Univ. of Ala. v. St. John

376 So.3d 460

YOUNG AMERICANS FOR LIBERTY AT the UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA IN HUNTSVILLE and Joshua Greer

v.Finis ST. JOHN IV, in his official capacity as Chancellor of the University of Alabama System; Charles L. Karr, in his official capacity as Interim President of the University of Alabama in Huntsville; Kristi Motter, in her official capacity as Vice President for Student Affairs at the University of Alabama in Huntsville; Ronnie Hebert, in his official capacity as Dean of Students at the University of Alabama in Huntsville; Will Hall, in his official capacity as Director of Charger Union and Conference Training Center at the University of Alabama in Huntsville; and Juanita Owens, in her official capacity as Associate Director of Conferences and Events at the University of Alabama in Huntsville

1210309

Supreme Court of Alabama.

November 18, 2022

W. Brent Woodall The Woodall Law Firm, Florence; and John J, Bursch, Tyson C. Langhofer, Michael R. Ross, and Mathew W. Hoffmann of Alliance Defending Freedom, Lansdowne, Virginia, for appellants.

Jay M. Ezelle, Cole R. Gresham, and Sybil V. Newton of Starnes Davis Florie LLP, Birmingham, for appellees.

Steve Marshall, att’y gen., and Edmund G. LaCour, Jr., solicitor gen., and James W. Davis and Misty S. Fairbanks Messick, asst. att’ys gen., for amicus curiae State of Alabama, in support of the appellants.

Matthew J. Clark, Alabama Center for Law and Liberty, Birmingham, for amicus curiae Alabama Center for Law and Liberty, in support of the appellants.

Margaret S. Clarke of Eagle Forum of Alabama, Birmingham; and and Daniel S. Flickinger, Birmingham, for amicus curiae Eagle Forum of Alabama, in support of the appellants.

Bryan M. Taylor of Bachus, Brom & Taylor LLC, Birmingham, for amici curiae Alabama State Legislators, in support of the appellants.

John J. Park, Jr., Gainesville, Georgia, for amicus curiae Americans for Prosperity Foundation, in support of the appellants.

Laura E. Clark of Clark Law Group, LLC, Prattville, for amicus curiae Speech First, Inc., in support of the appellants.

BRYAN, Justice.

Joshua Greer, a student at the University of Alabama in Huntsville ("the University"), and Young Americans for Liberty, a student organization at the University ("the plaintiffs"), appeal from a judgment dismissing their action challenging the legality of the University’s policy regulating speech in outdoor areas of the University’s campus ("the policy"). We reverse and remand.

In 2019, the Alabama Legislature passed what the parties refer to as the "Alabama Campus Free Speech Act" ("the Act"), § 16-68-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. The Act provides, in part:

"(a) On or before January 1, 2021, the board of trustees of each public institution of higher education shall adopt a policy on free expression that is consistent with [the Act]. The policy, at a minimum, shall adhere to all of the following provisions:

"(1) That the primary function of the public institution of higher education is the discovery, improvement, transmission, and dissemination of knowledge by means of research, teaching, discussion, and debate, and that; to fulfill that function, the institution will strive to ensure the fullest degree possible of intellectual freedom and free expression.

"(2) That it is not the proper role of the institution to shield individuals from speech protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, including without limitation, ideas and opinions they find unwelcome, disagreeable, or offensive.

"(3) That students, administrators, faculty, and staff are free to take positions on public controversies and to engage in protected expressive activity in outdoor areas of the campus, and to spontaneously and contemporaneously assemble, speak, and distribute literature.

"(4) That the outdoor areas of a campus of a public institution of higher education shall be deemed to be a forum for members of the campus community, and the institution shall not create free speech zones or other designated outdoor areas of the campus in order to limit or prohibit protected expressive activities.

"….

