United Supreme Council, 33 Degree of Ancient & Accepted Scottish Rite of Freemasonry v. United Supreme Council of Ancient Accepted Scottish Rite for 33 Degree of Freemasonry, Civil No. 1:16-cv-1103

UNITED SUPREME COUNCIL, 33 DEGREE OF THE ANCIENT AND ACCEPTED SCOTTISH RITE OF FREEMASONRY,PRINCE HALL AFFILIATION, SOUTHERN JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE ANCIENT ACCEPTED SCOTTISH RITE FOR THE 33 DEGREE OF FREEMASONRY,SOUTHERN JURISDICTION, PRINCE HALL AFFILIATED, ET AL., Defendants.

Civil No. 1:16-cv-1103

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Alexandria Division

August 15, 2019

Hon. Liam O'Grady

Hon. Ivan D. Davis

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses (Dkt. 355). On January 17, 2019, the Court determined that Defendants are entitled to attorneys' fees and expenses in this matter and ordered Defendants to file documentation supporting their requested award amount. See Dkt. 381. Briefing for the appropriate award is complete, and the issue is now ripe for resolution.¹ For the reasons stated below, and for good cause shown, the Court awards $245,040.40 in attorneys' fees and $13,424.98 in costs, plus interest accruing from the date of this Order.

When shaping an award of attorney's fees, the Court "must first determine a lodestar figure by multiplying the number of reasonable hours expended times a reasonable rate." Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 243 (4^th Cir. 2009). To do this, the Court considers the twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974):

(1) The time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the attorney's opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee for like work; (6) the attorney's expectations at the outset of the litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) the amount in controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community in which the suit arose; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship between attorney and client; and (12) attorneys' fees awards in similar cases.

Id. at 243-44 (quoting Barber v. Kimbrell's Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226 n.28 (4th Cir. 1978)). Although each factor is persuasive, the Court need not consider each factor individually because they all are "subsumed" into an analysis of what constitutes a reasonable rate and number of hours expended. Smith v. Loudoun Cty. Pub. Sch., 2017 WL 176510, at *2 (E.D. Va. Jan. 17, 2017).

A. Lodestar Calculation.

Defendants seek an award of attorneys' fees in two amounts. First, Defendants seek an award of 990.1 hours of work billed at $260 per hour for work performed by their primary attorneys at the Dozier Law Firm PLLC. Second, Defendants seek $13,357.00 in fees for contract attorneys employed to conduct document review at a rate of $46/hour for reviewers and $80/hour for project managers.

1. Reasonable Rate.

The reasonable rates for attorneys' fees are determined based on the "prevailing marketrates in the relevant community factoring in any required skill or experience." Burke v. Mattis, 315 F. Supp. 3d 907, 913 (E.D. Va. 2018). This Court follows the Vienna Metro Matrix as a guide for reasonable rates in Northern Virginia. Id.

All of Defendants' attorneys at the Dozier Law Firm PLLC billed at a rate of $260 per hour. Plaintiffs do not challenge the reasonableness of these rates. Defendants have also provided a persuasive affidavit from a local attorney, Craig Reilly, attesting that the requested rates are reasonable, if not under-compensatory, in this Court's community for attorneys with similar experience performing similar work. The Court also finds that the requested rates are reasonable under the Vienna Metro Matrix and the Johnson factors. In particular, the Court finds that the requested rate is exceptionally reasonable given the subject matter of this case (factors 2 and 3), Defendants' attorneys' inability to work on other matters or take on new clients given the demands and timeline of this case and the firm's late retention and small size (factors 1, 4, and 7), the customary fee for like work (factor 5), the skill and experience of the attorneys (factor 9), and the undesirability of the case among other lawyers in the community (factor 10). Accordingly, the Court will award the $260 hourly rate without reductions for the Dozier Law Firm attorneys.

The Court also finds that the $46/hour and $80/hour rates charged by the contract attorneys conducting document review were reasonable in light of the Johnson factors and Craig Reilly's affidavit.

2. Reasonable Hours.

Defendants seek attorneys' fees for 990.1 hours worked by the Dozier Law Firm. The Court finds that the vast majority of the requested hours are reasonable, but nevertheless finds it appropriate to reduce the requested hours by 10%.

