United States v. Wiggins

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. CADET WIGGINS, et al., Defendant.

CRIMINAL ACTION No. 21-630 (CCC)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

December 22, 2023

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION & ORDER

CLAIRE C. CECCHI, U.S.D.J.

This matter comes before the Court to address whether Defendant Wiggins Cadet (“Mr. Cadet”) should continue to represent himself in this case. The events leading up to this decision began with a November 16, 2023, request from Mr Cadet to proceed pro se in this case and forgo representation by his counsel. ECF No. 159. On November 29 2023 (the “November 29 Hearing”), the Court held a hearing pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), to assess the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent nature of Mr. Cadet's decision to represent himself. ECF No. 160. During that hearing, Mr. Cadet was responsive to the Court's questions and articulated his desire for self-representation, a request the Court granted. Following that initial Faretta hearing, Mr Cadet's ability and willingness to participate in these proceedings has significantly declined. Mr. Cadet's change in behavior resulted in several days of subsequent hearings, in which the Court, among other things, held an evidentiary identity hearing on December 6, 2023 (the “December 6 Hearing”), and a second Faretta hearing on December 7, 2023 (the “December 7 Hearing”). The Court also held an additional hearing on December 11, 2023 (the “December 11 Hearing”), in order to further inquire about Mr Cadet's desire to proceed pro se in this case.

Mr. Cadet stonewalled these pretrial proceedings by repeatedly asserting frivolous arguments and refusing to abide by the Court's instructions. Among other things, Mr. Cadet refused to acknowledge that he was the defendant, Wiggins Cadet, arguing instead that he was a “surety” or “subrogee” for the “principal defendant.” When asked where the “principal defendant” was located, he stated that Wiggins Cadet only existed on paper, specifically on the docket and the charging instrument. As a result, the Court conducted an identity hearing, requiring the Government to call a witness and submit evidence, to establish that Mr. Cadet was, in fact, the named defendant, Wiggins Cadet-even though he admitted to being the defendant a week earlier at the first Faretta hearing. After the Court denied Mr. Cadet's “surety” argument as substantively meritless and explicitly directed that he move on from the subject, Mr. Cadet continued to raise the issue in response to nearly every question posed by the Court.

As a result of Mr. Cadet's disruptive and uncooperative behavior, the Government requested that the Court hold a second Faretta colloquy, which was conducted at the December 7 Hearing, to determine whether Mr. Cadet's waiver of his right to counsel remained a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent decision. During that colloquy, Mr. Cadet refused to meaningfully answer the Court's questions by either remaining silent or restating his position that he was merely a “surety” or “subrogee” for the defendant. At the Government's request, the Court also engaged in yet another colloquy with Mr. Cadet at the December 11 Hearing, to give him one more opportunity to unequivocally express his desire to proceed pro se. However, as he did during the second Faretta hearing, Mr. Cadet again refused to substantively answer the Court's questions, instead remaining nonresponsive, maintaining that he was “not the defendant,” and repeatedly directing the Court to his submissions.^[1] For the reasons set forth below, and in consideration of the events taking place since Mr. Cadet began representing himself, the Court will revoke Mr. Cadet's pro se status and reappoint John McMahon, Esq. as full-time counsel.^[2]

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a superseding indictment returned by a grand jury on August 2, 2022, charging Mr. Cadet and his co-defendant, Zyquan McCray with (1) Hobbs Act Robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) and Section 2; (2) conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act Robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); (3) brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and Section 2; and (4) conspiracy to brandish a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o). ECF No. 152 at 2; see also ECF No. 84. Mr. Cadet was also charged with possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). See ECF No. 84.

As discussed above, upon being informed that Mr. Cadet sought to represent himself at trial, the Court held a status conference and engaged in a Faretta colloquy at the November 29 Hearing.^[3] See ECF No. 160; Nov. 29 Hearing Transcript (“Nov. 29 Tr.”). After conducting the Faretta colloquy with Mr. Cadet, during which he identified himself as Wiggins Cadet and provided coherent, responsive answers to the Court's questions, the Court determined that Mr. Cadet had knowingly and voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and granted him pro se status. See ECF No. 160; Nov. 29 Tr. The Court also appointed Mr. McMahon as standby counsel. See ECF No. 160; Nov. 29 Tr.

