United States v. Williams-Bethea

464 F.Supp.3d 562

UNITED STATES

v.Melanie WILLIAMS-BETHEA, Defendant.

18-cr-78 (AJN)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed June 2, 2020

Thomas McKay, Alex Rossmiller, U.S. Attorney's Office, New York, NY, for United States.

OPINION & ORDER

ALISON J. NATHAN, District Judge:

Melanie Williams-Bethea is currently incarcerated at FCI Danbury in Connecticut, which is the site of a significant COVID-19 outbreak. Ms. Williams-Bethea suffers from a number of serious medical issues that put her at high risk of severe medical consequences were she to contract the virus. As a result, she filed an administrative request with the Bureau of Prisons seeking release, but the BOP denied her request. She subsequently filed an emergency motion for compassionate release, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), with this Court. For the reasons that follow, Ms. Williams-Bethea's motion for compassionate is GRANTED, and the Government is ordered to release Ms. Williams-Bethea from custody immediately.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Underlying Criminal Charges

In January 2018, the Government charged Ms. Williams-Bethea in a multi-defendant indictment. See Dkt. No. 19. She was charged with bribery, fraud in connection with federal student aid, conspiracy to commit bribery and to commit fraud in connection with federal student aid, and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Id. The Government alleged, and Ms. Williams-Bethea later admitted, that she was the ringleader in a years-long scheme to defraud Columbia University's Teacher College, where she was employed as Director of Financial Aid, of more than two-million dollars. Ms. Williams-Bethea awarded unearned and unjustified student-aid stipends to student co-conspirators, and those students then kicked back portions of the stipends to her, generally paying back about half the money they received. See Sentencing Transcript, Dkt. No. 155, at 27–29. She personally obtained "hundreds of thousands of dollars, certainly at least $350,000" from this scheme. Sentencing Tr. at 29.

Following her indictment, the Magistrate Judge determined that incarcerating Ms. Williams-Bethea was not necessary to secure the safety of the community, so she was released on bail pending trial. See Dkt. No. 5. In November 2018, Ms. Williams-Bethea pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bribery and admitted responsibility for this scheme. See Dkt. Nos. 74, 77. The Court then sentenced the Defendant to 40 months’ imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release. See Sentencing Tr. at 32; Dkt. No. 129 (Judgment).

B. Ms. Williams-Bethea's Motion for Compassionate Release

Ms. Williams-Bethea is currently serving her sentence at FCI Danbury in Connecticut. Her scheduled release date from custody is May 14, 2022, and the BOP has authority to transfer her to home confinement as early as November 2021. See Williams-Bethea Reply Br., Dkt. No. 172, at 8. On May 7, 2020, the Defendant requested that the warden of FCI Danbury release her from custody, but the warden subsequently denied her request. See Dkt No. 169, Ex. C. On May 22, 2020, she filed an emergency motion for compassionate release. Dkt. No. 169. Ms. Williams-Bethea seeks compassionate release because her age and underlying health conditions make her especially vulnerable to COVID-19. The Government opposes the Defendant's motion, which is now fully briefed. See Gov't Opposition, Dkt. No. 171.

II. THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO COMPASSIONATE RELEASE

"Federal courts are forbidden, as a general matter, to ‘modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed,’ 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) ; but the rule of finality is subject to a few narrow exceptions." Freeman v. United States , 564 U.S. 522, 526, 131 S.Ct. 2685, 180 L.Ed.2d 519 (2011). The compassionate-release statute creates one such exception: It allows a court to "reduce" a term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), if "it finds that ... extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction ... and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Under the recently enacted First Step Act, defendants serving their sentence may move the Court for compassionate release. United States v. Gotti , 433 F.Supp.3d 613, 615-16 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) ; United States v. Gross , No. 15-cr-769 (AJN), 452 F.Supp.3d 26, 28–29 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2020). Ms. Williams-Bethea has filed such a motion.

A. Even if Ms. Williams-Bethea Has Not Exhausted, the Court Excuses Compliance With This Requirement

Before a compassionate-release motion can be considered on the merits, the defendant must exhaust administrative remedies. The First Step Act provides that courts can consider compassionate-release motions brought by incarcerated defendants only if one of two requirements is met. First, courts can consider such motions "after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Second, courts can consider such motions after "the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility." Id. The earlier of these two dates controls; as soon as one of these requirements is met, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied. Id.

