A v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist.

STUDENT A, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BERKELEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-02510-JST

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

October 12, 2017

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: ECF No. 46

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). ECF No. 46. The Court will grant the motion in part as to the individual defendants and deny it as to defendant Berkeley Unified School District ("BUSD") and the BUSD Board of Education.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are four elementary, middle, and high school students from BUSD. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 24-27 ("Complaint"). Each of the Plaintiffs - identified in the Complaint as Students A, B, C, and D - has been diagnosed with specific learning disabilities ("SLDs"). Id. Plaintiffs allege these SLDs entitle them to receive services under the Individuals with Disabilities Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.; and California Education Code § 5600 et seq. Id. ¶¶ 24-27. Plaintiffs further allege state and federal laws require California school districts to provide them with a free appropriate public education ("FAPE") in the least restrictive environment. See id. ¶¶ 6-10. They contend BUSD systematically fails to honor these obligations. Id. ¶¶ 10-15.

Plaintiffs bring this putative class action against Defendants BUSD; Superintendent of BUSD Donald Evans; the BUSD Board of Education; and the individual directors of that board. Id. ¶¶ 32-36. They assert claims for (1) violations of IDEA; (2) violations of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq.; (3) violations of Title II of the ADA; (4) violations of California Education Code section 56000 et seq.; and (5) declaratory relief. Id. ¶¶ 165-208. Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint on the basis that Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and have failed to state a claim because claims against public officials in their official capacities are redundant when those claims are also asserted against public entities. ECF No. 46 at 5.

II. JURISDICTION

Plaintiffs contend the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and §§ 1343(a)(3) and (4).

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) tests the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court. See Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). If a plaintiff lacks Article III standing to bring a suit, the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the suit must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1). Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2004). "A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual. In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction." Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). In resolving a facial attack, the court assumes that the allegations are true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). A court addressing a facial attack must confine its inquiry to the allegations in the complaint. See Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., Dist. No. 205, Maricopa Cty., 343 F.3d 1036, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003). Defendants here bring a facial attack to the Court's jurisdiction. ECF No. 38 at 14-15.

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that thepleader is entitled to relief," in order to "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the ground upon which it rests." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. "Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory." Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). The Court must "accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. IDEA Exhaustion

At the core of Defendants' motion is the assertion that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing suit.

"The IDEA is a comprehensive educational scheme, conferring on disabled students a substantive right to public education and providing financial assistance to enable states to meet their educational needs." Hoeft v. Tucscon Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 310 (1988)). Federal funds are dependent on states "implement[ing] policies assuring a 'free appropriate public education,' sometimes referred to as a 'FAPE,' for all children with disabilities." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a). States that participate in the IDEA are required to provide students with disabilities with an IEP in furtherance of its goal of providing students with an appropriate public education. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A), (a)(4).

The IDEA also "provides procedural safeguards to allow parental involvement concerning the child's educational program and allows parents to obtain administrative and judicial review of decisions they deem unsatisfactory or inappropriate." Cayla R. v. Morgan Hill Unified School Dist., No. 5:10-CV-04312 EJD, 2012 WL 1038664, at *3 (N.D. Cal. March 27, 2012) (citingHonig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1988)).

The IDEA also contains an exhaustion requirement that, absent certain exceptions, must be satisfied before a plaintiff files a lawsuit. 20 U.S.C. § 1415. The required pre-litigation steps include a "due process complaint notice," "a meeting with the parents and the relevant member or members of the IEP Team who have specific knowledge of the facts identified in the complaint," and "an impartial due process hearing." Id. The IDEA's exhaustion requirement applies even when the civil action is brought under another law if the suit "'seek[s] relief that is also available' under the IDEA." Cayla R., 2012 WL 1038664, at *3 (quoting Payne, 653 F.3d at 872); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) ("before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under this subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought under this subchapter").

"The exhaustion doctrine embodies the notion that 'agencies, not the courts, ought to have primary responsibility for the programs that Congress has charged them to administer.'" Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1303 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992)). "The IDEA's exhaustion requirement also recognizes the traditionally strong state and local interest in education, as reflected in the statute's emphasis on state and local responsibility." Id. The exhaustion provision is meant "to allow state and local agencies to exercise discretion and education expertise by giving 'agencies the first opportunity to correct shortcomings in their educational programs[.]'" Cayla R., 2012 WL 1038664, at *4 (quoting Payne, 653 F.3d at 875-76)).

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have neither complied with the IDEA's administrative exhaustion requirement to obtain and conclude a due process hearing nor presented an adequate reason to be excused from that requirement. ECF No. 46 at 6. Plaintiffs respond that exhaustion is not a jurisdictional requirement; that because their failure to exhaust does not appear on the face of the complaint, it cannot be addressed until summary judgment; and that Plaintiffs are excused from exhausting their administrative remedies because it would be futile and inadequate to do so. ECF No. 55 at 7.

Defendants are correct that the requirement is not jurisdictional. In Payne v. PeninsulaSchool District, the Ninth Circuit clarified that the IDEA's exhaustion requirement is a claims processing provision that IDEA defendants may offer as an affirmative defense and is not a prerequisite to the exercise of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Payne, 653 F.3d at 867, 870. While Payne indicated that defendants could challenge "claims under the exhaustion provision in an unenumerated motion to dismiss," the Ninth Circuit overruled that part of Payne's holding in Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 2014). In Albino, the Ninth Circuit held, in the context of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), that "[f]ailure to exhaust under the PLRA is 'an affirmative defense the defendant must plead and prove.'" 747 F.3d at 1166. The court held that "[i]n the rare event that a failure to exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint, a defendant may move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Otherwise, defendants must produce evidence proving failure to exhaust in order to carry their burden." Id.; see also Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) ("[Affirmative defenses may not be raised by motion to dismiss, but this is not true when, as here, the defense raises no disputed issues of fact." (citation omitted)).

The Albino court men...