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Utah v. Strie
U.S. Supreme Court June 20, 2016
EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM AN UNLAWFUL DETENTION IS ADMISSIBLE IF A VALID ARREST WARRANT IS SUBSE-
QUENTLY DISCOVERED
Narcocs detecve Douglas Fackrell conducted surveillance on a South Salt Lake City residence based on an
anonymous p about drug acvity. The number of people he observed making brief visits to the house over the
course of a week made him suspicious that the occupants were dealing drugs. Aer observing Strie leave the
residence, Ocer Fackrell detained Strie, requested idencaon, and asked Strie what he was doing at the
house. The police dispatcher informed him that Strie had an outstanding arrest warrant for a trac violaon.
Ocer Fackrell arrested Strie, searched him, and found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Strie moved
to suppress the evidence, arguing it was derived from an unlawful invesgatory stop. The trial court denied the
moon, and the Utah Court of Appeals armed. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, however, and ordered the
evidence suppressed.
The Supreme Court granted cerorari “to resolve disagreement about how the aenuaon doctrine applies where
an unconstuonal detenon leads to the discovery of a valid arrest warrant.” The aenuaon doctrine states
evidence illegally obtained might sll be admissible if the connecon between the evidence and the illegal method
is suciently remote or aenuated to “dissipate the taint.” In this case, ve jusces held that the evidence Ocer
Fackrell seized was admissible based on an applicaon of the aenuaon factors from Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S.
590 (1975). Because there was no agrant police misconduct, the discovery of a valid, pre-exisng, and untainted
arrest warrant aenuated the connecon between the unconstuonal invesgatory stop and the evidence seized
incident to a lawful arrest. The Court therefore reversed the Utah Supreme Court and held the evidence admissible.
Jusces Sotomayor and Ginsburg dissented: “The Court today holds that the discovery of a warrant for an unpaid
parking cket will forgive a police ocer’s violaon of your Fourth Amendment rights. Do not be soothed by the
opinion’s technical language: This case allows the police to stop you on the street, demand your idencaon, and
check it for outstanding trac warrants – even if you are doing nothing wrong. If the ocer discovers a warrant for
a ne you forgot to pay, courts will now excuse his illegal stop and will admit into evidence anything he happens
to nd by searching you aer arresng you on the warrant. Because the Fourth Amendment should prohibit, not
permit, such misconduct, I dissent.”
Jusce Kagan also dissented, arguing that the majority had misapplied the Brown factors, and reasoning that the
Fourth Amendment violaon was not an innocent mistake. “Far from a Barney Fife-type mishap,” Kagan wrote, the
ocer’s stop “was a calculated decision, taken with so lile juscaon that the state has never tried to defend its
legality.” The discovery of an arrest warrant, Kagan said, “was an eminently foreseeable consequence of stopping
Strie.” 40 N Central Ave, Suite 2700, Phoenix, Arizona 85004
P: 602-263-1700 | www.jshfirm.com
1
(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2015
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reade r.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
UTAH v. STRIEFF
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
No. 14–1373. Argued February 22, 2016—Decided Ju ne 20, 2016
Narcotics detective Douglas Fackrell conducted surveillance on a South
Salt Lake City residence based on an anonymous tip about drug ac-
tivity. The number of people he observed making brief visits to the
house over the course of a week made him suspicious that the occu-
pants were dealing drugs. After observing respondent Edward Strieff
leave the residence, Officer Fackrell detained Strieff at a nearby
parking lot, identifying himself and asking Strieff what he was doing
at the house. He then requested Strieff’s identification and relayed
the information to a police dispatcher, who informed him that Strieff
had an outstanding arrest warrant for a traffic violation. Officer
Fackrell arrested Strieff, searched him, and found methamphetamine
and drug paraphernalia. Strieff moved to suppress the evidence, ar-
guing that it was derived from an unlawful investigatory stop. The
trial court denied the motion, and the Utah Court of Appeals af-
firmed. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, however, and ordered the
evidence suppressed.
Held: The evidence Officer Fackrell seized incident to Strieff’s arrest is
admissible based on an application of the attenuation factors from
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590. In this case, there was no flagrant
police misconduct. Therefore, Officer Fackrell’s discovery of a valid,
pre-existing, and untainted arrest warrant attenuated the connection
between the unconstitutional investigatory stop and the evidence
seized incident to a lawful arrest. Pp. 4–10.
(a) As the primary judicial remedy for deterring Fourth Amend-
ment violations, the exclusionary rule encompasses both the “primary
evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure”
and, relevant here, “evidence later discovered and found to be deriva-
tive of an illegality.” Segura v. United States, 468 U. S. 796, 804.
But to ensure that those deterrence benefits are not outweighed by
2 UTAH v. STRIEFF
Syllabus
the rule’s substantial social costs, there are several exceptions to the
rule. One exception is the attenuation doctrine, which provides for
admissibility when the connection between unconstitutional police
conduct and the evidence is sufficiently remote or has been interrupt-
ed by some intervening circumstance. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547
U. S. 586, 593. Pp. 4–5.
(b) As a threshold matter, the attenuation doctrine is not limited to
the defendant’s independent acts. The doctrine therefore applies
here, where the intervening circumstance is the discovery of a valid,
pre-existing, and untainted arrest warrant. Assuming, without de-
ciding, that Officer Fackrell lacked reasonable suspicion to stop
Strieff initially, the discovery of that arrest warrant attenuated the
connection between the unlawful stop and the evidence seized from
Strieff incident to his arrest. Pp. 5–10.
(1) Three factors articulated in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U. S. 590,
lead to this conclusion. The first, “temporal proximity” between the
initially unlawful stop and the search, id., at 603, favors suppressing
the evidence. Officer Fackrell discovered drug contraband on Strieff
only minutes after the illegal stop. In contrast, the second factor,
“the presence of intervening circumstances, id., at 603–604, strongly
favors the State. The existence of a valid warrant, predating the in-
vestigation and entirely unconnected with the stop, favors finding
sufficient attenuation between the unlawful conduct and the discov-
ery of evidence. That warrant authorized Officer Fackrell to arrest
Strieff, and once the arrest was authorized, his search of Strieff inci-
dent to that arrest was undisputedly lawful. The third factor, “the
purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct,” id., at 604, also
strongly favors the State. Officer Fackrell was at most negligent, but
his errors in judgment hardly rise to a purposeful or flagrant viola-
tion of Strieff’s Fourth Amendment rights. After the unlawful stop,
his conduct was lawful, and there is no indication that the stop was
part of any systemic or recurrent police misconduct. Pp. 6–9.
(2) Strieff’s counterarguments are unpersuasive. First, neither
Officer Fackrell’s purpose nor the flagrancy of the violation rises to a
level of misconduct warranting suppression. Officer Fackrell’s pur-
pose was not to conduct a suspicionless fishing expedition but was to
gather information about activity inside a house whose occupants
were legitimately suspected of dealing drugs. Strieff conflates the
standard for an illegal stop with the standard for flagrancy, which
requires more than the mere absence of proper cause. Second, it is
unlikely that the prevalence of outstanding warrants will lead to
dragnet searches by police. Such misconduct would expose police to
civil liability and, in any event, is already accounted for by Brown’s
“purpose and flagrancy” factor. Pp. 9–10.
