United States v. Young

1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. CLARK D. YOUNG, Defendant/Movant.

Criminal Action No. 5: 19-033-DCR

Civil Action No. 5: 22-258-DCR

United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Central Division, Lexington

April 3, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Danny C. Reeves, Chief Judge United States District Court Eastern District of Kentucky

Defendant/Movant Clark Young has filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. [Record No. 57] The motion was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Edward B. Atkins for issuance of a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).^[1]Magistrate Judge Atkins issued his report on March 6, 2023, recommending that Young's motion be denied. [Record No. 70]

This Court makes de novo determinations of those portions of a magistrate judge's recommendation to which objections are made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). However, “[i]t does not appear that Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate's factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects to those findings.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S 140, 150 (1985). In this case, the parties did not submit any objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. Notwithstanding that failure, the undersigned has reviewed Young's motion de novo. Following this review, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Atkins' that Young did not establish that his attorneys provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. Accordingly, Young's § 2255 motion will be denied.

I. Background

A federal grand jury indicted Young on one count of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count 1) and one count of possessing with the intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count 2). [Record No. 1] The defendant pleaded guilty to Count 1 and the lesser included offense of Count 2 (i.e., possessing a controlled substance) in May 2019. [Record No. 23]

The United States notified the Court that Young would be eligible for an enhanced statutory punishment pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), after the defendant moved for re-arraignment. [Record No. 20] The government stated in its amended notice that four of Young's prior state convictions rendered the defendant eligible for an ACCA enhancement: one conviction for manslaughter in the second degree, one conviction for assault in the second degree, and two convictions for trafficking in a controlled substance. [Record No. 21, pp. 1-2]

The government noted that Young waived “the right to appeal [his] guilty plea, conviction and sentence” in his plea agreement during the defendant's change-of-plea hearing,. [Record No. 43, p. 8] Young affirmed that he had reviewed his plea agreement with his attorney and was satisfied with his attorney's representation. [Id. at pp. 3-4] The Court the reviewed the relevant statutory penalties and asked Young if he understood that he “would still be bound by [his] plea and will have no right to withdraw it,” even “if the sentence [was] more severe than [he] expected.” [Id. at p. 13] Young indicated that he understood. [Id.]

Young's Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) reported that Count 1 required a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 15 years and that the lesser included offense of Count 2 required a mandatory minimum of 90 days. [Record No. 33, ¶ 62] The PSR recommended enhancing the defendant's sentence under the ACCA because “the defendant ha[d] at least three prior convictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense, or both, which were committed on different occasions.” [Id. at ¶ 30]

Young's court-appointed attorney, Mary Ann Leichty, did not object to the PSR. [Record No. 42, p. 2] In an affidavit provided by the United States in response to the current motion, Leichty explained that she did not object to the statutory enhancement under the ACCA because the defendant's “priors qualified him as an Armed Career Criminal which resulted in his enhanced sentence.” [Record No. 64-2 p. 2] Moreover, she did not file objections to the PSR's recommended guidelines range because, after carefully reviewing the document with the defendant, she “and Mr. Young did not find any errors in the PSR or the calculations.” [Id.]

During Young's sentencing hearing, the Court stated that Young would be sentenced to “230 months on Count 1, and 30 months on Count 2, to run concurrently for a total term of 200 months.” [Record No. 42, p. 10] The Judgment entered by the Court imposed a sentence of 230 months' imprisonment. [Record No. 64-2, p. 3] Leichty stated that she initially thought that the Court imposed a sentence of 200 months' imprisonment at the defendant's sentencing hearing but recognized her misunderstanding upon reading the Judgment filed in the record. [Id., Record No. 28] After Leichty conferred with the attorney for the United States, who also admitted to having misunderstood the Judgment announced at the defendant's sentencing hearing, the parties filed a Joint Motion to Clarify or Correct the Judgment. [Record No. 29] However, Judge Hood denied the motion, explaining that the written Judgment “accurately reflects the Court's intention that Young be sentenced to 230 months imprisonment on Count 1, and 30 months imprisonment on Count 2, to run concurrently, for a total term of 230 months imprisonment.” [Record No. 30]

Young timely appealed his sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. [Record No. 31] Attorney Thomas Rein was appointed to represent Young on appeal. [Record No. 38] Rein appealed Judge Hood's inconsistency in announcing the defendant's sentence and counsel's failure to object to the Court's alleged error. United States v. Young, No. 19-6075, 2020 WL 11567509, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 11, 2020). Notwithstanding this argument, the court dismissed Young's appeal as precluded by the terms of his plea agreement. Id. The United States Supreme Court denied Young's petition for writ of certiorari in October 2021. [Record No. 55] The defendant timely filed the instant § 2255 motion.

Young argues that his attorneys provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. His allegations center on his attorneys' failure to object to the application of a sentence enhancement under the ACCA and Leichty's failure to accurately inform him that he had received a sentence of 230 months' imprisonment. [Record No. 57] Young also alleges that Rein was ineffective for arguing on direct appeal that Leichty provided ineffective assistance.

Magistrate Judge Atkins concluded in his Report and Recommendation that all claims in Young's motion should be denied. [Record No. 70] He explains that Young's contentions that trial and appellate counsel should have objected to the ACCA enhancement fail because the defendant's predicate offenses properly justified application of the enhancement. [Id. at pp. 5-12, 15-16] Additionally, he concludes that trial counsel Leichty was not ineffective for failing to object to the sentencing Court's announcement of Young's sentence because she did not become aware of the inconsistency until she reviewed the Judgment after the defendant's sentencing hearing. [Id. at pp. 12-13] Finally, the Magistrate Judge recommends that Young's appellate attorney Rein did not provide ineffective assistance in arguing that trial counsel was ineffective on appeal, even if such a claim is normally preserved for a petition seeking collateral relief. [Id. at pp. 14-15]

II. Legal Standard

A prisoner has a statutory right to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. To succeed on a § 2255 claim, a prisoner must demonstrate that that his sentence was unlawful, that the court lacked jurisdiction, that the sentence was “in excess of the maximum authorized by law,” or that the sentence is “otherwise subject to collateral attack.” “A motion brought under § 2255 must allege one of three bases as a threshold standard: (1) an error of constitutional magnitude; (2) a sentence imposed outside the statutory limits; or (3) an error of fact or law that was so fundamental as to render the entire proceeding invalid.” Weinberger v. United States, 268 F.3d 346, 351 (6th Cir. 2001).

Here, Young claims that he is entitled to relief because his trial and appellate attorneys' actions violated his right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. VI. A defendant's right to such effective assistance is violated when counsel's performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and he is prejudiced by that performance. Henness v. Bagley, 766 F.3d 550, 554 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). To show prejudice, a movant must establish “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

Under the first prong of Strickland, courts “strongly presume” that counsel “made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment” and “take care to avoid ‘second-guessing'” an attorney's use of discretion. Lundgren v. Mitchell, 440 F.3d 754, 759-60 (6th Cir. 2014); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.

To satisfy the second prong, the movant must demonstrate that counsel's deficient performance would have changed the outcome of the proceeding, considering “the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96. A movant must establish his claim of ineffective assistance by a preponderance of the evidence. Pough v. United States, 442...