United States v. Williams

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MALCOM ANWAR WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 22-13150

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit

June 28, 2023

DO NOT PUBLISH

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 0:15-cr-60120-KAM-2 Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Malcolm Williams, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's dismissal in part and denial in part of his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). He argues that the district court abused its discretion by (1) construing his § 3582(c) motion as a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate sentence; (2) addressing sua sponte whether he had exhausted his administrative remedies; and (3) failing to consider his arguments concerning intervening changes in the law and his rehabilitation as required by Concepcion v United States, 142 S.Ct. 2389 (2022). After review, we affirm.

I. Background

Williams pleaded guilty in 2015 to Hobbs Act robbery pursuant to a written plea agreement. At sentencing, Williams was deemed a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a) on the basis that the Hobbs Act robbery conviction qualified as a "crime of violence," and Williams had two prior state offenses that qualified as either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.^[1] The district court imposed a sentence of 151 months' imprisonment. Williams did not appeal. Two of his codefendants did, however, and successfully challenged their respective career-offender enhancements on the basis that Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under the Guidelines. See United States v. Eason, 953 F.3d 1184, 1187 (11th Cir. 2020).

In 2020, Williams filed a pro se 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) motion seeking a sentence reduction based on "extraordinary and compelling reasons," namely, that (1) Hobbs Act robbery is no longer considered a "crime of violence" due to an amendment to the crime of violence definition in the Guidelines; (2) two of his codefendants had their career-offender designations based on Hobbs Act robbery vacated on appeal; and (3) one of his state convictions should not have counted as a predicate offense for purposes of the career-offender enhancement. The district court denied the motion, concluding that it lacked authority to reduce Williams's sentence because a change in law did not constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 to reduce a sentence. Furthermore, it explained that, even if it had the authority to reduce his sentence, consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors weighed against a reduction. Finally, the district court noted that releasing him early would be inconsistent with the policy statements in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 because Williams presented a danger to the community.

Williams appealed the denial of his § 3582(c) motion, and we affirmed. United States v. Williams, No. 20-14360, 2021 WL 6101491 (11th Cir. Dec. 21, 2021).

Thereafter, in August 2022, Williams filed a renewed motion for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that the Supreme Court's then-recent decision in Concepcion v. United States, required the district court to consider intervening changes in the law and changes of fact, such as evidence of rehabilitation, when deciding § 3582(c) motions for a sentence reduction. Thus, he argued that, under Concepcion, the district court was bound to consider that Hobbs Act robbery was no longer a crime of violence under the amended guidelines as evidenced by this Court's decision in Eason, as well as his evidence of postconviction rehabilitation. In terms of evidence of rehabilitation, Williams noted that he had an "excellent" prison record with no disciplinary problems, he mentored other inmates, he completed over 500 hours of educational programming, he had no other felony convictions and was not a danger to society, and he had maintained positive business and personal relationships in society so that he would be a productive member upon release. In terms of compassionate release, Williams alleged that he was "healthy," but had been recently diagnosed as "pre-diabetic," with high A1C levels and "high sodium." He maintained that "[a] home diet would substantially improve these conditions."

The district court dismissed the motion in part and denied it in part. First, the district court concluded that, to the extent Williams sought a sentence reduction based on Concepcion, "the present motion [was] effectively [an unauthorized] successive petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255" over which the court lacked jurisdiction. Second, as for Williams's request for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A), the district court denied his motion because he had not exhausted his administrative remedies and he did not satisfy the definition of "extraordinary and compelling reasons" set forth in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

Williams argues that the district court abused its discretion by (1) construing his § 3582(c) motion as a second or successive § 2255 motion to vacate sentence; (2) addressing sua sponte whether he had exhausted his administrative remedies; and (3) failing to consider his arguments concerning intervening changes in the law and his rehabilitation as required by Concepcion.

We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for an 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) sentence reduction. United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1251 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 583 (2021). We review a district court's denial of a movant's § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for abuse of discretion. United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021).

Generally, a court "may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Section 3582(c)(1)(A), however, provides the following limited exception:

the court, upon motion of the Director of the [BOP], or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights . . . may reduce the term of imprisonment . . ., after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction . . . and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.

Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A).^[2] Thus, the district court may reduce a movant's imprisonment term if: (1) there are extraordinary and compelling reasons for doing so, (2) the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) favor doing so, and (3) doing so is consistent with the policy statements in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2021). If the district court finds against the movant on any one of these requirements, it cannot grant relief, and need not analyze the other requirements. United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1347-48 (11th Cir. 2021); Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237-38 (explaining that "nothing on the face of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) requires a court to conduct the compassionate-release analysis in any particular order").

The Sentencing Commission defines "extraordinary and compelling reasons" in Application Note 1 to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. Pursuant to this definition, there are four circumstances under which "extraordinary and compelling reasons exist": (A) the defendant suffers from (i) "a terminal illness" or (ii) a permanent health condition "that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility from which he or she is not expected to recover"; (B) the defendant is "at least 65 years old," "is experiencing a serious [age-related] deterioration in physical or mental health," and "has served at least 10 years or 75 percent of his or her term of imprisonment, whichever is less"; (C) the defendant's assistance is needed in caring for the defendant's minor child, spouse, or registered partner due to (i) "[t]he death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant's minor child or minor children" or (ii) "[t]he incapacitation of the defendant's spouse or registered partner"; and (D) there exist "other" extraordinary and compelling reasons "[a]s determined by the Director of the [BOP]." See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. (n.1 (A)-(D)). "[D]istrict courts are bound by the Commission's definition of 'extraordinary and compelling reasons' found in [§] 1B1.13." Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1262; see also Giron, 15 F.4th at 1346 ("[T]he only circumstances that can rise to the level of extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release are limited to those extraordinary and compelling reasons as described by [§] 1B1.13.").

Under the prior-panel-precedent rule, we are bound by the holdings of Bryant and Giron unless they have been "overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this court sitting en banc." United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008). "To conclude that we are not bound by a prior holding in light of a Supreme Court case, we must find that the case is 'clearly on point' and that it 'actually abrogate[s] or directly conflict[s] with, as opposed to merely weaken[s], the holding of the prior panel.'" United States v. Dudley, 5 F.4th 1249, 1265 (11th Cir. 2021), cert. denied 142 S.Ct. 1376 (2022), (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246, 1255 (11th Cir. 2009)).

Here the gravamen of Williams's argument is that Concepcion changed the framework and analysis that the district court must conduct when deciding motions for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c), but his reliance on Concepcion is misplaced. In Concepcion, the Supreme Court discussed...