United States v. Williams

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GREGORY WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-14355

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

August 8, 2019

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

Non-Argument Calendar

D.C. Docket No. 3:16-cr-00089-MCR-1

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida Before MARTIN, NEWSOM, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.

BRANCH, Circuit Judge:

Gregory Williams appeals his convictions and 78-month sentence. A 19-count superseding indictment charged Williams with the following: nine counts of unlawful possession or transfer of a machinegun, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(o), 924(a)(2); nine counts of possession of an unregistered machinegun, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d), 5871; and one count of making a false statement to a firearm dealer in connection with the purchase of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6), 924(a)(2). On appeal, Williams argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal, in denying his motion for a mistrial, and in imposing his 78-month sentence. We affirm.

I. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL

Williams argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal.¹ The actions that led to Williams's indictment were hissales of auto sears, a part designed to convert semi-automatic firearms into automatic weapons. Williams testified at trial that he was unaware of the purpose of auto sears. Based on this testimony, he asserts that no reasonable jury could have found that he "knowingly" transferred or possessed machineguns or possessed an unregistered machinegun.

Although Williams moved for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the government's case, he failed to renew that motion at the close of evidence. Ordinarily, we review de novo whether there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction, asking "whether a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. House, 684 F.3d 1173, 1196 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Mercer, 541 F.3d 1070, 1074 (11th Cir. 2008)). However, when a defendant presents his case after the denial of a motion for acquittal but fails to renew that motion after the close of evidence, "we review the defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for a manifest miscarriage of justice." See id. The parties dispute which standard of review governs, but we need not resolve the dispute. Williams's argument fails even under de novo review.

"With limited exceptions, 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) makes it unlawful for an individual to possess a machinegun." United States v. Rogers, 94 F.3d 1519, 1523 (11th Cir. 1996). To prove a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), the government mustshow that the defendant knew that the firearm in question was a machinegun. Cf. id. (holding that the government failed to demonstrate that the defendant knew the weapon "had been altered to operate as a fully automatic weapon"). An auto sear is itself a machinegun under the relevant statute, the National Firearms Act ("NFA"), which defines a machinegun as:

any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. The term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun, and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person.

26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) (emphasis added); 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(23) ("The term 'machinegun' has the meaning given such term in . . . 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b)."). Here, then, for the counts of unlawful possession or transfer of a machinegun, the government needed to prove that Williams (1) possessed or transferred an auto sear and (2) was aware that the auto sears constituted machineguns.

The NFA also requires a limited subset of firearms to be registered in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record ("NFRTR"). See 26 U.S.C. § 5861(a)-(b). The NFA defines the term "firearm" such that it encompasses only certain types of firearms.² In this opinion, we use the term firearm as the statutedefines it. In that light, it is unlawful for any person to receive or possess "firearms" that are not registered to him in the NFRTR. Id. § 5861(d). To obtain a conviction under § 5861(d), "the government need not prove that the defendant knew that the 'firearm' was not registered, but must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew of the features of the 'firearm' that brought it within the scope of the" NFA. United States v. Moore, 253 F.3d 607, 609 (11th Cir. 2001). A machinegun is a firearm within the scope of the NFA. See 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)(6), (b). As explained, so is an auto sear: "The term 'machinegun' . . . shall also include . . . any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun." Id. § 5845(b). Accordingly, for the counts of possession of an unregistered machinegun, the government needed to prove that Williams (1) possessed an auto sear that should have been but was not registered to him inthe NFRTR and (2) was aware that auto sears made the weapons into which they were installed fire automatically, converting them into machineguns.

For both machinegun-possession crimes, Williams contests only the knowledge element, asserting that he was unaware of an auto sear's purpose.

As a threshold matter, Williams's testimony that he was ignorant of the purpose of auto sears does him no favors. The jury was entitled to disbelieve his statements regarding auto sears and to consider those statements as substantive evidence of his guilt. See United States v. Hough, 803 F.3d 1181, 1188 (11th Cir. 2015) ("Having seen and heard her testimony, the jury was free to discredit her explanation, to infer that the opposite of what she said was true, and to consider that inference as substantive evidence of her guilt.").

Of course, the jury disbelieving Williams's testimony alone would not be enough to support his convictions. The government still has the "fundamental obligation to establish guilt in its case-in-chief," even when a defendant chooses to testify. United States v. McCarrick, 294 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2002). And the government met its fundamental obligation here. Evidence adduced at trial included, but was not limited to, the following: (1) Williams's text message to an undercover Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives ("ATF") agent buyer with a photo that stated auto sears allowed a Glock to be fired at "full-auto"; (2) the ATF agent's testimony that Williams said of the auto sears, "These mothersare legit, though. I tried one."; (3) Williams's post-arrest admission to the ATF that he knew he was selling items that could change a firearm from semiautomatic to fully automatic. Moreover, although Williams testified that he thought an auto sear was just "a piece of metal," he also stated that he thought it was legal to have an auto sear "until you attach it to the actual machine -- make it a machine gun." Finally, the auto sears were not registered to Williams in the NFRTR.

In sum, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Williams. We affirm the district court's denial of Williams's motion for a judgment of acquittal.

II. IMPROPER QUESTIONING AND MOTION FOR MISTRIAL

Williams also argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial. Williams moved for a mistrial after the government asked, while questioning an ATF expert, an inappropriate question about how quickly a magazine could be emptied into the jury box.

During the trial, the following exchange occurred:

[GOVERNMENT:] Well, let me -- just for example, let me show you an item that's been admitted into evidence as Government's Exhibit 14F2. There's two magazines here. One magazine holds how many bullets?

[ATF EXPERT:] This is a 13-round magazine.

[GOVERNMENT:] And how many is this?

[ATF EXPERT:] This is a 27-round magazine.

[GOVERNMENT:] 27-round magazine?

[ATF EXPERT:] Yes.

[GOVERNMENT:] Can go into a Glock pistol?

[ATF EXPERT:] Yes, sir. They actually have bigger magazines than this.

[GOVERNMENT:] Well, God forbid, if I want to use this Glock pistol in the courtroom here this morning, how quickly can I expend 27 rounds into the jury box? How long is it going to take?

(Demonstrating).

[ATF EXPERT:] It would take approximately two seconds to --

DEFENDANT WILLIAMS:³ I object.

THE COURT: Excuse me?

DEFENDANT WILLIAMS: I object.

THE COURT: Overruled.

[ATF EXPERT:] It would take approximately two seconds to fire 27 rounds at the cyclic rate of 1100 to 1200 rounds per second [sic].

[GOVERNMENT:] So I could empty this into the jury box before [the court security officer] has a chance to get out of his chair?

DEFENDANT WILLIAMS: I object.

THE COURT: Sustained.

DEFENDANT WILLIAMS: Judge, I would like to move for a mistrial.

THE COURT: No, sir, denied.

After a recess that immediately followed and in front of the jury, Williams again addressed the court:

THE COURT: . . . Mr. Williams?

DEFENDANT WILLIAMS: I need to address the Court. I asked the Court to strike the last question by the Government about shooting to the jury box. It was [sic] impermissible Golden Rule violation.

THE COURT: I sustained your objection. And the jury should disregard the question. It's not evidence, you know that, I've told you that, but you should disregard it.

DEFENDANT WILLIAMS: I renew my request for a mistrial.

THE COURT: Your request is denied.

Later, with the jury excused, Williams moved for a judgment of acquittal. In discussing the motion, Williams renewed his request for a new trial:

DEFENDANT WILLIAMS: I say, even though it's a violation of the Golden Rule to create scare [sic] and fear inside the jury?

THE COURT: I didn't

...