximately 2020 to 2022 between Vargas Velez, Michael Angelo Mitchell-Principe, Charlie Manuel Dejesus-Rivera, Cynthia Sanchez, Rudolfo P. Garza, Jr., and Jose Yancarlos Vargas Velez (“Yani”).^[1] (Dkt. #183 at 1).

Vargas Velez proceeded to a jury trial. (Dkt. #206). Following the Government's case-in-chief, Vargas Velez moved for judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. (Dkt. #214 at 2). The Court denied that motion. (Dkt. #214 at 2). Following Defendant's case-in-chief Vargas Velez renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29, which the Court again denied. (Dkt. #214 at 2-3). After one-and-a-half days of deliberations,^[2] the jury found Vargas Velez guilty of Count One of the Third Superseding Indictment and determined that the following quantity of methamphetamine was attributable to Vargas Velez:

50 grams but less than 500 grams of a mixture of substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine or 5 grams but less than 50 grams of methamphetamine (actual)

(Dkt. #219).

Vargas Velez now renews his motion for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29(c). In the alternative, he asks the Court to vacate the jury's verdict and grant him a new trial under Rule 33(a).

II. Discussion

Vargas Velez moves for a judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The Court addresses each motion in turn and concludes that neither has merit.^[3]

A. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

The Court first addresses Vargas Velez's motion for a judgment of acquittal. Vargas Velez argues that the Government presented insufficient evidence for the jury to find that he conspired to manufacture or distribute or conspired to possess with the intent to manufacture or distribute methamphetamine in violation of Section 846. (Dkt. #224 at 1).

It is true that courts have authority to set aside a guilty verdict and enter an acquittal. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(c)(2). But the “jury's constitutional role in deciding criminal trials leaves little room for judicial second-guessing.” United States v. Crittenden, 46 F.4th 292, 296 (5th Cir. 2022) (en banc). Review of jury verdicts is therefore “quite limited.” Id. (quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978)).

A trial court “can acquit a defendant found guilty by a jury only if ‘no rational juror could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'” Id. (quoting United States v. Sanjar, 876 F.3d 725, 744 (5th Cir. 2017)). This standard “does not require that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, provided a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Loe, 262 F.3d 427, 432 (5th Cir. 2001). The factfinder is “free to choose among reasonable constructions of the evidence,” and ultimately “retains the sole authority to weigh any conflicting evidence and to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.” Id. (quotations omitted).

Here, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Vargas Velez conspired to manufacture or distribute or conspired to possess with the intent to manufacture or distribute methamphetamine in violation of Section 846. To convict Vargas Velez of this conspiracy, the Government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt “(1) the existence of an agreement . . . to possess with intent to distribute; (2) knowledge of the agreement; and (3) voluntary participation in the agreement.” United States v. Lara, 23 F.4th 459, 470-71 (5th Cir. 2022) (quotations omitted).^[4] Critically, Vargas Velez “need not know all the details of the unlawful enterprise or know the exact number or identity of all the co-conspirators, so long as he knowingly participates in some fashion in the larger objectives of the conspiracy.” United States v. Brown, 553 F.3d 768, 781 (5th Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted). Indeed, a defendant may be found guilty of conspiracy “even if he or she plays only a minor role.” Greenwood, 974 F.2d at 1457.

At trial, the Government introduced several taped phone calls between an undercover law enforcement officer and Yani-Vargas Velez's brother-that took place on Vargas Velez's cellphone. These phone calls involved setting up sales of methamphetamine. See, e.g., (Dkt. #228-41 at 1). For at least five of these calls, Vargas Velez answered his own cellphone, seemingly acknowledged that he knew the caller (the undercover officer) was trying to reach his brother Yani, and either told the undercover officer that Yani would call him back or asked the undercover officer to wait while he got Yani on the line.^[5] See, e.g., (Dkt. #228-44 at 1). Shortly following at least two of these phone calls, codefendants Dejesus-Rivera and Mitchell-Principe delivered one kilogram of methamphetamine to the undercover officer.

This evidence presented at trial sufficiently ties Vargas Velez to the conspiracy. First, there is evidence that Yani, Dejesus-Rivera, and Mitchell-Principe agreed to violate federal drug laws by selling large quantities of methamphetamine to the undercover officer. This agreement is evident from the timing of the phone calls between Yani and the undercover officer, in which they discussed drug sales, and the subsequent delivery of the methamphetamine by Dejesus-Rivera and Mitchell-Principe to the undercover officer on two separate occasions. See, e.g., (Dkt. #228-48). Second, there is evidence that Vargas Velez knew about this agreement based on (i) Vargas Velez receiving at least five phone calls on his cellphone from the undercover officer concerning drug sales and (ii) Vargas Velez immediately acknowledging that the caller was trying to reach his brother Yani once the undercover officer began asking about the sale of drugs in nondescript terms.

(Dkt. #228-64 at 1).^[6] And third, there is evidence that Vargas Velez voluntarily participated in the conspiracy by repeatedly allowing his cellphone to be used by Yani to communicate with the undercover officer regarding the sale of methamphetamine.^[7]

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, this evidence was sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Vargas Velez conspired to manufacture or distribute or conspired to possess with the intent to manufacture or distribute methamphetamine in violation of Section 846. Thus, the Court concludes that Vargas Velez is not entitled to a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29.

B. Motion for New Trial

The Court next addresses Vargas Velez's motion for a new trial under Rule 33. Vargas Velez argues that the Court should grant a new trial because the verdict “was against the weight of the evidence adduced.” (Dkt. #224 at 1).

District courts have authority to vacate a verdict and grant a new trial if “justice so requires.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(a). Broadly speaking, this power is exercised in two situations. The first is when “error infects the trial-perhaps the erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence, inflammatory comments by a lawyer, or faulty jury instructions.” Crittenden, 46 F.4th at 296. The second is when “the court believes the evidence weighs ‘heavily against the verdict.'” Id. (quoting United States v. Robertson, 110 F.3d 1113, 1118 (5th Cir. 1997)).

Vargas Velez's argument fails under either situation. As to the first situation, Vargas Velez does not specifically point to any error from trial, instead merely reasserting “each and every ground previously set forth in all defense motions during trial and trial objections.” (Dkt. #224 at 2). As Vargas Velez has failed to make any new arguments concerning his previous motions and objections, the Court declines to revisit its past rulings, and therefore, Vargas Velez has failed to show that any error has occurred in this case.

Concerning the second situation, the Court is put “in the unusual position of weighing the evidence and assessing the credibility of witnesses.” Crittenden, 46 F.4th at 297 (cleaned up). The Court cannot “entirely usurp the jury's function” and set aside the verdict merely because it would have ruled the other way. United States v. Tarango, 396 F.3d 666, 672 (5th Cir. 2005). Rather, the Court's “power to grant a new trial based on a different assessment of the evidence must be ‘exercised with caution' and ‘invoked only in exceptional cases.'” Crittenden, 46 F.4th at 297 (quoting United States v. Sinclair, 438 F.2d 50, 51 n.1 (5th Cir. 1971)). The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, recently clarified the governing standard:

If the court reaches the conclusion that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence and that a miscarriage of justice may have resulted, the court may set aside the

...