As discussed, Ms. Williams-Bethea requested that the warden of her prison, FCI Danbury, release her immediately due to "the ongoing coronavirus pandemic and Ms. Williams-Bethea's vulnerabilities were she to contract the virus." Dkt. No. 169, Ex. C. Ms. Williams-Bethea represents, and the Government does not dispute, that FCI Danbury's warden denied her request a few days later (the parties have not provided that denial to the Court). See Williams-Bethea Br. at 9; Gov't Br. at 3. The Defendant contends that this is sufficient to satisfy the First Step Act's exhaustion requirement. But the Government disagrees, and contends that she has not satisfied the requirement because she "must exhaust ‘all administrative rights to appeal such a denial,’ which she does not claim to have done." Gov't Br. at 3 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) ). For her part, Ms. Williams-Bethea responds that "[t]he government provides no guidance as to whom or through what process Ms. Williams-Bethea could appeal the denial or why that process, if it exists, would not have been futile." Williams-Bethea Reply Br. at 3.

The Court need not decide whether the Defendant has satisfied the statutory exhaustion requirement, because even if she has not, the Court excuses that failure to exhaust. As the Court discussed at length in its recent decision in United States v. Scparta , the First Step Act's exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional, but instead a claims-processing rule. A defendant's lack of compliance therefore does not strip the Court of power to grant compassionate release. No. 18-cr-578 (AJN), ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2020 WL 1910481, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2020) ; accord United States v. Pena , No. 15-CR-551 (AJN), 459 F.Supp.3d 544 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2020). The Second Circuit has also held that such requirements generally admit of equitable exceptions, such as waiver, estoppel, and futility. Scparta , ––– F.Supp.3d at ––––, 2020 WL 1910481, at *5 ; see Paese v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co. , 449 F.3d 435, 443 (2d Cir. 2006). To determine whether a claims-processing rule is subject to such exceptions, courts look to statutory text and history. See McCarthy v. Madigan , 503 U.S. 140, 144, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992) ; see, e.g. , United States v. Russo , No. 16-cr-141 (LJL), 454 F.Supp.3d 270, 276–77 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2020).

The First Step Act's plain text creates "an exhaustion requirement like no other of which the Court is aware," in that it contains elements of both a traditional exhaustion scheme and a timeliness requirement. Scparta , ––– F.Supp.3d at ––––, 2020 WL 1910481, at *6 ; see also Russo , 454 F.Supp.3d at 276–77. The Supreme Court and Second Circuit have often applied equitable exceptions to otherwise unforgiving time requirements, strongly supporting the conclusion that they apply here too. See, e.g. , Holland v. Florida , 560 U.S. 631, 649, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 177 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010) (applying equitable exception even though text did not permit such an exception); Paese , 449 F.3d at 443. Moreover, the Court also considers the exhaustion provision's statutory title, "Increasing the Use and Transparency of Compassionate Release." Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5339 (2018). Without the application of equitable exceptions, prisoners bringing compassionate-release motions due to COVID-19 might never obtain timely judicial review before the virus takes its toll. Such an interpretation, therefore, would serve neither of the provision's stated aims. Finally, the statute's legislative history, which the Supreme Court has described as "paramount" to this inquiry, makes clear that "Congress specifically designed the First Step Act to result in expeditious review of prisoner applications and to improve the health and safety of inmates, prison staff, and the community." Scparta , ––– F.Supp.3d at ––––, 2020 WL 1910481, at *7 (citing McCarthy , 503 U.S. at 144, 112 S.Ct. 1081, and H.R. Rep. 115-699 at 22 ). Leaving Ms. Williams-Bethea in administrative limbo while her life is at risk would be contrary to Congress's express purpose.

In sum, the First Step Act's text, history, and structure all support the Court's conclusion that the statute's exhaustion requirement is amenable to equitable exceptions. And here, waiting for Ms. Williams-Bethea to exhaust her remedies would both be futile and cause her irreparable harm. FCI Danbury, the complex at which the Defendant is currently held, is a heavily populated BOP facility and currently has more than 140 confirmed cases of COVID-19. See Williams-Bethea Br., Dkt. No. 169, at 2–4 (summarizing publicly...