United States v. Williams

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. TAVARIE ALEXANDER WILLIAMS

No. 3:17-cr-00238

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division

January 4, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ELI RICHARDSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the Court is Defendant's Sealed Motion for a New Trial (Doc. No. 256-1, “Motion”), ^[1] and his Supplemental Motion for New Trial (Doc. No. 291 “Supplemental Motion”). The Government has responded in opposition to both motions in a consolidated response (Doc. No. 303, “Response”). Defendant did not file a reply.

BACKGROUND

On December 13, 2017, Defendant was indicted in this case on three counts: sex trafficking a child, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a), (b)(1), and (c)^[2] (Count One) transportation of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a)^[3] (Count Two); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 911(g)(1) and 924 (Count Three). (Doc. No. 1).^[4] A jury trial commenced on January 28, 2020. (Doc. No. 186).

At trial, the minor victim (hereinafter, “Ms. Doe”) testified that on June 20, 2016, Defendant picked her up in San Antonio, Texas, and brought her back to his hotel room. (Doc. No. 279 at 49-50). Ms. Doe was twelve years old at the time. (Id. at 47). That same night, Defendant posted an online advertisement of Ms. Doe on Backpage.com, which Defendant described to her as a “sex trafficking app.” (Id. at 51). Ms. Doe testified that Defendant prostituted (“pimped out”) Ms. Doe to paying customers by setting up the tricks^[5] and instructing Ms. Doe to have sex with the tricks, collect their money, and give it to Defendant. (Doc. No. 279 at 52-56). Defendant also had sex with her himself. (Id.). Over the next 39 days, Defendant and Ms. Doe traveled from Texas to various cities in Tennessee. (Id. at 57-58). During the course of their travels, Defendant continued to pimp out Ms Doe. (See generally Doc. No. 279). On July 29, 2016, five weeks after Ms. Doe met Defendant in San Antonio, Texas, police found Ms. Doe at a hotel in Franklin, Tennessee with Defendant. (Id. at 127).

Besides Ms. Doe's testimony as to the above-described events, other testimony and evidence admitted at trial supports that notion that Defendant pimped out Ms. Doe. For example, Victoria Hightower testified that Defendant informed her, a prostitute herself, that he had a “new girl” and that he brought Ms. Doe to meet Ms. Hightower so that Ms. Hightower would teach her the proper “protocol.” (Doc. No. 277 at 66, 71-76). Arterio Holman testified that he traveled with Defendant and Ms. Doe from Texas to Tennessee and that Defendant informed him that he was “setting up dates for this little girl when we got back to the hotel room.”^[6] (Doc. No. 280 at 24, 52). Ads on Backpage.com were posted by someone using a cellphone with a number that was registered to Defendant during the time Defendant was with Ms. Doe, with taglines (which expectedly were not always grammatically clear or correct) including: “Tonight's threat is on me guys” (Doc. No. 278 at 25, Tr. Ex. 21A at 1), ^[7] “After a hard days work, I'm the antidote you need for relaxing” (id. at 37, Tr. Ex. 21C at 1), “Seeking a freak well u call and get me the greatest of my time” (Tr. Ex. 20 at 30), and “Paris last night for u guys to try my pleasure” (Tr. Ex. 21B at 1). One of the ads included photos of Ms. Doe.^[8] (Doc. No. 20 at 30). Additionally, numerous text messages between phones registered to Defendant reveal that Defendant was instructing someone to whom he had given a phone (during the time Ms. Doe was with him) what to do with tricks, how much to charge, and how to collect the trick's money. (See Doc. No. 30). For example, the following text exchanges between Defendant and Ms. Doe were introduced into evidence: “There is no car out there; Bitch wtf u got going on? u got tha money; I got the 100; Ok get it over quick; Ok baby; He is leaving” (Tr. Ex. 31A at 1); “U got ur money right; Yah I got the 100 baby” (id. at 7); “Tell him u give him a blow job for 100” (id. at 11); and “He wants to fuck; go ahead” (id. at 12).

