Valenzuela v. My Way Holdings, LLC

541 P.3d 191

Johnny Raul VALENZUELA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. MY WAY HOLDINGS, LLC, a Nevada Limited Company dba Sunland Park Racetrack and Casino, Rick Baugh, Johnny P. Luna, Martin Bustillos, Defendants-Appellants,andViolet Smith, in her individual capacity, The New Mexico Racing Commission; and Ismael Trejo, Executive Director of the New Mexico Racing Commission, in his official capacity, Defendants.

No. A-1-CA-40013

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Filing Date: November 20, 2023

Daniel A. Marquez, El Paso, TX, Gene N. Chavez, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee

Jennings Haug, Keleher Mcleod LLP, Thomas C. Bird, Deron B. Knoner, Ryan M. Walters, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellants

OPINION

MEDINA, Judge.

{1} In this case we interpret the scope of the jurisdiction granted to this Court by New Mexico's statute prohibiting strategic litigation against public participation (Anti-SLAPP statute) expedited appeal provision, NMSA 1978, § 38-2-9.1(C) (2001), as well as considering the statute's application under the circumstances. Appellants My Way Holdings, LLC, Rick Baugh, Johnny P. Luna, and Martin Bustillos appeal the district court's denial of their motion to dismiss Appellee Johnny Raul Valenzuela's complaint via special motion under the Anti-SLAPP statute, or in the alternative under Rule 1-012(B)(6) NMRA for failure to state a claim. In our calendar notice, this Court directed the parties to brief "whether the right to an expedited appeal described in ... Section 38-2-9.1(C) ... is applicable to the district court's denial of [Appellants’] request for dismissal pursuant to Rule 1-012(B)(6)."

{2} We first hold that the expedited appeal under Section 38-2-9.1(C) applies only to the special motion raising speech-based affirmative defenses under the Anti-SLAPP statute and the Noerr - Pennington doctrine. Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to consider Appellants’ alternative Rule 1-012(B)(6) arguments on expedited appeal. We next affirm the district court's denial of Appellants’ special motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

{3} We draw the following facts from Appellee's allegations set forth in the complaint. In 2017, Appellee was licensed by the New Mexico Racing Commission (NMRC) as a racehorse jockey. On January 15, 2017, Appellee was scheduled to jockey a racehorse at Sunland Park Racetrack. Prior to the race, Appellants conducted a compliance inspection and spot check of jockeys inside the changing room and in the hallway near the changing room. Appellants Luna and Bustillos, Sunland Park security personnel, claimed to have observed a prohibited electrical device in the hallway trash can after witnessing Appellee move towards it during the inspection, wrote reports about the incident, and provided the reports to the NMRC.¹ Before the NMRC board of stewards began disciplinary proceedings against Plaintiff for violations of the New Mexico Horse Racing Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 60-1A-1 to -30 (2007, amended through 2023), Appellants banned Appellee from the Sunland Park Racetrack. See 15.2.1.7(S)(11) NMAC (providing that the stewards are racing officials "with powers and duties specified by" statute and the regulations); 15.2.1.9(B) NMAC (subjecting licensees to disciplinary proceedings conducted by the stewards).

{4} The board of stewards summarily suspended Appellee from using his NMRC license and entering any property under the jurisdiction of the NMRC, including Sunland Park Racetrack. See 15.2.1.9(B)(3)(a) NMAC (authorizing the board of stewards to summarily suspend a person pending a hearing). The board of stewards held a disciplinary hearing at which Appellants Luna and Bustillos both testified about their discovery of a prohibited electrical device at the Sunland Park Racetrack on January 15, 2017. Following the hearing, the board of stewards suspended Appellee's NMRC license for five years and imposed a $5,000 fine.

{5} Appellee appealed the board of stewards’ decision to an administrative hearing officer under the NMRC, and an evidentiary hearing was held on January 30, 2018. See 15.2.1.9(B)(9)(a) NMAC (stating that a "person who has been aggrieved by a ruling of the stewards may appeal to the [NMRC]"). Appellants Luna, Bustillos, and Defendant Violet Smith, a member of the Sunland Park Racetrack board of stewards, testified at the evidentiary hearing. The hearing officer reversed the board of stewards’ decision and dismissed the disciplinary action. The hearing officer cited to a lack of physical evidence purported to be in Appellee's possession as well as inconsistent testimony from Appellants Luna, Bustillos, and Defendant Smith and found that the NMRC board of stewards failed to meet its burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Appellee possessed a prohibited electrical device.

