United States v. Williams

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. ABIJAH WILLIAMS, Defendant.

2:18-cr-00013-JDL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MAINE

May 26, 2020

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA

On January 31, 2019, Abijah Williams pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and cocaine base under 21 U.S.C. § 841 (ECF No. 64). He now moves to withdraw his guilty plea (ECF No. 80). After careful consideration, I conclude that Williams has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating a "fair and just reason"—as the First Circuit has interpreted that phrase—to withdraw his guilty plea, and I deny the motion.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The procedural history of this case indicates that Williams had difficulty deciding whether to plead guilty or to proceed to trial. On January 26, 2018, the Government indicted Williams on one count of possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and cocaine base. On February 1, the Court appointed Attorney Amy Fairfield to represent Williams, and Williams entered an initial plea of not guilty. Over the next several months, Attorney Fairfield requested multiple continuances and an extension of the deadline for filing pretrial motions on Williams' behalf, and the Court granted each request. Attorney Corey McKenna, who was then employed at Attorney Fairfield's law firm, shared responsibilities on Williams' case.

Nearly one year after Williams entered his initial plea of not guilty, a change of plea hearing was scheduled. Shortly before the hearing date, Attorney Fairfield moved to withdraw as counsel for Williams at his request. I held a hearing on Attorney Fairfield's motion to withdraw as counsel on January 3, 2019, and denied the motion. A change of plea hearing was subsequently held on January 25. During the hearing, Williams decided not to plead guilty, and the hearing was continued at his request. A second change of plea hearing was held before Judge George Z. Singal on January 31. At the January 31 hearing, Williams pleaded guilty to the sole count of the indictment, and the Court accepted his plea.

On March 26, Attorney Fairfield and Attorney McKenna withdrew as counsel for Williams, and Attorney Joel Vincent was appointed as substitute counsel. Williams represented that he would seek to withdraw his guilty plea. On June 18, Attorney Vincent filed a formal motion to withdraw Williams' guilty plea. The motion asserts that Williams' relationship with his prior counsel was "difficult" and that, despite Williams' "ongoing insistence," Attorneys Fairfield and McKenna had failed to file a motion to suppress the evidence seized at the traffic stop that resulted in his arrest. ECF No. 80 at 3. The motion further asserts that Williams' prior attorneys did not inform him of the deadline to file a motion to suppress and that they only showed him certain discovery surrounding the traffic stop after the deadline had passed.

Evidentiary hearings on Williams' motion to withdraw his guilty plea were held on November 18 and December 5, 2019. Williams testified at both hearings. Because Williams voluntarily waived the attorney-client privilege on all issues relevant to the motion, Attorneys McKenna and Fairfield testified as well. The evidence at the hearings centered on the communications between Williams and his attorneys related to his stop and arrest, which Williams contends should have been the subject of a motion to suppress, and the attorneys' reasons for not filing such a motion.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts surrounding Williams' stop and arrest are not in serious dispute. Neither party called the officer who performed the stop, Maine State Trooper Matthew Williams, as a witness, but the trooper's written report was received into evidence. In all important respects, the trooper's report is consistent with the testimony by Williams and his former attorneys regarding the stop, arrest, and accompanying searches.

The trooper, an experienced member of the Maine State Police, was traveling northbound on I-95 in York shortly before 9 p.m. on December 19, 2017. He twice observed a gray Infiniti sedan following other vehicles too closely, and he determined by radar that the vehicle was operating at 79 miles per hour in a 70-miles-per-hour zone.

He followed the vehicle without activating his lights or siren. The vehicle abruptly exited in Wells, and the trooper continued to follow it through the toll plaza.The vehicle then quickly pulled into the toll plaza's employee parking lot. The trooper activated his cruiser's blue lights and approached the stopped vehicle. He obtained the driver's licenses of the operator, Abijah Williams, and a female passenger. Williams and the passenger told the trooper that they were lost. Williams stated that he was trying to go to Augusta, but then claimed he was going to Skowhegan to meet friends. When asked who his friends were, Williams struggled to think of their names. He appeared rigid and tense to the trooper, and his hands were shaking. Based on Williams' abrupt exit from I-95, his nervous demeanor, and the vague and inconsistent responses that he and his passenger gave when asked where they were going, the trooper suspected that the two were engaged in criminal activity. The trooper asked Williams to stand outside the vehicle and called for a drug-sniffing dog.

