El v. Solomon

ANTHONY MAURICE BONE EL, Plaintiff, v. GEORGE T. SOLOMON, JACK CLELLAND and R. MCNEIL, Defendants.

1:17CV445

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

November 6, 2020

ORDER, MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the Court for a recommended ruling on Defendants George E. Solomon, Jack Clelland, and R. McNeil's motion for summary judgment. (Docket Entry 60.) Plaintiff Anthony Maurice Bone-El filed a brief in opposition to Defendants' motion. (Docket Entry 64; see also Docket Entries 69-71.) Plaintiff also filed a motion to appoint counsel (Docket Entry 67) and a motion to permit additional discovery (Docket Entry 68). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned will deny Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel, grant Plaintiff's motion to permit additional discovery, and recommend that Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff in this action filed a Complaint alleging a violation of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Complaint ("Compl."), Docket Entry 2.) At the time of the alleged incident, Plaintiff was an inmate at Albemarle Correctional Institution ("Albemarle CI"), a facility within the North Carolina Department of Public Safety ("NCDPS").¹ (Id. at 4.)² Plaintiff alleges that he has been denied his constitutional right to practice his faith as a member of the Moorish Science Temple of America ("MSTA"). (Id. at 5-9.) He contends that members of the MSTA are "deem[ed] to be Moslem in the truest sense of both terms and word." (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff asserts that, because he is Moslem, he is required to have a prayer rug, prayer beads, and a kufi to practice his MSTA faith. (Id.) He further contends that the Islam faith (and, therefore, MSTA) requires a prayer rug when prostrate praying three times a day. (Id. at 5-8.) Plaintiff states that Defendants' refusal to give him a prayer rug forces him to "prostrate on a dirty floor." (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff has used someone else's prayer rug but is unsure when the person will want it back. (Id.) As a result of Defendants' actions, Plaintiff claims that his First Amendment right to free exercise of his religion has been violated, and he demands declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. (Id. at 10; see also Am. Compl., Docket Entry 13.)

On August 13, 2020, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff's claim fails because Defendants have not substantially burdened Plaintiff's ability to exercise his religion. (Docket Entry 60.) In support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants submitted the declaration of Chaplain Betty Brown, NCDPS's Director of Chaplaincy Services since 2003. (Betty Brown Declaration, Docket Entry 62-1.) As the Director of Chaplaincy Services, her duties and responsibilities include formulating andproviding professional supervision of chaplaincy services. (Id. ¶ 4.) More specifically, she provides guidance and assistance for the religious programs and services to all the facilities within North Carolina prisons. (Id.)

Ms. Brown avers that NCDPS provides written guidance to NCDPS administrators, chaplains, and other appropriate staff concerning religious practices and religious paraphernalia. (Id. ¶ 5; see also Ex. 1 to Brown Decl., NCDPS Religious Practices Resource Guide and Reference Manual ("Manuel"), Docket Entry 62-2.) The Manuel recognizes the MSTA as an approved religion. (Manual at 5.) The Manuel provides guidance on MSTA's basic beliefs, authorized practices, and approved religious property. (Id. 5-10.) Before policy concerning a religious practice is written or modified, a division of prison chaplaincy services (1) conducts thorough research on proposed faith practices; (2) seeks guidance from other state prison systems; and (3) consults with recognized authorities within the faith group to determine the tenets and requirements of the faith practice, and how best to accommodate those practices without endangering the health and safety of staff or other inmates, without interrupting prison operations, and without squandering monetary or personnel resources. (Brown Decl. ¶ 8.)

Pursuant to the Manual, members of the MSTA faith are approved to receive a Fez head covering, one national flag of Morocco, one flag of the United States, a picture of the Prophet Noble Drew Ali, a nationality identification card, and certain reading material. (Manual at 7.) Members of the MSTA faith are not authorized to receive prayer beads, prayer rugs, or kufis because those items are not required to practice MSTA. (Id.; see also Brown Decl. ¶ 9.) Ms. Brown states that the approved items for MSTA worship are related to the basictenets of that faith's religious beliefs. (Brown Decl. ¶ 10.) Although Plaintiff claims that the MSTA religious group is Moslem (or Muslim) and thus requires a prayer rug and prayer beads (see Compl. at 7), Ms. Brown contends that, based upon generally accepted authority, a Muslim may use a blanket, towel, or any other piece of cloth for prostrate praying. (Brown Decl. ¶ 12.) Thus, it is not a violation of the faith practice of Islam to prostrate pray without a prayer rug or prayer beads. (Id.)

In response to the summary judgment motion, Plaintiff has filed an affidavit contending that members of the MSTA faith "are the same which is Islam" and that both groups are Muslim. (Anthony Maurice Bone-El Affidavit at 1-2, Docket Entry 65.) He further asserts that members of the MSTA faith should be entitled to possess prayer beads, prayer rugs, and kufis, and be permitted to celebrate Ramadan fasting.³ (Id. at 1-3.) Approximately one month after response briefs were due, Plaintiff filed additional briefs and documents in opposition to Defendants' motion. (See Docket Entries 69-71.) He also filed a motion to appoint counsel (Docket Entry 67) and a motion to permit additional discovery (Docket Entry 68).⁴

II. DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate when there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Zahodnickv. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 135 F.3d 911, 913 (4th Cir. 1997). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of coming forward and demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Temkin v. Frederick Cnty. Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party must then affirmatively demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact which requires trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a fact finder to return a verdict for that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cnty., Md., 48 F.3d 810, 817 (4th Cir. 1995). Thus, the moving party can bear his burden either by presenting affirmative evidence or by demonstrating that the non-moving party's evidence is insufficient to establish his claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

When making the summary judgment determination, the Court must view the evidence, and all justifiable inferences from the evidence, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Zahodnick, 135 F.3d at 913; Halperin v. Abacus Tech. Corp., 128 F.3d 191, 196 (4th Cir. 1997). However, the party opposing summary judgment may not rest on mere allegations or denials, and the court need not consider "unsupported assertions" or "self-serving opinions without objective corroboration." Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 962 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49.

1. Substantial Burden

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. "Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from theprotections of the Constitution." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987). Prisoners "clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion." O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has applied the First Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).

To state a free exercise claim under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he held a sincere religious belief, and that the official action or regulation substantially burdened his exercise of that belief.⁵ Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989). The Fourth Circuit has held that "a substantial burden on religious exercise occurs when a state or local government, through act or omission, put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs." Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir.2006) (internal quotations and citations omitted). In contrast, "[n]o substantial burden occurs if the government action merely makes the religious exercise more expensive or difficult, but fails to pressure the adherent to violate his or her religious beliefs or abandon one of the precepts of his religion." Dellinger v. Clarke, 172 F. Supp. 3d 898, 902-03 (W.D.Va. 2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted). A prison policy that substantially burdens an inmate's ability to practice his religion withstands a First Amendment challenge when it is "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 349 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (1987)). "In assessing [whether there is a substantial] burden, courts must not judge the significance of the particular belief or practice in question." Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 187 n.2.

Plaintiff essentially contends that the denial of a prayer rug substantially burdened his...