{6} Appellee sued Appellants for negligent misrepresentation, fraud, negligence, civil conspiracy, tortious interference with contract, prima facie tort, spoliation, and malicious abuse of process. Appellee also alleged that despite the dismissal of the disciplinary action, Appellants continued to ban Appellee from the Sunland Park property. Appellants filed a motion to dismiss all of Appellee's claims via special motion under the Anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that their participation and testimony at Appellee's disciplinary hearings was protected speech under two different theories of immunity—absolute immunity for testimony and qualified immunity for reporting—and under the Noerr - Pennington doctrine because Appellants exercised their right to petition a government agency. Appellants also argued in the alternative that Appellee's complaint generally failed to state a claim under Rule 1-012(B)(6) because Appellee could not prevail under any state of facts provable under the claim, or the claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

{7} The district court denied Appellants’ motion, ruling that "the ... Anti-SLAPP statute and the Noerr - Pennington doctrine [did] not apply" because Appellants’ "alleged conduct, if true, [was] not conduct the Legislature intended the Anti-SLAPP statute to protect." Further, the district court stated if the allegations against Appellants "are found to be true, ... [Appellants’] conduct would be considered to be a sham under the Noerr -Pennington test and the protections under the doctrine would also be waived." The district court also denied Appellants’ alternative Rule 1-012(B)(6) motion, ruling that Appellee sufficiently pleaded causes of action such that he may be entitled to recover from Appellants. Appellants appealed the district court's order that "the ... Anti-SLAPP statute and the Noerr - Pennington doctrine [did] not apply" and the denial of Appellants’ Rule 1-012(B)(6) motion, under the Anti-SLAPP statute's expedited appeal provision. See § 38-2-9.1(C) (authorizing an expedited appeal from an order ruling on a special motion under the statute); Cordova v. Cline , 2017-NMSC-020, ¶ 17, 396 P.3d 159 (concluding "that the Anti-SLAPP statute provides a right to an interlocutory appeal under the expedited appeal provision").

DISCUSSION

{8} We begin our analysis with our review of Section 38-2-9.1(C), which provides for an expedited appeal. We hold that the Section 38-2-9.1(C) expedited appeal applies to the affirmative, speech-based defenses raised in a special motion under the Anti-SLAPP statute and not to all possible defenses raised by a defendant. After determining the scope of our review on appeal, we then turn to the merits of Appellants’ special motion to dismiss. Under the facts of this case, we first hold that the Anti-SLAPP statute applies to Appellants’ conduct at issue. We then determine whether Appellants’ speech-based defenses bar Appellee's claims. Concluding that that they do not, we affirm the district court's denial of Appellants’ special motion to dismiss. Although this is a close case under the heightened pleading standard, we hold that Appellee pleaded sufficient factual and legal information to prevent dismissal under the Anti-SLAPP statute.

I. Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Anti-SLAPP Statute's Expedited Appeal Provision

{9} We begin by addressing whether the expedited appeal provision in Section 38-2-9.1(C) extends to the defenses Appellants alternatively raised under Rule 1-012(B)(6). We do so because "[t]he question of jurisdiction is a controlling consideration that must be resolved before [proceeding] further." State v. ex rel Bevacqua-Young v. Steele , 2017-NMCA-081, ¶ 6, 406 P.3d 547 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Whether a court has jurisdiction to hear a particular matter is a question of law that we review de novo." Gzaskow v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd. , 2017-NMCA-064, ¶ 22, 403 P.3d 694 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Our analysis also requires interpretation of Section 38-2-9.1, which we review de novo. See Baker v. Hedstrom , 2013-NMSC-043, ¶ 10, 309 P.3d 1047.

{10} Appellee argues that Appellants’ Rule 1-012(B)(6) defenses are not properly brought before this Court under the expedited appeal provision of Section 38-1-9.1(C) because a moving party is entitled to the procedural protections of the Anti-SLAPP statute only if they demonstrate they are the target of a SLAPP suit by special motion. The expedited appeal considers only that question. Appellants respond in part that the plain language of Section 38-1-9.1 does not create a "specific limitation on the type, nature, or number of defenses that a defendant may assert" under the Anti-SLAPP statute and permits various forms motions. Instead, Appellants suggest that "flexible consideration of any arguments properly raised by [A]ppellant[s]" is warranted based on persuasive federal authority. Because we limit our analysis to the language of Section 38-1-9.1 and the intent of our Anti-SLAPP statute, we do not address Appellants’ policy arguments based on federal authority.

{11} After review of the Anti-SLAPP statute, our own case law, the principles of finality, and other...