A.V. v. State

228 N.E.3d 505

A.V., Appellant-Defendant

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff

Court of Appeals Case No. 23A-JV-1765

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Filed February 9, 2024

Appeal from the Hendricks Superior Court, The Honorable Ryan W. Tanselle, Judge, Trial Court Cause No. 32D03-2212-JD-195

Attorney for Appellant: Audrey Lunsford, Lunsford Legal, LLC, Indianapolis, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Kathy Bradley, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

Tavitas, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] A.V., a juvenile, was adjudicated a delinquent for committing battery against a public safety official, a Level 6 felony if committed by an adult, and resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult. On appeal, A.V. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her adjudications. Specifically, A.V. argues that her adjudications must be reversed because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop her. We address A.V.’s arguments despite A.V.’s failure to object to the evidence at trial. We find, however, that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop A.V. and that the evidence is sufficient to sustain her adjudications. Accordingly, we affirm.

Issue

[2] A.V. raises one issue, which we restate as whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support A.V.’s adjudications when, according to A.V., the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop her.

Facts

[3] In the early morning hours of Wednesday, December 21, 2022, Danville Police Department Officer Kennedy Molina was pursuing a vehicle that had committed several traffic infractions. The vehicle drove into a ditch, and the two young male occupants fled on foot into a nearby neighborhood in Avon. Officer Molina pursued the individuals on foot, and law enforcement set up a perimeter. Law enforcement eventually located the passenger of the vehicle, and after speaking with him, law enforcement believed that someone was driving to the neighborhood to pick up the other suspect, who was last seen near Quillen Court.

[4] Avon Police Department Lieutenant Thomas Owens and other officers contin- ued to search for the suspect. After approximately one hour, Lieutenant Owens turned onto Quillen Court, and he noticed a vehicle’s brake lights switch from on to off. It was twenty-five degrees outside, and every other vehicle had frost on the windows except for this vehicle. This information led Lieutenant Owens to believe the vehicle had been driven recently. Additionally, the vehicle’s license plate was not registered to anyone residing in the neighborhood, and the vehicle was parked at an angle by the curb, as if it had "just [] pulled in." Tr. Vol. p. 15.

[5] At this point, Lieutenant Owens believed the vehicle was there to pick up the suspect, and he approached the vehicle. He noticed that the driver, A.V., appeared to be a fifteen- or sixteen-year-old girl. The following exchange then took place:

Lt. Owens: So where’s he at?

A.V.: I don’t know.

Lt. Owens: Where did he tell you to pick him up at?

A.V.: He didn’t tell me to pick him up.

Lt. Owens: What did he tell you to do?

A.V.: He didn’t tell me to do anything.

Lt. Owens: Then why are you here?

A.V.: Because I’m sitting here.

Lt. Owens: How old are you?

A.V.: Does that matter?

Lt. Owens: Yes, it does.

State’s Ex. 1 at 1:06-1:29. A.V. refused to provide her age.

[6] Lieutenant Owens then instructed A.V. to step outside the vehicle several times, but a defiant A.V. refused. The doors were locked, so Lieutenant Owens reached inside the vehicle to unlock the door. He tried to pull A.V. out by the wrist, but A.V. "pulled back in to try and get away." Tr. Vol. p. 16. Lieutenant Owens eventually pulled A.V. from the vehicle, while A.V. flailed, screamed, and cursed at the officers. A.V. kicked Lieutenant Owens in the shoulder, arm, and back as he attempted to place her in handcuffs. A.V. screamed that the handcuffs hurt, and Lieutenant Owens loosened them.

[7] After loosening the handcuffs, Lieutenant Owens instructed A.V. to sit down, but A.V. refused. Lieutenant Owens then pulled A.V. to the ground and again asked A.V. her age, which A.V. would not provide. Officers eventually located the suspect hiding in the back of A.V.’s vehicle.

[8] The State filed a delinquency petition, which alleged that A.V. committed battery against a public safety official, a Level 6 felony if committed by an adult, and resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor if committed by an adult. The juvenile court held a fact-finding hearing on May 1, 2023.

