Unitt v. Bennett

LEE P. UNITT v. DANIEL BENNETT, et al.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-11373-RGS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

April 3, 2020

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

STEARNS, D.J.

In this lawsuit, plaintiff Lee Unitt complains of oppressive conditions of confinement during her incarceration at the Massachusetts women's prison, MCI Framingham — namely, oppressive heat, lack of ventilation, and exposure to dangerous airborne particulates, such as asbestos and PCBs, and mold. She alleges that these conditions caused her preexisting serious health problems to significantly worsen. See Am. Compl. (Dkt #32). Unitt brings claims for injunctive relief under the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq.¹ She also bringsEighth Amendment claims of cruel or unusual punishments under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking injunctive and monetary relief.² Over the course of the litigation, several defendants have been dismissed. Now before the court is a motion brought by the remaining seven defendants to dismiss, or in the alternative, for entry of summary judgment. The remaining defendants are the former Secretary of the Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Security and Safety, three former Commissioners of the Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC), and one present and two former Superintendents of MCI Framingham.

DISCUSSION

I. Claims for Injunctive Relief

Since initiating this action, Unitt has been released from DOC custody, thus mooting her prayers for injunctive relief. Unitt makes a familiar argument that her claims fit within the narrow exception to the mootness doctrine made for cases that are "capable of repetition, yet evading review." See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1993), quoting S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). The exception, however, is not applicable here,as there is no "'reasonable expectation' or a 'demonstrated probability' that the same controversy will recur involving the same complaining party." Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 479, 482 (1982), quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (per curiam) (emphasis added).³

II. Statute of Limitations

Treating June 29, 2018, as the filing date for this action, defendants argue that any injuries for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement that pre-date June 29, 2015 are time-barred. Defendants' statute of limitations argument ignores the procedural history of the case. As originally filed, Unitt's Complaint set out various claims regarding allegedly inadequate medical care she received while at MCI-Framingham together with her present complaints regarding environmental conditions at the institution. See Unitt v. Spencer, et al., C.A. No. 17-11468-RGS. On June 28, 2018, the court ordered that the two sets of claims be severed for reasons of improper joinder, but as a matter of fairness, allowed Unitt to file an amended second complaint. Sensitive to the limitations issue, the court further ordered:

As long as a proposed amended complaint is filed by May 22, 2018, for purposes of the statute of limitations and relation back of amendments, the date this action was commenced (August 3,2017) will be considered to be the commencement date of any new case opened as result of severing claims from this action.

Order (Dkt #15), at 27.

III. Official Capacity Claims

Under the Eleventh Amendment, a State, its agencies, and agency officials acting in their official capacities are not "persons" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and therefore are not subject to suit for money damages in the federal courts without the State's consent or the abrogation of State sovereignty by Congress acting under its Fourteenth Amendment powers. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-67 (1989); Lopes v. Commonwealth, 442 Mass. 170, 175 (2004). The Commonwealth has not consented to being sued for money damages in either the federal courts or in its own courts under section 1983, nor has Congress authorized such suits. See Woodbridge v. Worcester State Hosp., 384 Mass. 38, 44-45 (1981). Thus, Unitt's claims for money damages against the remaining defendants in their official capacity must be dismissed.

State officials, however, who are sued in their personal capacity for constitutional violations are "persons" subject to suit for money damages under section 1983. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-26 (1991) (distinguishing personal capacity from official capacity suits). Personal liability must, however, "be based on [the official's] own acts or omissions amounting at theleast to reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of others and not on acts or omissions of others under the doctrine of respondeat superior." Robinson v. Commonwealth, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 6, 12 (1992). Consequently, Unitt's damages claims against the remaining defendants in their personal capacities do not fall within the Eleventh Amendment immunity bar.

IV. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendants next object that Unitt failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The PLRA requires that a prisoner complaining of prison conditions "must now exhaust all available remedies" before filing suit under section 1983, "or any other Federal law." Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1857-1858 (2016). The exhaustion of remedies requirement is mandatory. Id. at 1858 (rejecting a "special circumstances" exception to the exhaustion requirement created by the lower court). Because the PLRA requires "proper," not merely "simple" exhaustion of available remedies, a procedurally defective grievance does not comply with the Act. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-99 (2006) (untimely filing). The exhaustion requirement extends to available administrative appeals as well as primary grievance procedures. Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1023-1024 (7thCir. 2002). See also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, §§ 38E ("An inmate shall not file any claim that may be the subject of a grievance under [Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 127, §] 38E unless the inmate has exhausted the administrative remedy established pursuant to said section 38E."). Finally, the PLRA's exhaustion requirement "applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). See also O'Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1060-1061 (9th Cir. 2007) (claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act).

In moving for summary judgment, defendants argue that the only grievances Unitt filed on the issues raised in her present complaint were untimely. According to the affidavits of the MCI Institutional Grievance Coordinator and her assistant (Dkts #72-5, #72-6), Unitt submitted only one formal grievance, and that was in 2018. The grievance was lengthy and cited systemic institutional deficiencies dating back to 2005. The grievance was initially rejected because Unitt had failed to first submit an informal grievance. She then followed with one, but it was not processed with the explanation that Unitt had failed to file it within five days of becoming aware of the grounds of her grievance. Unitt then grieved the rejection of herinformal grievance, arguing that she had not become aware of all the underlying circumstances until less than five days before her first attempt to grieve the issue. That grievance was denied, and then Superintendent Allison Hallett upheld the denial.

In rebuttal, Unitt argues that her effort to exhaust her administrative remedies should be viewed through the prism of the numerous letters she wrote to successive MCI-Framingham superintendents from 2016 through 2018. Some of the letters written to Superintendent Hallett bear the heading "Re: Exhaustion of my Administrative Remedies." There is no dispute that they were received. See Dkts ##79-1 through 79-4.

All of this is a twisted trail to follow and to an outside viewer there are Kafkaesque aspects to the DOC's grievance process.⁴ This is not, perhapshappily, an issue of law for the court to resolve. Despite the strictures an inmate must abide, and the corners she must square, at the end of the day administrative exhaustion under the PLRA is not a pleading requirement. Rather, failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense for which defendants bear the burden of proof. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007) ("We conclude that failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, and that inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints."). Because there are legitimate issues of fact as to whether Unitt was given a fair opportunity to exhaust her remedies, it is for a finder of fact to make the ultimate determination whether her efforts were sufficient to satisfy the goals of the PLRA, which are to permit legitimate complaints to be resolved locally by prison authorities while protecting the federal courts from frivolous or marginal lawsuits. See Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. at 1859, 1860 (exhaustion is "unavailable" where a purported grievance process is incapable of offering any redress whatsoever, or is so opaque that it "practically speaking" is "incapable of use," or where prison administrators thwart inmates from "taking advantage of a grievance process through machinations, misrepresentation, or intimidation.").

V. Sufficiency of Unitt's Amended Complaint

To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a complaint must include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The plaintiff's obligation in establishing a claim "requires more than labels and conclusions." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,...