United States v. Woodfork

999 F.3d 511

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Edward WOODFORK, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 20-3415

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 22, 2021

Decided June 4, 2021

Melissa Moody, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Urbana, IL, W. Scott Simpson, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Springfield, IL for Plaintiff - Appellee

Daniel J. Hillis, Attorney, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Springfield, IL, for Defendant - Appellant

Before Wood, Brennan, and St. Eve, Circuit Judges.

St. Eve, Circuit Judge.

In 2018, a state police officer sought and obtained a warrant to search Defendant Edward Woodfork's home based on the officer's orchestration of several controlled-buy drug transactions involving Woodfork. Upon executing the warrant, officers discovered methamphetamine and a firearm at Woodfork's suspected residence. Based on this evidence, a federal grand jury indicted Woodfork for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm by a felon.

Woodfork maintains that the officer made material misstatements or omissions in seeking the warrant in violation of Franks v. Delaware , 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), and that probable cause to issue the search warrant was lacking in the first instance. Accordingly, Woodfork moved the district court to quash the search warrant and to suppress the resulting evidence. When the district court denied the motion, Woodfork pled guilty to both charges but preserved his ability to appeal the district court's denial of his suppression motion.

For the reasons explained below, we affirm the district court's denial of the motion to quash and to suppress.

I. Background

The government's prosecution of Woodfork arose out of an investigation by the Vermillion (County) Metropolitan Enforcement Group ("VMEG"). As part of the investigation, Danville Police Officer Scott Crawley sought a warrant from a county judge to search the residence that officers believed to be Woodfork's home at 1220 North Franklin Street in Danville, Illinois. Crawley did not submit an affidavit in support of the search warrant request; instead, he testified under oath, live before the judge. The court recorded the testimony.

During his testimony, Crawley identified Edward Woodfork as the target of the requested search warrant. He testified that Woodfork had sold 1.6 grams of crystal methamphetamine in a controlled buy to a confidential source earlier that day.¹ Prior to the transaction, officers searched the source for currency and contraband and provided the source with $110 of official advanced funds to buy the methamphetamine from Woodfork. Officers surveilled the transaction, and the source wore a wire that recorded the transaction. Officers also searched the source after the transaction. Crawley reported that he had relied on the confidential source "multiple times" in the past and that the source was "reliable."

Crawley also testified that the officers intended to set up a second controlled buy on the day of the hearing. For this transaction, a second reliable confidential source contacted Woodfork to buy crystal methamphetamine. The source attempted to set up the controlled buy with Woodfork away from 1220 North Franklin Street so that officers could stop Woodfork in his car before he arrived at the agreed-upon location for the controlled buy. This "buy bust" maneuver was stymied, however, by Woodfork's insistence that the source come to Woodfork's home for the transaction. Because the source feared retaliation, he did not want the transaction to take place at Woodfork's home. In describing this attempt at a controlled buy, Crawley first testified that Woodfork directed the source to come to "Franklin and English" for the sale, and Crawley testified that law enforcement understood this intersection to mean Woodfork's residence at 1220 North Franklin Street. Later in the hearing, the court questioned Crawley further about where the transaction was supposed to take place, and Crawley confirmed Woodfork was directing the buyer to his home at 1220 North Franklin Street.

Crawley further testified that he had "done" three "past buys" from Woodfork within the last year using the same confidential informants. Those three controlled buys were also "wired buys."

Based on this testimony, the judge issued a search warrant for Woodfork's home at 1220 North Franklin Street. Upon executing the warrant, officers discovered methamphetamine and a firearm. The government presented this evidence to a federal grand jury, which indicted Woodfork for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm by a felon. Woodfork moved to quash the search warrant and in the alternative to suppress the evidence discovered through the warrant-authorized search of his home. He argued that he was entitled to a Franks hearing and suppression of the evidence from the search because he claimed that Crawley had misled the warrant-issuing judge regarding the identification of his home as the place to be searched and by omitting details about the confidential sources’ criminal histories.

The district court found that Woodfork was not entitled to a Franks hearing. First, he "failed to show Crawley made false statements about his address knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth." See Franks , 438 U.S. at 155–56, 98 S.Ct. 2674. In addition, the district court found that Woodfork failed to show that "the alleged false statement [about his address] was essential to the establishment of probable cause, because even without the statement, Crawley's testimony provided the issuing judge with a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed [to search 1220 North Franklin Street]." The district court further found that "the omission of information about the sources’ backgrounds, criminal histories, or motives does not change the probable cause determination." Finally, the district court held that regardless of probable cause, the good-faith exception announced in United States v. Leon would apply. See 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984).

When the district court denied his motion, Woodfork conditionally pled guilty, preserving his ability to challenge the suppression ruling. The district court sentenced Woodfork to two concurrent 120-month sentences and five years’ supervised release.

II. Discussion

On appeal, Woodfork argues that the district court should have held a Franks hearing to investigate the veracity of Officer Crawley's testimony in support of the search warrant. Woodfork contends that Crawley made two material omissions or misstatements during his testimony before the county judge that render the search warrant invalid. First, he argues Crawley recklessly or intentionally omitted the confidential sources’ criminal histories and other details about their credibility.² Second, he asserts that Crawley "invented" the street corner ("Franklin and English") where the controlled buy was supposed to take place, so that it was a material misstatement to suggest that 1220 North Franklin Street was the location where drugs were likely to be found. Woodfork also maintains that the district court erred in applying Leon ’s good-faith exception, because, he claims that Crawley acted in bad faith. For these reasons, Woodfork seeks to suppress the evidence discovered at 1220 North Franklin Street.

In reviewing a motion to suppress, we review the district court's "legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. Similarly, we review the denial of a Franks hearing for clear error, but any legal determinations that factored into the ruling are reviewed de novo ." United States v. Hancock , 844 F.3d 702, 707–08 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Glover , 755 F.3d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 2014) ). We give " ‘great deference’ to the conclusion of the judge who initially issued the warrant," upholding it "so long as ‘there is substantial evidence in the record’ that supports the state judge's decision." United States v. Leonard , 884 F.3d 730, 733 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Garcia , 528 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 2008) ; United States v. Curry , 538 F.3d 718, 729 (7th Cir. 2008) ).

A. Entitlement to a Franks Hearing

The Fourth Amendment provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." U.S. Const. amend. IV. "Probable cause for issuance of a search warrant exists if there is ‘a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’ " Bacon , 991 F.3d at 839–40 (quoting Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) ). "The ability of the neutral and detached magistrate to determine probable cause depends on the accuracy of the information the police submit." United States v. Clark , 935 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2019). " ‘A search warrant is not valid if the police obtain it by deliberately or recklessly presenting false, material information,’ or by omitting material information from the affidavit provided to the issuing judge." Id. (quoting United States v. McMurtrey , 704 F.3d 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2013) ).

"To obtain a Franks hearing, the defendant must make a ‘substantial preliminary showing’ of (1) a material falsity or omission that would alter the probable cause determination, and (2) a deliberate or reckless disregard for the truth." Glover , 755 F.3d at 820 (citing McMurtrey , 704 F.3d at 508 ); see also United States v. Bell , 925 F.3d 362, 372 (7th Cir. 2019) ("[A] defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing when he ‘makes a substantial preliminary showing that the police procured a warrant to search his property with intentional or reckless misrepresentations in the warrant affidavit and such statements were necessary to a finding of probable cause.’ ") (quoting United States v. Kienast , 907 F.3d 522, 531 (7th Cir. 2018) ). " Franks hearings are ‘rarely...