United States v. Wiley

93 F.4th 619

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. Maurice Owen WILEY, Jr., a/k/a Tweet, Defendant - Appellant.

No. 21-4458

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

Argued: September 19, 2023

Amended: February 21, 2024

Decided: February 15, 2024

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, District Judge. (1:19-cr-00529-TDS-1)

ARGUED: Mark Patrick Foster, Jr., FOSTER LAW OFFICES, PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina; John David Bryson, WYATT, EARLY, HARRIS & WHEELER, LLP, High Point, North Carolina, for Appellant. Graham Tod Green, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Sandra J. Hairston, United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, Craig M. Principe, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Chief Judge Diaz wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Benjamin joined.

DIAZ, Chief Judge:

A jury convicted Maurice Owen Wiley, Jr., of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), attempted Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and 2, and conspiracy to possess firearms in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o). Wiley appeals, raising a host of challenges. As we explain, we affirm.

I.

A.

Wiley and his coconspirators agreed to rob Wai Ping Chan and Hong Zheng, the married owners of the China Wok restaurant in Durham, North Carolina. Wiley's coconspirators, who regularly robbed businesses, suspected that the owners kept the China Wok's business proceeds in their home because "they are Asian and they don't believe in banks." J.A. 1111. So Wiley and his coconspirators hatched a plan to rob the owners at home.

First, the group surveilled the China Wok and the owners' home. They decided that they would lay in wait in the bushes around the home and rob the owners when they returned from work. The group also agreed that each would carry a firearm. Hykeem Cox, a coconspirator, provided a firearm to a coconspirator who didn't have one.¹

Next, Wiley secured a rental car, and the group waited outside the China Wok. When they saw the owners leave the restaurant, Wiley drove the group to the owners' home. But as they approached the front yard to hide, the owners' van pulled up. So the group retreated and went to a coconspirator's home to develop a new plan.

The group decided that rather than wait in the bushes, they would wait in the car until the owners got home. So two days after the aborted first attempt, Wiley secured a different rental car. After driving to the China Wok to confirm the owners were working, Wiley drove the group to the owners' home. They parked across the street and waited.

Soon after, the owners pulled up. Zheng waited in their van while Chan got out and walked to the front door. When the group saw a money bag in Chan's hands, they jumped out of the car and ran toward Chan and the van. They demanded the money and began firing. Chan retrieved a firearm by the front door and fired back. In the exchange of gunfire, Cox shot and killed Zheng.

B.

1.

A grand jury charged Wiley with conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery (count one), attempted Hobbs Act robbery (count two), conspiracy to possess firearms in furtherance of a crime of violence (count three), and possession of ammunition by a felon (count four).

Wiley moved to dismiss count three for failure to state an offense. That count alleged that Wiley conspired "to possess firearms in furtherance of a crime of violence, to wit: an offense under [18 U.S.C § 924(c)]; in violation of [18 U.S.C § 924(o)]." J.A. 27. Wiley read this count as specifying the predicate crime of violence to be "an offense under [18 U.S.C § 924(c)]." He argued that a § 924(c) offense itself doesn't constitute a "crime of violence," as that term is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3).

The district court denied his motion. The court found that count three didn't specify a predicate crime of violence. Rather, the count quoted the statutory language of § 924(o), which prohibits conspiring to commit an offense under § 924(c).

2.

The case proceeded to trial. Before jury selection, prospective jurors completed questionnaires. As relevant to this appeal, question four asked, "Have you or any of your family members ever been a plaintiff or defendant in a court case (criminal, civil or domestic)?" E.g., J.A. 1565. Based on their affirmative responses to that question, the government identified three jurors it wanted to question further during voir dire: Anitra Ingram, Linwood Brandis, and Janet Riddle.

The district court utilized the jury box system for voir dire. For each panel of prospective jurors, the court first asked each juror personal background questions. Then, it asked the whole panel some general questions, instructing jurors to raise a hand if their answer was "yes" so that it could ask follow-up questions. Last, the parties submitted specific follow-up questions for individual jurors or the entire panel.

The district court's general questions for the first panel asked (1) whether any jurors or their family or friends had been the victim of a crime, and (2) whether any jurors had taken part in a legal proceeding as a party or witness. Because these questions didn't fully cover the scope of question four, the government requested that the district court ask the panel whether any jurors' family or friends had been a plaintiff or defendant in a court case. The district court instead asked the panel whether any jurors had been a party in a court case. The government subsequently requested that the court ask whether any jurors' family or friends had been a plaintiff or defendant in a criminal case.

Riddle didn't answer yes to any of these questions. Ingram did, but she didn't mention the details she provided on the questionnaire. Brandis too answered yes and offered the details he provided on the questionnaire. The government exercised peremptory strikes on Riddle and Ingram, both of whom are Black.

Wiley objected under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). During the Batson bench hearing, the government said that it struck Riddle and Ingram because they didn't disclose orally the details they provided on the questionnaire to question four. But then the parties determined that the district court's questions, taken together, didn't fully cover question four. So the government requested that the district court ask the panel question four as it was worded on the questionnaire. The court did, but neither Riddle nor Ingram disclosed additional information.

Wiley renewed his objection to the government's challenges, which the district court denied. The final jury consisted of twelve members, seven who self-identified as white, four as Black, and one as mixed.

3.

Cox testified for the government at trial. He detailed Wiley's involvement in the offenses, including that Wiley (1) planned the robbery, (2) drove the rental cars, and (3) used a firearm. The government corroborated Cox's testimony with surveillance footage, ballistics evidence, phone records, and data from the rental car's internal monitoring system.

At the close of the government's evidence, Wiley moved for a judgment of acquittal. The district court reserved ruling. Wiley renewed his motion after resting his case, and the court again reserved ruling.

4.

Before closing arguments, the parties submitted proposed jury instructions, one of which defined "reasonable doubt." The district court informed the parties that it would revise the proposed instruction on reasonable doubt because the "Fourth Circuit has made it very clear that I am not to define reasonable doubt." J.A. 842. It also cautioned them to "be careful what you argue in closing in terms of defining reasonable doubt." J.A. 843.

During closing argument, Wiley defined reasonable doubt as "the kind of evidence that you're going to rely on and act on in important matters." J.A. 1359. He then sought to show how Cox's lack of credibility would amount to reasonable doubt in an important matter. He spun a hypothetical where a juror's decision to invest money in a business opportunity hinged on Cox's "can't-fail business plan" and involvement. J.A 1359. The district court sustained the government's objection to the hypothetical and told the jury that it would instruct them on the standard for reasonable doubt.

5.

The jury found Wiley guilty on all counts except count four. Wiley renewed his motion for acquittal. He argued that there was insufficient evidence that he interfered with interstate commerce—a required element of each of his three convictions—and that there was insufficient evidence of two conspiracies. He also argued that the district court's jury instruction constructively amended count three by specifying Hobbs Act robbery as the predicate crime of violence.

After post-verdict briefing, the court denied the motion. This appeal followed.

II.

Wiley raises four challenges to his convictions. He argues that (1) the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss count three for failure to state an offense and then constructively amended count three when instructing the jury; (2) the district court erred in denying his Batson challenges; (3) the district court violated his due process rights by prohibiting him from defining "reasonable doubt" during closing argument; and (4) the district court erred in finding that there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions. We consider each contention in turn.

A.

We begin with Wiley's argument that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss count three for failure to state an offense, and then by constructively amending count three through its jury instructions. We review de novo...