The trooper also ran Williams' information in his computer system and learned that Williams was on parole¹ in Connecticut for attempted homicide, and that Williams was subject to a Connecticut protective order² in which the female passenger was the named protected person. The information available to the trooper did not specify what restrictions were included in the protective order. However, based on his experience, the trooper surmised that the protective order prohibited Williams from having contact with the passenger. Both Williams and the passengertold the trooper that the protective order had been rescinded and that they were permitted to have contact. Nonetheless, the trooper arrested Williams for violating the protective order, handcuffed him, and placed him in the back of the police cruiser.

Following his arrest, Williams told the trooper that his parole officer's phone number was in his phone, which was in the vehicle Williams had been driving. He gave the trooper permission to retrieve the phone from the driver's side of the car. The trooper returned to the vehicle and opened the driver's-side door to look for the phone. He then saw a small, folded envelope in plain sight on the driver's-side floorboard. The envelope bore a blue lightbulb ink-stamp. Based on his training, education, and experience, the trooper recognized the envelope as packaging for a ½-gram dose of heroin. The trooper opened the envelope and observed that it contained a brown substance, which he believed was heroin.

The police dog and its handler then arrived and conducted a dog sniff around the vehicle. The dog alerted to the odor of narcotics on the vehicle. At that point, the trooper searched the vehicle and discovered a box containing 400 envelopes of heroin and 45 grams of cocaine base in the engine compartment. Additionally, a sandwich bag containing heroin was found on the ground near another trooper's cruiser.

Both Williams and the passenger were transported to the Troop G Barracks in Portland. After waiving her Miranda rights, the passenger explained that Williams told her the following: that Williams knew that the trooper had been following him on the highway and that Williams believed he was about to be pulled over. She also stated that Williams had given her the sandwich bag containing heroin and told herto hide it, which led her to throw the bag under the police cruiser. She also told the trooper that she knew Williams was trafficking drugs and that she had made several trips with him to do so. She explained that Williams had been physically abusing her and showed the trooper several bruises and cuts on her body.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

"A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea." United States v. Gates, 709 F.3d 58, 68 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Negrón-Narváez, 403 F.3d 33, 36 (1st Cir. 2005)). However, a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing, even if the court has already accepted the guilty plea, if he or she can show a "fair and just reason" for requesting the withdrawal. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). The defendant bears the burden of making this showing. See United States v. Caramadre, 807 F.3d 359, 366 (1st Cir. 2015).

To determine whether a "fair and just reason" justifies the withdrawal of a guilty plea, courts examine five factors: (1) "whether the plea was knowing, voluntary and intelligent within the meaning of Rule 11," (2) whether "the proffered reason for withdrawing the plea" is plausible, (3) whether the request to withdraw the plea is timely, (4) "whether the defendant asserted his innocence," and (5) "whether the plea was pursuant to a plea agreement." United States v. Richardson, 225 F.3d 46, 51 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Cotal-Crespo, 47 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1995) and United States v. Aker, 181 F.3d 167, 170 (1st Cir. 1999)). The first factor is the most significant. See United States v. Isom, 580 F.3d 43, 52 (1st Cir. 2009) (collecting cases). If the "combined weight" of the five factors suggests that there is a fair and just reason for the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea, a court then considers anyprejudice to the government that would be caused by the withdrawal. Gates, 709 F.3d at 69 (quoting United States v. Doyle, 981 F.2d 591, 594 (1st Cir. 1992)).

I evaluate each of these factors in determining whether to grant Williams' request to withdraw his guilty plea. In this case, some factors overlap significantly, and others are either inapplicable or undisputed by the parties. I therefore focus primarily on the critical first factor—whether Williams' plea was knowing, voluntary, and...