United States v. Williams

106 F.4th 639

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Millard WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 22-3179

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit

Argued April 16, 2024

Decided July 2, 2024

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 18-cr-00149-1 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.

Cornelius Adrian Vandenberg, III, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Dana Schneider Gotfryd, Attorney, Williams & Connolly LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before St. Eve, Jackson-Akiwumi, and Pryor, Circuit Judges.

St. Eve, Circuit Judge.

Over the phone and while inside a Georgia jail, Millard Williams orchestrated the shipment of a mysterious package to an address in Chicago. Law enforcement intercepted the package. It contained furanyl fentanyl, a Schedule I controlled substance.

A jury later found Williams guilty of (among other things) conspiring to possess and possessing at least 100 grams of furanyl fentanyl. It also determined that furanyl fentanyl is an "analogue of fentanyl," triggering a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vi).

This appeal primarily asks us to consider whether furanyl fentanyl is in fact an "analogue of fentanyl" for purposes of § 841(b)(1)(A)(vi)'s penalty provision. Williams says it is not, arguing that we should look to the definition of the term "controlled substance analogue" elsewhere in the statute. That definition excludes already-scheduled substances. So, because furanyl fentanyl is a Schedule I substance, he argues, it cannot be an "analogue of fentanyl." Failing that, Williams asserts that the district court's definition of "analogue" renders the provision unconstitutionally vague.

We disagree. Briefly, the statute makes clear that a "controlled substance analogue" is a term of art quite different from the term "analogue of fentanyl," so we must instead simply look to the ordinary meaning of the word "analogue." There is nothing problematically vague about the definition that emerges as applied to furanyl fentanyl.

We also reject Williams's other challenges to his conviction and sentence. While he argues that the district court should have suppressed the evidence found inside the intercepted package, we find there was more than sufficient evidence to supply the reasonable suspicion required to seize it. And as to his procedural challenges to his sentence, we conclude that the district court made no errors requiring resentencing.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

1. Intercepted Phone Calls

In February 2017, while detained in Georgia on narcotics charges, Millard Williams made a series of phone calls cryptically discussing the shipment of a package to Chicago. Homeland Security Investigations intercepted the calls, which we summarize below.

The calls began on February 23, with Williams contacting an individual named Willie Alexander. Williams informed Alexander that he would be receiving two "postcards or two letters" in the mail. In more phone conversations over the coming days, Williams told Alexander not to "do anything" with the letters without further instruction and warned him not to accept any late-coming mail—"especially from inter-, inter-, inter-, you know what I'm saying?" "It might be a trick," Williams cautioned, apparently in reference to delayed international shipments.

The mail arrived as Williams promised. On February 28, Alexander reported to Williams that his "thing was at the shop yesterday, the letters." Williams asked for "the last two digits on that"—apparently referring to the tracking number—to which Alexander responded, "83HK." Williams promised Alexander that someone would send him money if he forwarded the package to a "Maria Gonzalez," whose address Williams had previously provided. Once more, Williams stressed that delivery timing was key: "I'll be in contact with you so I know the date that it's supposed to arrive. It's very important that I know that. Or else, you know what I mean?" Williams then confirmed the spelling of "Gonzalez" and the shipping address of "1008 North Springfield, Chicago . . . 60651."

On March 1, Williams called Michelle Jamison and Roland Black. He reported to them that he had "one cavalry" planned for "Maria Gonzalez" and instructed them to pick up the package from "Maria" after its arrival in Chicago.

That same day, Williams called Alexander and asked him how soon he could send the package, this time referring to its contents as "clothes." Alexander offered to do it the next morning. Williams then gave Alexander detailed marching orders for the next day: He was to go to the post office, pick out a box big enough to fit the "pants" and "shirts," take them out of their original packaging, put them in the box, and send everything "Priority Mail Express." Williams promised that he would have someone send Alexander money to cover the postage.

Later that day, Williams called Alexander again, this time with even more specific instructions:

About my clothes . . . Especially the shoes . . . Take 'em out the box that they in . . . and wrap 'em up in some plastic or something so that they don't get scuffed . . . .

