United States v. Woods

46 F.4th 904

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee

v.Jonathan WOODS, Defendant - Appellant

No. 21-3547

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: May 9, 2022

Filed: August 31, 2022

Counsel who represented the appellant was John Wesley Hall of Little Rock, AR.

Counsel who represented the appellee was Kenneth P. Elser, AUSA, of Fort Smith, AR.

Before STRAS, MELLOY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

Former state senator Jonathan Woods appeals the district court's¹ denial of his post-direct-appeal motion for a new trial or sentencing hearing. We affirm.

Woods and others were convicted of several offenses related to bribery and kickback schemes involving state funds. See United States v. Woods, 978 F.3d 554 (8th Cir. 2020) (direct appeal); see also, United States v. Paris, 954 F.3d 1069 (8th Cir. 2019) (co-defendant direct appeal). Some co-conspirators cooperated with investigators, some pleaded guilty, and others, like Woods, went to trial. Evidence at trial established that Woods participated in two separate schemes through which he directed public funds to organizations in exchange for payments to himself and the hiring of specific individuals. Due to the extensive nature of the underlying schemes, the number of resulting criminal cases, and protracted proceedings below to address the destruction of computer data by an FBI agent, the district court in this matter gained particularly in-depth familiarity with the case.

As relevant to the present appeal, one of the underlying conspiracies involved an organization hiring Woods's eventual wife, Christina Mitchell, at Woods's request as part of a kickback for Woods's routing of public funds to the organization. As also relevant to the present appeal, a former Arkansas state senator, Jeremy Hutchinson, purportedly served as counsel to a co-conspirator, Milton "Rusty" Cranford, and to an organization that received funds through the conspiracy. Hutchinson, who was a co-conspirator in the underlying schemes, cooperated with the FBI and later pleaded guilty to several offenses.

Approximately six months after we issued an opinion affirming Woods's convictions and four months after our mandate issued, Woods filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 alleging that newly discovered evidence demonstrated violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The evidence at issue included a letter describing Hutchinson's interactions with investigators and an investigator's notes concerning the organization's hiring of Mitchell. In support of his motion, Woods argued the evidence showed that Hutchinson had vetted Mitchell for the job she received and had found her qualified. As a second point of support, Woods argued that an investigator had interfered with the attorney client privilege between Hutchinson and Cranford by causing Hutchinson to disclose privileged information from Cranford.

The district court determined that evidence concerning the vetting of Christina Mitchell was neither material nor exculpatory. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194 ("We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."). We agree.

"Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." United States v. Ladoucer, 573 F.3d 628, 636 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) ). Here, general evidence of the circumstances surrounding Mitchell's hiring was material in that it demonstrated one aspect of a quid pro quo exchange of public funds for Woods's benefit. The additional fact that a convicted co-conspirator vetted Mitchell and found her qualified for the position is not material because it does little to show the absence of a quid pro quo exchange. Woods's theory of materiality rests on the common-sense assertion that the hiring of an unqualified applicant could give rise to an inference of impropriety. The district court, however, expressly distinguished the present situation involving a qualified applicant and correctly noted that: (1) a witness at trial had...