United States v. West

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ROY WEST, Defendant.

No. 06-20185

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division

November 7, 2022

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SENTENCE REDUCTION UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) [ECF No 969]

Victoria A. Roberts United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Roy West is in year 17 of a life without parole sentence. The indictment and case submitted to the jury should have netted West not more than ten years in prison.

Errors on the part of competent people - prosecutors, defense counsel, probation officers and, ultimately, this judge at the time of sentencing - resulted in the imposition of a sentence in violation of the law on West. Even skilled appellate counsel failed to raise the sentencing error.

West has no way to correct this extraordinary and compelling error -and end his days in prison - but through his now pending motion for sentence reduction (compassionate release).

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act of 2018, opens an avenue for this Judge to correct a fundamentally unfair sentence that did not exist before. Justice and faith in our judicial system demand correction for the benefit of Roy West.

This human error on multiple levels, the resulting sentencing disparity, the absence of any other avenue for relief, and West's extraordinary rehabilitation constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction. The 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors support a sentence reduction as well.

The Court GRANTS West's motion. [ECF No. 969].

II. BACKGROUND

A grand jury returned a first superseding indictment in June 2010 charging West with conspiracy to use interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder for hire in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958. West was tried twice on this charge.

The first time around, the jury failed to reach a verdict. The Court declared a mistrial. A second jury convicted West in April 2011.

On August 25, 2011, the Court imposed a life sentence on West.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed West's conviction on direct appeal. United States v. West, 534 Fed.Appx. 280 (6th Cir. 2013). Thereafter, West filed a motion for a new trial followed by a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Court denied both motions.

West filed this motion in June 2022. In it, he raises for the first time an unmistakable sentencing error which everyone overlooked until now. The motion is fully briefed.

III. DISCUSSION

Section 3582(c)(1)(A) authorizes the Court to reduce a defendant's sentence if he demonstrates that: (1) “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant a reduction; (2) a reduction is “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission”; and (3) the relevant § 3553(a) factors support a reduction. United States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555, 561 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting § 3582(c)(1)(A)). “Currently, no policy statement applies where a defendant (as opposed to the Bureau of Prisons) files a motion seeking a sentence reduction.” United States v. McKinnie, 24 F.4th 583, 586 (6th Cir. 2022). Therefore, the Court “must deny a defendant's motion if the defendant fails to show either that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a sentence reduction or that the § 3553(a) factors support a reduction.” Id.

West says an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction is that the Court imposed a life sentence on him even though the jury did not make a finding that death resulted from the conspiracy. He says this violated his constitutional rights as set forth in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).

West also contends that his medical conditions, race, and age place him at a higher risk for serious illness from COVID-19. Finally, West says that § 3553(a) factors - and in particular, the disparate sentences imposed on his co-defendants - support his request for relief.

The government opposes West's motion. It says: (1) the evidence at trial overwhelmingly showed a causal link between West's conspiracy and Leonard Day's death, so any Apprendi violation was harmless; (2) even if West could overcome the harmlessness threshold, compassionate release is not a proper remedy for an Apprendi violation, and finding otherwise would allow prisoners to bypass the strictures of habeas law, effectively abrogating AEDPA's limitations on successive § 2255 motions; and (3) West fails to establish extraordinary and compelling reasons based on his medical conditions and risk from COVID-19.

IV. EXTRAORDINARY AND COMPELLING REASONS SUPPORT SENTENCE REDUCTION

A. This Court Imposed an Illegal Sentence on Roy West

The statute of conviction - 18 U.S.C. § 1958 - provides alternative, enhanced punishments:

(a) Whoever travels in or causes another (including the intended victim) to travel in interstate or foreign commerce, or uses or causes another (including the intended victim) to use the mail or any facility of interstate or foreign commerce, with intent that a murder be committed in violation of the laws of any State or the United States as consideration for the receipt of, or as consideration for a promise or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value, or who conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than ten years, or both; and if personal injury results, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than twenty years, or both; and if death results, shall be punished by death or life imprisonment, or shall be fined not more than $250,000, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) (emphasis added).

The first superseding indictment charged West with conspiring to travel in interstate commerce, and to use a facility of interstate commerce with the intent to murder Leonard Day. The indictment did not include any allegation that personal injury or death actually resulted from the conspiracy, and it did not charge West with any substantive count requiring the jury to decide if murder occurred. Indeed, in denying West's motion to vacate, the Court found that: “The cause of Leonard Day's death is not pertinent to West's criminal charge. West was charged with the crime of conspiracy to use interstate facilities in the commission of a murder for hire. Day's cause of death was not an element of this offense.” [ECF No. 923, PageID.12302].

Moreover, as West points out, “The jury was not instructed that . . . death was an element, nor was there any special finding[] by the jury that the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a death.” [ECF No. 969, PageID.12798].

Nonetheless, at sentencing, the Court noted: “[The Probation Officer] concludes and everyone is in agreement that . . . the Court is bound to impose a mandatory life sentence on Mr. West.” [ECF No. 682, PageID.8190]. West did not object at sentencing, nor did he raise it on appeal or in post-trial motions for relief.

West now argues that the life sentence violated Apprendi, and that the Apprendi violation constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A).

The Court agrees with West: imposition of a life sentence without submitting the question of whether death resulted from the conspiracy to the jury violated Apprendi, because: (1) § 1958(a) imposes three distinct penalties; and (2) the alternatives under § 1958(a) are elements for conviction that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. See Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500, 518 (2016) (“If statutory alternatives carry different punishments, then under Apprendi they must be elements.”); Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 210 (2014) (“Because the ‘death results' enhancement increased the minimum and maximum sentences to which Burrage was exposed, it is an element that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.”).

The government argues that the Apprendi violation is harmless and not extraordinary and compelling. See United States v. Kuehne, 547 F.3d 667, 681 (6th Cir. 2008).

But the government relies on the incorrect standard for harmlessness. The government says harmlessness may be found where the fact not submitted to the jury “was uncontested or was supported by overwhelming evidence.” [ECF No. 971, PageID.12898 (emphasis added)]. However, for an error to be found harmless, the actual standard requires that “the omitted element was ‘uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence.'” Kuehne, 547 F.3d at 681 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

While trial evidence may satisfy the overwhelming evidence prong, West contested that death resulted from the conspiracy. Indeed, West presented substantial evidence related to Day's long criminal history in support of his defense that a party outside of the conspiracy caused Day's murder. For example, he: (1) introduced evidence that a thief who robbed Day at gunpoint - and shot at Day while he ran away - might want him dead; (2) “elicit[ed] testimony that various persons in the neighborhood did not like Day, that Day made himself a target for violence, and that people likely wanted him dead”; and (3) “informed the jury that Day was wanted for ‘very serious crimes,' had been involved with illegal drugs, and was thought to be ‘armed and dangerous.'” See United States v. West, 534 Fed.Appx. 280, 284 (6th Cir. 2013).

The error is far from harmless under Kuehne. Instead, it is extraordinary and compelling.

1. Finality in Judgments Cannot Trump Fundamental Fairness

The legal system has a strong interest in the finality of judgments. Indeed, most sentencing errors will likely not qualify as extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence reduction which outweigh the interest in protecting finality of judgments. Courts...