[9] Prior to the fact-finding hearing, A.V. did not file a motion to suppress any evidence that was obtained as a result of her exchange with the police. During the bench trial, Officer Molina and Lieutenant Owens testified to the facts stated above. The State also admitted into evidence Lieutenant Owens’s body camera footage from the incident, which corroborated his testimony. A.V. made no objection to any of this evidence based on the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Instead, A.V. argued in her closing argument that Lieutenant Owens lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. After taking the matter under advisement, the juvenile court, on May 26, 2023, issued its order finding that A.V. was a delinquent child for committing the charged offenses. The juvenile court ordered that A.V. serve six months on probation with the possibility of an early release after five months. A.V. now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Failure to Object at Trial

[1] [10] A.V. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her adjudications. Although A.V. characterizes the issue here as whether the State presented "sufficient evidence" to support her adjudications, Appellant’s Br. p. 8, in reality, A.V. is challenging the traffic stop and her arrest on Fourth Amendment grounds.¹ She argues that Lieutenant Owens lacked reasonable suspicion to stop her. She also argues that, because Lieutenant Owens lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause, he was "not acting lawfully," and she was, therefore, permitted to use reasonable force to resist the arrest.² Id. at 14.

[11] Prior to trial, A.V. did not move to suppress the evidence, nor did she object at trial to the admission of any of the evidence based on the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. She did not argue that Lieutenant Owens lacked reasonable suspicion until her closing argument.

[2–4] [12] It is well-settled that the primary remedy for Fourth Amendment violations is the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of those rights. Shotts v. State, 925 N.E.2d 719, 723 (Ind. 2010). The defendant, however, must lodge a "contemporaneous objection at the time the evidence is introduced at trial." Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010). Such an objection is required regardless of whether the defendant has filed a pretrial motion to suppress. Id. The failure to object to the evidence waives any challenge to the admission of the evidence on appeal. Id.; see also Ind. Evid. R. 103(a) (noting that a party may claim error in a ruling to admit evidence only if, among other things, the party timely objects or moves to strike). Here, A.V. neither moved to suppress the evidence before trial nor objected to the admission of the evidence at trial as an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

[5–7] [13] Even when the appellant fails to properly object at trial, certain issues may be preserved for appeal under the fundamental error doctrine. Brown, 929 N.E.2d at 207. Fundamental error "occurs only when the error ‘makes a fair trial impossible or constitutes clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.’ " Strack v. State, 186 N.E.3d 99, 103 (Ind. 2022) (quoting Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 126, 131 (Ind. 2009)). It is an "extremely narrow doctrine." Isom v. State, 170 N.E.3d 623, 651 (Ind. 2021). A.V. on appeal, however, does not argue that the admission of the evidence constitutes fundamental error. Bradfield v. State, 192 N.E.3d 933, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing App. R. 46(A)(8)(a)).

[14] We recognize, however, that, in Gaddie v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2014), our Supreme Court addressed a Fourth Amendment challenge in the context of a sufficiency of the evidence argument involving a conviction for resisting law enforcement by fleeing. See also M.J. v. State, 19 N.E.3d 796, 798 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (relying upon Gaddie and addressing a Fourth Amendment challenge in the context of a sufficiency of the evidence argument for a resisting law enforcement by fleeing conviction), trans. denied; Briggs v. State, 873 N.E.2d 129, 132 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (addressing a Fourth Amendment challenge in the context of a sufficiency of the evidence argument for a resisting law enforcement by resisting conviction), trans. denied. In Gaddie, M.J., and Briggs, the Courts did not mention whether the defendant objected at trial to the evidence or raised the Fourth Amendment issue at trial. Accordingly, notwithstanding A.V.’s failure to object at trial, we will address A.V.’s arguments. Generally, however, a defendant must object during the tidal to the admission of the evidence to preserve the issue on appeal. Brown, 929 N.E.2d at 207.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[8, 9] [15] In sufficiency of the evidence arguments, we apply a "deferential standard of review," and we will "neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility." Carmack v. State, 200 N.E.3d 452, 459 (Ind. 2023). We examine "all the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict," and we "will affirm the [adjudication] if probative evidence supports each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.

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