On February 6, 2020, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on Counts One and Two, and not guilty on Count Three. (Doc. No. 227). That same day, the Court set sentencing for June 8, 2020. (Doc. Nos. 226, 231). Since then, sentencing has been postponed several times upon motion of one party or the other, although at present no sentencing date is scheduled, pending resolution of the Motion and Supplemental Motion.

On October 22, 2020, Defendant filed the Motion, requesting a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. (Doc. No. 256-1). On November 12, 2020, Defendant sent a pro se letter to the Court requesting new counsel. (Doc. No. 259). After a hearing on Defendant's request, the Court denied Defendant's request to terminate his current counsel but did appoint him a second counsel of record. (Doc. No. 269). On June 1, 2020, Defendant's new counsel filed the Supplemental Motion, which set forth additional arguments in support of defendant's bid for a new trial. (Doc. No. 291). On August 30, 2021, the Government responded to both the Motion and the Supplemental motion, in a single filing. (Doc. No. 303). Accordingly, this matter is now ripe for review.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, a court may “vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. A Rule 33 motion for a new trial “calls on the trial judge to take on the role of a thirteenth juror, weighing evidence and making credibility determinations firsthand to ensure there is not a miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Mallory, 902 F.3d 584, 596 (6th Cir. 2018). The Court has broad discretion to decide a motion for a new trial, but it “should exercise such discretion only in the extraordinary circumstances where the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.” United States v. Ashworth, 836 F.2d 260, 266 (6th Cir. 1988); see also United States v. Garner, 529 F.2d 962, 969 (6th Cir. 1976) (“Motions for a new trial are not favored and are granted only with great caution.”). “The defendant bears the burden of proving that a new trial should be granted.” United States v. Davis, 15 F.3d 526, 531 (6th Cir. 1994).

ANALYSIS

I. The Motion

Via the Motion, Defendant argues that a new trial is warranted based on “newly discovered information.” Defendant also (apparently) argues that a new trial is warranted because this new information is Brady material that the Government suppressed.^[9]

Defendant bases this argument on two pieces of information that he obtained post-trial: (i) a September 30, 2020 email from one of the assigned prosecutors (Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) Schiferle) to defense counsel wherein the AUSA represents that she obtained information about an event involving Ms. Doe that occurred after trial (Doc. No. 253, “Exhibit A”); and (ii) a June 1, 2017 “Narrative Regarding Potential Brady Material” that was authored by the assistant district attorney on Defendant's state case (Doc. No. 253-2, “Exhibit B”). After describing applicable legal standards, the Court will explore in turn whether either piece of information warrants a new trial.

A. Newly Discovered Evidence Legal Standard

Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in pertinent part, that “the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). Not surprisingly, it is possible that in a particular case, justice will so require in light of newly discovered evidence. But “[t]o demonstrate that a new trial is warranted on the basis of newly discovered evidence, a defendant must prove: (1) the new evidence was discovered after the trial; (2) the evidence could not have been discovered earlier with due diligence; (3) the evidence is material and not merely cumulative or impeaching; and (4) the evidence would likely produce acquittal.”^[10] United States v. Jenkins, 726 Fed.Appx. 452, 457 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. Seago, 930 F.2d 482, 488 (6th Cir. 1991)) (emphasis added). “The burden of proof rests with the defendant.” Id. (citing United States v. McLain, 9 Fed.Appx. 463, 464 (6th Cir. 2001)).

“Undisclosed evidence is material ‘if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'” United States v. Ramer, 883 F.3d 659, 672 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). “A ‘reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. (quoting United States v. Hawkins, 969 F.2d 169, 175 (6th Cir. 1992)). “[W]here the undisclosed evidence merely furnishes an additional basis on which to challenge a witness whose credibility has already been shown to be questionable or who is subject to extensive attack by reason of other evidence, the undisclosed evidence may be cumulative, and hence not material.” Ramer, 883 F.3d at 672 (quoting Bales v. Bell, 788 F.3d 568, 574 (6th Cir. 2015)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Brady Material

“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused . . . violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). These principles have been extended to the disclosure of impeachment evidence in cases where the “reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence.” Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To...