I got somebody that gon' send you the money today . . . . If you could send the clothes . . . like, tomorrow . . . before they close? . . . It's 'gon have a tracking number on it, right? Just send that back . . . .

Just do that for me. I really need those clothes and I don't want nobody to have 'em . . . . [I'll] call you tomorrow afternoon to make sure you picked up the money and everything . . . . Just make sure that it actually gets mailed tomorrow before 5:00 . . . . Priority Mail Express.

As scheduled, on March 2 Alexander shipped from an Atlanta post office a package containing a bundle wrapped in clothing. He soon called Williams, reporting, "I just did it . . . . I wrapped it in some shirts."

2. Intercepted Package

In response to the February 28 phone call, Homeland Security Investigations instructed Chicago-based Postal Inspector Alexander Lupiani to seize any parcels headed to the 1008 North Springfield address. Lupiani soon learned of a package that fit the bill: a postal carrier had attempted delivery on March 3 of an express-mail package shipped from Atlanta. It was sitting at a post office in Chicago.

Lupiani went to the Chicago post office and inspected the package. While it did not have the "83HK" tracking number that Alexander had mentioned to Williams, it did have an Atlanta, Georgia, return address and was addressed to "Maria Gonzalez."

Lupiani seized the parcel, and law enforcement agents searched it the next day pursuant to a warrant. Inside, wrapped in a t-shirt placed in a garbage bag, they found two sealed packages of a white granular substance that tested as furanyl fentanyl, a Schedule I substance.

On March 9, law enforcement conducted a controlled delivery of the package, which now contained sham narcotics, a fluorescent tracing powder, and a beacon device to signal when the package was opened. A woman identifying herself as Maria Gonzalez (in fact named Janet Vazquez) accepted the package and took it inside.

Black called Jamison two minutes after the delivery. Jamison then called Williams, relaying "they got it."

A few minutes later, law enforcement received a signal that the package had been opened. They entered the building and Black fled. They found him hiding upstairs with the fluorescent tracing powder on his hands.

B. Procedural Background

1. Indictment and Pretrial Motions

A grand jury indicted Williams—along with Black, Alexander, and Jamison—on violations of the Controlled Substances Act. Williams faced charges of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of a mixture or substance of furanyl fentanyl, an analogue of fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846; possessing with intent to distribute a mixture or substance of furanyl fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and using the U.S. mail to further the conspiracy, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Possession with intent to distribute at least 100 grams of a substance with a detectable amount of "any analogue of [fentanyl]" carries a mandatory minimum of ten years' imprisonment.¹ 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vi).

Williams moved to dismiss the conspiracy and possession counts, making the same argument then as now: that furanyl fentanyl is not an "analogue of fentanyl" within the meaning of § 841(b)(1)(A)(vi)'s penalty provision. Williams maintained that "analogue" for purposes of § 841(b)(1)(A)(vi) had the same meaning as "controlled substance analogue" under 21 U.S.C. § 802(32), which excludes scheduled substances. Since furanyl fentanyl was a scheduled substance, he contended it could not be an "analogue of fentanyl" under § 841(b)(1)(A)(vi).

The district court denied the motion. It reasoned that the term "analogue of fentanyl" was distinct from the term "controlled substance analogue," so the statutory definition of the latter term did not control. Instead, the plain meaning of the word "analogue" led the court to conclude that an "analogue of fentanyl" is "any substance with a structurally similar chemical compound to fentanyl." The district court also rejected Williams's alternative argument that its construction rendered the phrase unconstitutionally vague, concluding that the statute provided fair notice because ordinary people would know that furanyl fentanyl is an analogue of fentanyl.

Williams separately moved to suppress the evidence discovered inside the package on the grounds that the government lacked the reasonable suspicion required to seize it. Specifically, he argued that the package's outward appearance was not suspicious and that agents had no knowledge at the time of the seizure of any shipping irregularities associated with it—for instance, knowledge that "Maria Gonzalez" did not exist, that...