United States v. Watson

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANDRE WATSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-2311

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

March 22, 2021

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 21a0147n.06

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

BEFORE: CLAY, McKEAGUE, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Defendant Andre Watson was convicted by a jury on three counts: (1) use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of a murder-for-hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a); (2) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(1)(a); and (3) discharging a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime causing death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1) and (j). On appeal, Watson argues that § 1958(a) is unconstitutional as applied to him, that the district court provided the jury with incorrect instructions on the § 1958(a) count, and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions on the latter two counts. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM Watson's convictions.

BACKGROUND

Darnell Bailey and Devin Wallace had been middle school friends. In 2013, they coincidentally met in a Walmart, and Bailey learned that Wallace, who was a drug trafficker and dealer, owed a significant drug debt. Bailey, who had previously been convicted of several fraud schemes, then came up with a jointly operated tax fraud scheme that allowed Wallace to repay his debt.

Bailey and Wallace then began another illegal venture. Many drug dealers have sufficient cash to purchase or lease a car but lack the documented income required by car dealerships for these transactions. Bailey and Wallace solved this market failure by fraudulently using the personal information of Wallace's drug addicted customers to procure cars from dealerships that they then subleased to Wallace's drug dealer clients. Bailey and Wallace usually obtained cars from dealerships where they had a relationship with a salesperson—often the salesperson was one of Wallace's drug clients—because those salespeople would make the transaction easier by, for example, overlooking missing or deficient paperwork. Although the enterprise was lucrative, there was tension between Bailey and Wallace. According to Bailey, Wallace often "played a lot of games" with money that strained their relationship. (Trial Tr., R. 282 at PageID# 3097.)

Meanwhile, Deaunta Belcher, who was Bailey's cousin, was dealing drugs from a "dope house" on Beniteau Street in Detroit. (Trial Tr., R. 277 at PageID## 2536-37.) Stephen Brown sold drugs for Belcher, and, according to Bailey, Defendant Andre Watson served as an "enforcer" for Belcher. (Trial Tr., R. 283 at PageID# 3230.) After a chance encounter between Wallace and Belcher at a casino, Belcher was invited to join the car fraud scheme. Belcher's value add was his drug dealing contacts, which allowed the enterprise to expand beyond Wallace's clients, as well as his contacts at car dealerships. Bailey also hoped that Belcher's "street reputation" would encourage Wallace to stop playing games. (Trial Tr., R. 282 at PageID# 3104.) However, according to Bailey, Wallace's games with money did not stop, and Belcher did not get along with Wallace either.

Three incidents led to an escalation in the tension between Belcher and Wallace. First, Wallace intentionally provided low quality heroin to Belcher. Another issue arose after Bailey and Belcher purchased a couple of cars from a car dealership salesperson, who was one of Belcher's drug customers, "and sold them to a couple of Wallace people." (Id. at PageID# 3108.) The salesperson asked Bailey and Belcher to return the dealer license plates, and they called Wallace with the request. But Wallace kept stalling and took "a week or two to return them." (Id.) Bailey and Belcher were angry about Wallace's delay because they did not want to lose the dealership as a source of cars, and Belcher did not want to lose the salesperson as a drug customer. Finally, Wallace was indicted in federal court on drug charges. Following Belcher's subsequent arrest on state drug charges, Bailey and Belcher worried that Wallace was providing the government with incriminating information against them, although they "figured out later on that it wasn't him or . . . wasn't sure whether it was him or not." (Id. at PageID# 3111.)

In May 2015, Bailey and Belcher drove to Zeidman's pawnshop to meet with Watson and Brown. Upon arriving, Bailey stayed in the car while Belcher offered Watson and Brown a house and a car in exchange for killing Wallace. Bailey joined midway through the conversation and Brown asked him "where could he find Wallace at" to murder him. (Id. at PageID# 3115.) After the meeting at Zeidman's, Bailey was supposed to meet Wallace at a strip club in Dearborn. While Bailey went to a different strip club, Brown and Watson went to the Dearborn strip club to kill Wallace, but he escaped.