"(7) That the public institution of higher education may maintain and enforce constitutional time, place, and manner restrictions for outdoor areas of campus only when they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant institutional interest and when the restrictions employ clear, published, contentneutral, and viewpoint-neutral criteria, and provide for ample alternative means of expression. All restrictions shall allow for members of the university community to spontaneously and contemporaneously assemble and distribute literature."

§ 16-68-3(a)(1)-(4), (7), Ala. Code 1975 (emphasis added).

In June 2020, in response to the passage of the Act, the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama ("the Board") adopted the policy, which regulates the use of outdoor areas on the University’s campus. See the University’s "Policies and Procedures," No. 03.01.06, "Use of Outdoor Areas of Campus." The policy allows University students and student organizations, among others, to reserve and use outdoor spaces on campus to engage in speech. Whether a reservation is required depends on the nature of the students’ activities and expression. The general rule is that students must make reservations for activities that make use of the outdoor areas of campus. The Act defines "outdoor areas of campus" as "[t]he generally accessible outside areas of the campus of a public institution of higher education where members of the campus community are commonly allowed including, without limitation, grassy areas, walkways, and other similar common areas." § 16-68-2(6), Ala. Code 1975. Under the policy, students seeking to reserve space must apply for a reservation at least three business days before the planned event. However, there are two exceptions to the general rule requiring reservations for the use of outdoor space on campus. No reservation is needed for "casual recreational or social activities," a term that the policy does not define, The policy, ¶ B. Similarly, no reservation is needed for "spontaneous activities of expression, which are generally prompted by news or affairs coming into public knowledge less than forty-eight (48) hours prior to the spontaneous expression." The policy, ¶ F(1)(6). The policy allows such spontaneous speech in certain designated areas without prior approval from the University. The policy then lists 20 designated areas on campus where spontaneous speech is allowed.

In July 2021, the plaintiffs sued the members of the Board and various officials associated with the University; the members of the Board were later dismissed by joint stipulation.¹ The plaintiffs alleged that the policy violates the Act insofar as the policy generally requires reservations for speech, creates the exception for "spontaneous" speech, and creates designated areas on campus for that spontaneous speech. Alternatively, the plaintiffs alleged that the policy violates the right to free speech guaranteed by Article I, §4, of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 (Off. Recomp.), insofar as the policy requires reservations for speech and has the exception for spontaneous speech. The plaintiffs attached the policy to their complaint, which made the policy part of the complaint. See Rule 10(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. ("A copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes"). The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief.

[1, 2] The defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., arguing that the policy does not violate the Act or § 4 of the Alabama Constitution. The defendants also argued that the Act itself is unconstitutional because, they said, it violates Article XIV, § 264, of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 (Off. Recomp.). Section 264 gives the Board "management and control" over the University; the defendants argued that the Act impermissibly infringes oh the Board’s authority under that section. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss without providing an explanation. The plaintiffs filed a post-judgment motion, which the circuit court denied with a lengthy order explaining its rationale for having dismissed the case. The circuit court concluded that the policy does not violate the Act or § 4 of the Alabama Constitution. Given those conclusions, the circuit court declined to decide whether the Act violates § 264 of the Alabama Constitution. The plaintiffs appealed to this Court.

"The appropriate standard of review under Rule 12(b)(6)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] is whether, when the allegations of the complaint are viewed most strongly in the pleader’s favor, it appears that the pleader could prove any set of circumstances that would entitle [the pleader] to relief. In making this determination, this Court does not consider whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only whether [the plaintiff] may possibly prevail. We note that a Rule 12(b)(6) dis-missal is proper only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief."

Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993) (citations omitted).

[3–5] In determining the meaning of a statute, "our inquiry begins with the language of the statute, and if the meaning of the statutory language is plain, our analysis ends there." Ex parte McCormick, 932 So. 2d 124, 132 (Ala. 2005).

"Words used in a statute must be, given their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and where plain language is used a court is bound to interpret that language to mean exactly what it says. If the language of the statute is unambiguous, then there is no room for judicial construction and the clearly expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect."

IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng’g Assocs. Corp., 602 So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala. ...