Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Bd. of Oil

289 P.3d 558

720 Utah Adv. Rep. 55

2012 UT 73

UTAH CHAPTER OF THE SIERRA CLUB, et al., Petitioners,

v. BOARD OF OIL, GAS, AND MINING; and Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining, Respondents.andAlton Coal Development, LLC; and Kane County, Utah, Intervenors and Respondents.

No. 20100969.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Oct. 30, 2012.

Walton Morris, Charlottesville, VA, for Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club, petitioner.

Sharon Buccino, Washington, D.C., for Natural Resources Defense Council, petitioner.

Stephen H.M. Bloch, Salt Lake City, for Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, petitioner.

Mark Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Steven F. Alder, Michael S. Johnson, Fredric J. Donaldson, Emily E. Lewis, Asst. Att'ys Gen., for respondents Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining and Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining.

Denise A. Dragoo, Alan L. Sullivan, James P. Allen, Salt Lake City, Bennett E. Bayer, Lexington, KY, for intervenor and respondent Alton Coal Development, LLC.

Jim R. Scarth, Kent A. Burggraaf, Kanab, for intervenor and respondent Kane County, Utah.

Justice PARRISH, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 Petitioners appeal a decision of the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining (Board). The Board affirmed the approval of Alton Coal Development's (ACD) mining permit, which allowed ACD to conduct surface coal mining operations at the Coal Hollow Mine. Petitioners argue that the Board erred in affirming ACD's mining permit because the permit application was deficient in several respects. We disagree and affirm the Board's decision.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 This appeal concerns ACD's permit application seeking to conduct surface and coal mining operations at the Coal Hollow Mine in Kane County, Utah, on privately-owned, non-federal lands. Petitioners include the Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club, Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, Natural Resources Defense Council, and National Parks Conservation Association (collectively, Petitioners). Petitioners challenge the Board's decision, which affirmed the approval of ACD's mining permit application by the Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining (Division).

¶ 3 In June 2007, ACD submitted a permit application to the Division, seeking to conduct surface mining operations on private land at the Coal Hollow Mine in Kane County, Utah. The permit application was submitted pursuant to the Utah Coal Mining and Reclamation Act (Utah Coal Mining Act or Mining Act). See Utah Code §§ 40–10–1 to 40–10–30. The Division initially denied ACD's application, reasoning that it was incomplete. Later, ACD submitted supplemental information and, in March 2008, the Division determined that ACD's application was administratively complete. The Division then began its technical review of the application. In addition to its technical review, the Division convened an informal conference in June at the Alton City Hall to receive public comment on the mining permit. After receiving public comment, fully reviewing ACD's permit application, and conducting its own technical review, the Division approved ACD's permit application in October 2009.

¶ 4 In November, Petitioners challenged the Division's approval of ACD's permit application by filing a Request for Agency Action and Request for a Hearing with the Board. Petitioners alleged that the Division had failed to follow the necessary regulatory and statutory procedures when it approved ACD's permit application. Specifically, Petitioners urged the Board to vacate the approval of ACD's mining permit, arguing that ACD's permit application contained thirty-two deficiencies that the Division had overlooked.

¶ 5 The Board considered several prehearing motions and allowed the parties to conduct discovery. Petitioners took depositions of the Division and ACD, and ACD and the Division deposed Petitioners' expert witnesses. ACD also gave Petitioners access to the Coal Hollow Mine permit area, where they were allowed to inspect, measure, survey, photograph, test, and sample the permit site. The Board accepted briefing from all parties, including the Petitioners, ACD, Kane County, and the Division. Prior to the hearing, Petitioners narrowed their focus to seventeen arguments. The Board conducted a full evidentiary hearing spanning five days in April and June 2010 where the parties had the opportunity to present exhibits and witnesses and cross-examine opposing witnesses.

¶ 6 After the hearing, the Board took the case under advisement. The Board issued an interim order announcing its decision to affirm the Division's approval of ACD's mining permit. In August 2010, the Board received Petitioners' objections to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. It entered a final order on November 22, 2010. In its final order, the Board denied Petitioners' claims and affirmed the Division's decision to approve ACD's mining permit. The Board's final order contained extensive factual findings and legal conclusions on all seventeen of Petitioners' claims.