Almost all of the applicable Johnson factors support finding that the requested hours are reasonable. First, Defendants' attorneys spent 1107.08 hours defending a zealously, and at times unreasonably, litigated case in a compressed amount of time and have already voluntarily reduced their requested award by $33,590. Defendants have also not requested fees for work performed by their prior counsel, which has been represented to total approximately $40,000. Second, this case involved novel questions regarding intellectual property claims, an alleged conspiracy, and Masonic law. This case would therefore have been difficult to defend under the best of circumstances and was made even more difficult given the posture of the case when Defendants' attorneys were retained and Plaintiffs' litigation strategies. Third, the attorneys requesting the fees were retained a year after litigation commenced and while Defendants were under the threat of a Rule 37 judgment. As a result, the attorneys were required to essentially drop everything else to get up to speed, review the record and discovery, and provide competent representation. Fourth, the discovery in this case was extensive and, because discovery was eventually reopened, Defendants' lawyers were at times required to simultaneously work on discovery, prepare dispositive motives, and prepare for trial. Finally, Plaintiffs' Complaint sought $8 million in damages and Defendants were granted judgment on all claims because Plaintiffs lacked standing and each of Plaintiffs' claims otherwise lacked merit. Thus, the Johnson factors demonstrate that the requested hours are generally reasonable, particularly in light of the low requested rate and Defendants' degree of success in the litigation.

Nevertheless, Plaintiffs have raised various objections to individual line items of the submitted bills. The Court has reviewed the bills line-by-line and considered those objections. Rather than rule on the appropriateness of each billing entry individually, however, the Court finds it appropriate to address each type of objection raised in turn and determine what reductionto the total awarded hours, if any, is warranted based on those objections.

i. The Inconsistency Between the Requested and Estimated Award.

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs have objected that the requested attorneys' fees are more than twice Defendants' original estimate of their fees. Defendants have already voluntarily reduced their requested award by $33,590. Defendants' attorneys' requested rates are also on the lower end of rates that are considered reasonable in this district for comparable lawyers working comparable cases. Further, although the estimate was substantially lower than the fees ultimately requested due to a misunderstanding of the full nature and extent of recoverable fees, the original estimate still put Plaintiffs on notice that the fee request would be in the six figures. Accordingly, the Court does not find it appropriate to cap Defendants' fees by their erroneous estimate.

ii. Failure to Properly Itemize and Block Billing.

Billing entries must "describe specifically the tasks performed." Page v. Va. State Bd. of Elecs., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180310, at *33-34 (quoting Rum Creek Coal Sales v. Caperton, 31 F. 3d 169, 175 (4th Cir. 1994)). Block billing is the "practice of grouping, or 'lumping,' several tasks together under a single entry, without specifying the amount of time spent on a particular task." Id. (quoting Guidry v. Clare, 442 F. Supp. 2d 282, 294 (E.D. Va. 2006)). It is appropriate to reduce awards for block billing and vague billing entries because in both cases the court cannot "weigh the hours claimed and exclude hours that were not reasonably expended." Id. at *35 (quoting Guidry, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 294) (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court has previously imposed 10% and 20% fee reductions for block billing. Id. at *34.

Defendants' bill contains many entries which lump together multiple phone calls to the same person in the same day without any explanation as to the purpose or duration of each of those calls. Plaintiffs have also identified many entries that contain impermissible block billing,although the Court finds that it can properly evaluate the reasonableness of the hours expended in most of those entries given the inter-relatedness of the block-billed tasks. Finally, the Court is completely unable to evaluate the reasonableness of a handful of entries because their descriptions are redacted.

Accordingly, because the bill contains a significant number of entries that are not properly itemized or are improperly block-billed, but those deficiencies have had a relatively minor impact on the Court's ability to assess the reasonableness of the fees requested, the Court finds a 1% reduction in the total fee award appropriate.

iii. Entries for Tasks that Cannot Be Included in an Award for Attorneys' Fees or Are Duplicative or Excessive.

Plaintiffs have also...