United States v. Washington

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DARNELL LEE WASHINGTON, Defendant.

Criminal Action No. 1:16-cr-110 (RDA)

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division

April 5, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ROSSIE D. ALSTON, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Darnell Lee Washington's Motion for Compassionate Release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (the “Motion”). Dkt. 127. Having considered the Motion, the Government's Opposition (Dkt. 128), and the attached Exhibits, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Compassionate Release (Dkt. 127) is DENIED for the reasons that follow.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 18, 2016, Defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute heroin and fentanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), and distribution of a controlled substance resulting in serious bodily injury and death in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) (b)(1)(C), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Dkt. 46. The indictment alleged that Defendant sold heroin containing fentanyl to one of his regular customers who shared it with three other individuals. Id. The indictment further alleged that one individual experienced a non-fatal fentanyl overdose and a second individual suffered a fatal fentanyl overdose. Id.

On October 18, 2016, Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute heroin and fentanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1). Dkt. 56. The United States and Defendant agreed upon a sentence of 180 months. Dkt. 84. On January 10, 2017, Judge Gerald Bruce Lee sentenced Defendant to 177 months incarceration, which included a three-month downward adjustment to account for time served, and five years of supervised release. Dkt. 93.

On May 18, 2020, Defendant filed a request for compassionate release to the Warden of Federal Correctional Institute (FCI) Cumberland. Dkt. 115, Ex. 1. He asked for compassionate release or home confinement due to his obesity and high blood pressure. Id. His request was denied by the Warden, and on August 1, 2020, Defendant filed his first Motion for Compassionate Release in this Court. Dkt. 115. That Motion cited his vulnerability to COVID-19 as the basis for compassionate release. Id. On October 26, 2020, this Court denied his Motion. Dkt. 125.

On May 25, 2021, Defendant filed his second request for compassionate release with the Warden of FCI Cumberland. Dkt. 128, Ex. 1. The sole reason Defendant listed to justify his release in this instance was a sentencing disparity. Id. On June 9, 2021, the Warden denied his request. Dkt. 128, Ex. 2. On June 24, 2021, Defendant filed his second Motion for Compassionate Release with this Court, citing a sentencing disparity, his susceptibility to COVID-19, and his “in prison” rehabilitation as reasons justifying compassionate release. Dkt. 127. Defendant's second Motion for Compassionate Release is now before this Court.

II. ANALYSIS

Generally, a district court cannot modify a prisoner's sentence once imposed. United States v. Ferguson, 55 F.4th 262, 267 (4th Cir. 2022). However, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) permits prisoners to request compassionate release prior to serving their entire prison sentence. Compassionate release can be granted for limited reasons outlined by the statute, including the presence of “extraordinary and compelling” reasons. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Under § 3582(c)(1)(A), if the defendant shows that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction[,]” then the court must also weigh the § 3553(a) sentencing factors to determine whether they weigh for or against release.

Defendant requests that this Court reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). He claims that three “extraordinary and compelling” reasons warrant his release. First, he argues that the difference in his sentence and his codefendant's sentence creates an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for his release. Dkt. 127 at 16. Second, he claims that his susceptibility to COVID-19 is “extraordinary and compelling.” Id. at 21-23. Finally, he points to his “in prison” rehabilitation, in combination with his other reasons, as a basis for his release.^[1] Id. at 23.

The government opposes Defendant's Motion on all three grounds. Dkt. 128. The government also argues that this Court need not even consider Defendant's Motion on the merits because Defendant failed to fully exhaust his administrative remedies before filing it. Dkt. 128 at 14.

a. Exhaustion

Prior to the First Step Act of 2018, compassionate release petitions could only be brought by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP). United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 276 (4th Cir. 2020). An investigation into the BOP's compassionate release process revealed that the BOP significantly mismanaged the program and caused delays so significant that some inmates died before receiving an answer from BOP. Id. In an effort to reform this process, “Congress amended § 3582(c)(1)(A) to remove the Bureau of Prisons from its former role as a gatekeeper over compassionate release petitions,” through the First Step Act. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the amended statute, prisoners can bring compassionate release petitions to the sentencing court “after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights . . . or the lapse of 30 days from receipt of such request by the warden of the defendant's facility[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added).

