Valenta v. BI Inc.

JEFFREY JOHN VALENTA, Plaintiff, v. BI INCORPORATED, PRETRIAL/PROBATION SERVICE, Western District of Pennsylvania and its agents, ERIC LAWSON, CHALENE SCOTT, TARA, Supervisor - Last Name Unknown, and VERN, Last Name Unknown, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 20-912

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

April 1, 2021

Cathy Bissoon, District Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RE: ECF NOS. 16 AND 22

MAUREEN P. KELLY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Jeffrey John Valenta (“Plaintiff”) filed this pro se action arising out of allegations that he was injured by a defective GPS ankle monitor. Presently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant BI Incorporated (“BI”), ECF No. 16, and a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Pretrial/Probation Service, Eric Lawson (“Lawson”), Chalene Scott (“Scott”), Tara Kessler (“Kessler”) and Verne Howard (“Howard”) (collectively, the “Probation Defendants”), ECF No. 22.^[1] For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the Motions to Dismiss be granted.

II. REPORT

A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Plaintiff's Complaint

Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Motion”), accompanied by a proposed complaint, on June 19, 2020. ECF No. 1. After Plaintiff cured certain deficiencies, the Court granted Plaintiff's IFP Motion on August 4, 2020, and his Complaint was filed on the same day. ECF Nos. 2-6.

a. Factual allegations

In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims against United States Probation Officers Lawson, Scott, Kessler and Howard (collectively, the “Probation Officers”), the Pretrial/Probation Service, and BI. ECF No. 6.

Following arraignment on federal criminal charges, Plaintiff alleges that he was granted release on bond with conditions of pretrial release, including electronic monitoring. Id. ¶ 10. Between August 10, 2015 and September 14, 2017, Plaintiff was equipped with a position monitoring device on his right ankle without any issue. Id. ¶ 11. At some point prior to September 15, 2017, the initial monitoring device was replaced with a GPS device manufactured by BI that was placed on Plaintiff's ankle (the “Ankle Monitor”). Id. ¶ 12.

On September 15, 2017, Plaintiff suffered a “serious fall” in his home when the strap of the Ankle Monitor got caught on the top step of the stairs. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff fell over ten feet down the stairs. Id. ¶ 14. He suffered injuries that required hospital emergency room care, including a concussion, rib contusions, leg and foot bruising and severe pain. Id. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Howard was present and saw his injuries, but he offered no assistance and left

Plaintiff to drive himself to the emergency room. Id. Plaintiff also asserts that BI should have provided a mechanism to prevent slack in the GPS device to prevent injuries from falls. Id. ¶ 16.

At some time between September 15, 2017 and June 25, 2018, at the direction of Probation Officers Lawson, Scott, Kessler and Howard, Plaintiff's Ankle Monitor was replaced with another GPS monitoring device manufactured by BI (the “Second Monitor”). Id. ¶ 17. The Second Monitor utilized a non-removable internal battery, which could only be recharged while attached to Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 18. Plaintiff claims that he was required, at times, to charge his device in public, and that he suffered fear, embarrassment, ridicule, and concern that he would be electrically shocked. Id.

Prior to Plaintiff's June 25, 2018 sentencing on the federal criminal charges, Plaintiff reported to the Probation Officers that the Second Monitor was causing him pain and discomfort from the heat that it generated while charging. Id. ¶ 19. He claims that the Second Monitor reached temperatures of over 130 degrees, and it sent inaccurate alerts to the Probation Officers, which caused them to call, question and admonish Plaintiff, resulting in disturbances, anxiety, and stress. Id. ¶ 20. In addition, the Second Monitor malfunctioned during a pretrial release violation hearing and his sentencing hearing. Id. ¶ 21.

Plaintiff's sentencing hearing took place on June 25, 2018. Id. ¶ 22. During the hearing, Plaintiff reported to his counsel that he was suffering pain and discomfort as a result of his ankle monitor. Id. Because of this pain, Plaintiff claims that he was too distracted to fully participate in his sentencing, in violation of his constitutional rights. Id. ¶ 23.

After his sentencing hearing, the Second Monitor was removed. Id. ¶ 24. Plaintiff observed “a red, blistered and weeping silver dollar sized burn” on his ankle where the Second Monitor came into contact with his skin. Id. Plaintiff claims that the Probation Officers did not properly assist him in addressing this burn, and that he suffered further irritation of the burn as a result of the shackles that the United States Marshal Service placed on him during his hour-and-a-half ride to the CCA Youngstown detention facility, where his burn was eventually treated. Id. ¶ 25.^[2]

Plaintiff claims that he continues to experience sensitivity on his right ankle, and he experiences discomfort from wearing hosiery or footwear. Id. ¶ 26. Plaintiff also claims that he is unable to practice his profession as a wedding photographer to the extent that he did before the burn. Id. ¶ 27.

b. Plaintiff's claims

Plaintiff asserts two claims, which the Court refers to as Counts I and II for ease of reference.

i. “Bivens” claim (Count I)

Plaintiff asserts his first claim (Count I) against the Probation Defendants, which he has styled as a “Bivens claim.” Id. ¶¶ 28-33. Plaintiff claims that the Probation Defendants “owed a duty of ordinary care” to Plaintiff by virtue of 18 U.S.C. § 3154^[3] and the court order requiring Plaintiff's supervision by Pretrial/Probation during his pretrial release on electronic monitoring. Id. ¶ 29. He asserts that the Probation Defendants failed to exercise ordinary care because a reasonable person would have adjusted or removed the GPS ankle monitor that was causing him pain, suffering and anxiety. Id. ¶ 30. As a result of their negligence, Plaintiff claims that he suffered permanent injuries, including ankle pain and sensitivity, phantom vibrations, anxiety, loss of economic opportunity and financial harm, and depression. Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiff also claims that the United States is liable for the acts of its employees pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act. Id. ¶ 33.

ii. Strict Liability (Count II)

Plaintiff asserts a products liability claim in Count II against BI. He claims that BI is liable for manufacturing and selling the ankle monitor in a defective and unreasonably dangerous condition that caused him harm. Id. ¶¶ 34-57.

2. Motions to Dismiss

Defendant BI filed its Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support on November 30, 2020. ECF Nos. 16 and 17. Plaintiff filed his Response on December 29, 2020. ECF No. 25.

The Probation Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support on December 22, 2020. ECF Nos. 22 and 23. Plaintiff filed his Response on February 26, 2021. ECF No. 38. The Probation Defendants filed a Reply on March 10, 2021. ECF No. 39.

The Motions to Dismiss are now ripe for consideration.

B. LEGAL STANDARD

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

In assessing the sufficiency of a complaint pursuant to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint and all reasonable factual inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). The Court, however, need not accept bald assertions or inferences drawn by the plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. See Cal. Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that a complaint is properly dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) where it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, ” Id. at 570, or where the factual content does not allow the court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that, under Twombly, “labels, conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” do not suffice but, rather, the complaint “must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct” and that are sufficient “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s] of his claim”).

2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), “a court must grant a motion to dismiss if it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a claim.” In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(1) motions can raise either a facial or factual challenge to the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016). A facial attack challenges the sufficiency of the pleadings, whereas a factual attack challenges the sufficiency of jurisdictional facts. Lincoln...