¶ 7 Petitioners appealed the Board's decision to this court and sought a stay to prevent commencement of mining operations at the Coal Hollow Mine. We denied the request for a stay. We have jurisdiction under section 78A–3–102(3)(e)(iv) of the Utah Code. Additionally, the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and the Utah Coal Mining Act explicitly grant this court the authority to review decisions of the Board. Utah Code §§ 40–10–14(6)(a), 40–10–30(3), 63G–4–403(1).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8 Under the Utah Coal Mining Act, “[j]udicial review of adjudicative proceedings ... is governed by [the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) ] and provisions of [the Mining Act]....” Utah Code § 40–10–30(1); see also id. § 63G–4–102(1). The Mining Act grants this court explicit authority to set aside the Board's decision if it is found to be:

(a) unreasonable, unjust, arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion;

(b) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;

(c) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations;

(d) not in compliance with procedure required by law;

(e) based upon a clearly erroneous interpretation or application of the law; or (f) as to an adjudicative proceeding, unsupported by substantial evidence on the record.

Id. § 40–10–30(3).

[1] ¶ 9 Under UAPA, we review an agency's general interpretations of law for correctness, “granting little or no deference to the agency's determination.” Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Air Quality Bd., 2009 UT 76, ¶ 13, 226 P.3d 719 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the Mining Act's provisions, general interpretations of law include constitutional questions and rulings concerning the Board's jurisdiction or authority. See Utah Code § 40–10–30(3)(b)–(c); see also Associated Gen. Contractors v. Bd. of Oil, Gas, & Mining, 2001 UT 112, ¶ 18, 38 P.3d 291 (noting that we review an agency's interpretation of general questions of law for correctness and that general questions of law “include constitutional questions, rulings concerning an agency's jurisdiction or authority, interpretations of common law principles, and interpretations of statutes unrelated to the agency”).

¶ 10 The Legislature has given the Board explicit authority and wide latitude in interpreting the operative provisions of the Mining Act. See Utah Code §§ 40–10–6, 40–10–30(3)(e). Therefore, this court may set aside the Board's legal conclusions and interpretations of the Mining Act only if those conclusions are “based upon a clearly erroneous interpretation or application of the law.” Id. § 40–10–30(3)(e); see also Associated Gen. Contractors, 2001 UT 112, ¶ 18, 38 P.3d 291 (noting that we give deference to the Board's conclusions regarding “the agency's interpretation of the operative provisions of the statutory law it is empowered to administer” (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). We have previously noted that because “the [L]egislature has delegated to the Board regulatory authority over ... ‘the reclamation of lands affected by mining operations,’ ” the Board's “expertise and authority place [it] in a better position than the judiciary to interpret terms specific to the mining industry....” Associated Gen., Contractors, 2001 UT 112, ¶ 19, 38 P.3d 291 (quoting Utah Code § 40–8–7(1)(d) (2001)).

[2] [3] ¶ 11 With respect to the Board's factual findings, we give it great deference and will only set them aside where they are “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record.” Utah Code §§ 40–10–30(3)(f), 63G–4–403(4)(g); see also Associated Gen. Contractors, 2001 UT 112, ¶¶ 20–21, 38 P.3d 291. “Under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, substantial evidence is that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion.” Associated Gen. Contractors, 2001 UT 112, ¶ 21, 38 P.3d 291 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]n determining whether a rule is supported by substantial evidence, courts must decide if the relevant findings were reasonable and rational, although such an assessment does not constitute a de novo review or a reweighing of the evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Utah Code § 40–10–30(3) (noting that “[a]n appeal from an order of the board ... is not a trial de novo”). Thus, the Board's decisions “should be upheld if the quantum and quality of evidence the Board relied upon was adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support [the agency's] conclusion.” Associated Gen. Contractors, 2001 UT 112, ¶ 22, 38 P.3d 291 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

[4] [5] ¶ 12 “On appeal from an order of an administrative agency, the appealing party bears the burden of demonstrating that the agency's factual determinations are not supported by substantial evidence and we state the facts and all legitimate inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the agency's findings.” Ivory Homes, Ltd. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2011 UT 54, ¶ 11, 266 P.3d 751 (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). And “the ...