The government contends that Defendant's Motion is not ripe for review because he has not exhausted all of his administrative remedies. Dkt. 128 at 14. The government correctly notes that Defendant only cited a sentencing disparity between his sentence and his codefendant's sentence as the basis for his release in his request to the Warden of FCI Cumberland. Dkt. 128, Ex. 1. In his Motion, Defendant cites additional reasons supporting his release: his susceptibility to COVID-19 and his rehabilitation. Dkt. 127. The government claims Defendant must present each reason supporting his claim for compassionate release to the Warden before presenting the claims to this Court. Dkt. 128 at 14.

The standard for administrative exhaustion that the government asks this Court to impose does not comport with the standard the Fourth Circuit has previously imposed on prisoners seeking compassionate release. The Fourth Circuit has held that § 3582(c)(1)(A) provides two separate options for a prisoner to request compassionate release, “one of which does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies[.]” United States v. Muhammad, 16 F.4th 126, 131 (4th Cir. 2021). The government seeks to impose a de facto issue exhaustion requirement. Dkt. 128 at 14. However, recent authority from the Fourth Circuit specifically addresses issue exhaustion:

In short, the defendant is not required to exhaust his administrative remedies with BOP at all beyond making the initial request for compassionate release. Therefore, we see no reason to limit his motion for compassionate release in the district court to only those grounds for compassionate release he identified in his request to the BOP.... We hold that § 3582(c)(1)(A) does not require issue exhaustion.

Ferguson, 55 F.4th at 268-69 (emphasis in original). Because the Fourth Circuit does not require issue exhaustion, this Court finds the motion in whole ripe for review. This Court will consider all three of the arguments raised in Defendant's Motion to determine whether “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for compassionate release are present. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see also McCoy, 981 F.3d 271.

b. Defendant's Compassionate Release Motion

The term “extraordinary and compelling” is not defined in § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Instead, § 3582(c)(1)(A) requires a sentence reduction to “be consistent with applicable policy statements.” McCoy, 981 F.3d at 281 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Sentencing Commission provides a policy statement for compassionate release petitions brought by the BOP. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. However, there is “no applicable policy statement governing compassionate-release motions filed by defendants under the recently amended § 3582(c)(1)(A), and as a result, district courts are empowered . . . to consider any extraordinary and compelling reason for release that a defendant might raise.” United States v. Kindambu, Crim. No. 1:20-cr-260, 2023 WL 159767, at *2 (E.D. Va. Jan. 11, 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing McCoy, 981 F.3d at 284). Thus, this Court has already joined others in “treat[ing] the § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)-(C) factors as a guide, but not as an exhaustive list” for determining what constitutes an extraordinary or compelling reason for release. Kindambu, 2023 WL 159767, at *2.

1. Sentencing Disparity

Defendant cites the sentencing disparity between his prison sentence and his codefendant's sentence as the first reason justifying his compassionate release. Dkt. 127 at 16. In this regard, Defendant has served less than half of his 177-month sentence, while his codefendant has already completed his sentence. Dkt. 127 at 14. Defendant claims that his codefendant (his supplier) was the only one who was aware that the drugs he sold to Defendant were cut with fentanyl, and thus, he is more culpable than Defendant in the death that occurred due to the fentanyl. Id. The government claims that the difference in the sentences is due to the government's lack of evidence that the codefendant was the supplier of the fatal dose sold by Defendant. Dkt. 128 at 29.

Although a district court may consider any extraordinary or compelling reason a defendant might raise to justify compassionate release, McCoy, 981 F.3d at 284, the compassionate release framework is “not meant to provide movants...