On September 11, 2015, Belcher and Bailey met Wallace at a car dealership. At the dealership, Bailey and Wallace "had an intense argument" about Belcher being at the dealership. (Id. at PageID## 3118-19.) Belcher and Bailey then met at a gas station and discussed having Wallace killed. As Belcher, Bailey, and Wallace had a previously scheduled meeting for thatafternoon, Belcher called Brown and told him that Wallace was going to be downtown with Bailey and that he would call back with more information. Brown then called Watson to let him know the news. Later, Belcher called back and told Brown that the location for the meeting was the They Say restaurant. Brown, Watson, and a third man, Billy Chambers, then drove towards the They Say restaurant.

Bailey was the first to arrive at the restaurant and, at some point, Wallace called to say that he was outside in his car. Bailey went to Wallace's car and began talking to him. Belcher then arrived with his daughter, but they left after a short time. Brown and Watson then received a call from Belcher letting them know to look for Bailey because he was standing outside of Wallace's car talking to him. When they arrived, according to Brown and Chambers, Watson got out of the car and shot Wallace. Responding law enforcement found Wallace dead in his car. At some later point, Bailey gave $2,000 to Watson for the killing.

Watson was charged with (1) use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of a murder-for-hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a); (2) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(1)(a); and (3) discharging a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime causing death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1) and (j). After a fourteen day trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all three counts. Watson received a mandatory life sentence for his conviction under § 1958(a), ten years of imprisonment for his conviction under §§ 846 and 841(1)(a), and another mandatory life sentence for his conviction under §§ 924(c) and (j). This appeal follows.

DISCUSSION

I. Constitutionality of § 1958(a) As Applied to Watson's Conduct

Watson did not preserve this claim below, and "[t]his Court reviews unpreserved constitutional claims for plain error." United States v. Dubrule, 822 F.3d 866, 882 (6th Cir. 2016). "To establish plain error, a defendant must demonstrate: '(1) error, (2) that was plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings."' United States v. Collins, 799 F.3d 554, 574-75 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 488 F.3d 690, 697 (6th Cir. 2007)).

"Section 1958(a) is a jurisdictional statute allowing federal prosecutors to bring specific types of state murder cases into federal court." United States v. Johnson, 443 F. App'x 85, 97 (6th Cir. 2011). To obtain a conviction under § 1958(a), the government was required to prove that Watson: (1) used or caused another to use a facility of interstate commerce; (2) "with intent that a murder be committed in violation of the laws of any State or the United States;" and (3) committed the murder "as consideration for the receipt of, or as consideration for a promise or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value." 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a); see also United States v. Acierno, 579 F.3d 694, 699 (6th Cir. 2009). As to the first element, the Superseding Indictment alleged that Watson "used and caused another to use a facility of interstate or foreign commerce, to wit: a telephone." (Superseding Indictment, R. 141 at PageID## 613-14.) Following the presentation of evidence, the district court instructed the jury that a '"facility of interstate commerce' includes . . . the use of a cellular telephone." (Trial Tr., R. 287 at PageID# 3828.)

Watson challenges § 1958(a)'s constitutionality to the extent that a cell phone can be considered a facility of interstate commerce. The Constitution provides Congress with theauthority to regulate "the instrumentalities of interstate commerce . . . ,"¹ Taylor v. United States, --- U.S. ---, 136 S. Ct. 2074, 2079 (2016) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-559 (1995)), and "[w]e invalidate statutes only if they bear no rational relationship to" this power, United States v. Coleman, 675 F.3d 615, 619 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Faasse, 265 F.3d 475, 481 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc)). Watson nonetheless argues that a cell phone cannot be included as an instrumentality of interstate commerce because "the risks of globally expansive federal jurisdiction" due to the "ubiquitous nature" of cell phones "may warp traditional notions of American federalism." (Appellant Br. at 42, 46.)

However, "[o]ur caselaw...