The parties reconvened before the Court at the December 6 Hearing to address all remaining issues, such that jury selection could begin the following day as scheduled. It became immediately evident during the December 6 Hearing that Mr. Cadet's behavior-characterized by his newly disruptive, nonresponsive, and delay-inducing conduct-had changed since the Faretta colloquy. From the outset of the December 6 Hearing, Mr. Cadet refused to meaningfully participate or provide responsive answers to the Court's questions. Indeed, when asked for his appearance to open the hearing, Mr. Cadet responded, “My name is Wiggins. I am the surety on behalf of the principal, which is the defendant on the docket sheet, on the instrument docket sheet.” Dec. 6 Hearing Transcript (“Dec. 6 Tr.”) at 4:19-21. Asked to explain further, Mr. Cadet responded:

Well, in relation to the subject matter, I have an interest in it, which means I sent the notice to the court - the clerk of court and also to the prosecutor. I am the surety in this matter - in relation to this matter on behalf of the principal debtor which is the defendant. I tendered a special deposit to the clerk of court, which makes me the subrogee - and the clerk of courts in this court and also the prosecutor, the subrogors, and makes me substituted to the rights and claim and interest related -It makes me related - the first person - I'm primary rights. I‘m just enforcing my primary rights, which makes me the primary right of the subrogors.

Id. at 4:25-5:14.

Throughout the hearing, Mr. Cadet continuously refused to acknowledge his identity as the defendant, despite having done so during previous proceedings. Instead, he obstructed the proceedings, regularly interrupting the Court with, as the Government explains, “non-responsive monologue[s]” (ECF No. 171 at 1)-namely that he was merely a “surety” or “subrogee” to Wiggins Cadet and, having “tendered a special deposit,” was appearing solely to “settle and close this matter.” See, e.g., Dec. 6 Tr. at 34:4-23, 44:13-19. He repeated that he, “standing as the surety[,] will be exonerated” if there is a “refus[al] of tender of the special deposit.” Id. at 41:9-15. Mr. Cadet's disruptive and deleterious conduct appeared to arise out of his December 4 and December 5 submissions to the Court, each titled a “Notice of Subrogation and Substitution.” ECF Nos. 165, 166. The submissions primarily consisted of handwritten commentary about his role as a “surety” seeking a “pretrial settlement of this court transaction” (ECF No. 166 at 15), along with a notarized “I.S.L.A.M. Moorish Americans - Northwest Amexem Judicial Notice and Proclamation” in which Mr. Cadet identifies himself as a Moorish American, pledges allegiance to the Moorish Nation, and proclaims various associated rights and beliefs.^[4] Id. at 29-36.

In light of Mr. Cadet's continued insistence during the December 6 Hearing that he was a different person or entity, it became necessary for the Court to hold an identity hearing in which it received evidence and heard testimony from Special Agent Dallas Herrmann (“Special Agent Herrmann”) of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, who was involved in the investigation of this case. See Dec. 6 Tr. at 15:11-26:1, 33:11-40:14. Special Agent Herrmann testified about his familiarity with Mr. Cadet and various exhibits put forth by the Government, including Mr. Cadet's arrest report and arrest photograph. Id. at 17:2-19:24, 23:9-17. Special Agent Herrmann further testified that in September 2023, he visited the law office of John McMahon, Esq., counsel for Mr. Cadet at the time. Id. at 23:19-24:9. Special Agent Herrmann explained that he took a buccal swab from the individual he knew to be Wiggins Cadet. Id. at 24:24-25:1. Special Agent Herrmann concluded that the individual in the arrest photo, the individual appearing in the courtroom, and “Wiggins Cadet,” as named on the superseding indictment, were each the same individual from whom he took the buccal swab. Id. at 24:10-23, 25:2-26:1, 36:12-23, 38:25-39:15.

Throughout Mr. Herrmann's testimony, whenever the Court inquired as to whether Mr. Cadet had any objections to the evidence being admitted, he again repeated his speech. For example, he stated: “Once again, Your Honor, this is for the record and on the record. I, as Wiggins, the surety for the principal debtor and defendant, did tender a special deposit to the trustee clerk of court and for pretrial settlement of this court transaction.” Id. at 21:7-15. The Court likewise repeatedly asked whether he...