Valerio v. Total Taxi Repair & Body Shop, LLC

82 F.Supp.3d 723

Jose Valerio, Anibal Torres, Jr., Johnathan Collazo, and Ulises Garcia, Plaintiffs

v.Total Taxi Repair & Body Shop, LLC, Dispatch Taxi Management LLC, Dispatch Taxi Affiliation, Inc., GFST, Inc., Savas Tsitiridis, and Evgeny Freidman, individually, Defendants.

No. 12 C 9985

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed March 3, 2015

Karen I. Engelhardt, Ryan Matthew Thoma, Sara Stewart Schumann, Allison, Slutsky & Kennedy, P.C., Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs.

Jeffrey H. Bunn, Latimer Levay Fyock, George J. Spathis, Megan Mae Mathias, Stavros S. Giannoulias, Horwood Marcus & Berk Chartered, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Chief Judge Ruben Castillo, United States District Court

Plaintiffs Ulises Garcia, Jose Valerio. Anibal Torres, Jr., and Johnathan Collazo (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) brought this action against Defendants Total Taxi Repair & Body Shop, LLC (“Total Taxi”), Dispatch Taxi Affiliation. Inc. (“Dispatch Taxi”). Dispatch Taxi Management, LLC (“Dispatch Management”). Savas Tsitiridis, and Evgeny Freidman (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 215 et. seq., the Illinois Minimum Wage Law (“IMWL”), 820 Ill. Comp, Stat. 105/2 et seq. , and the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (“IWPCA”) 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 115/1 et seq. (R. 1, Compl.) Garcia, Valerio, and Torres accepted Offers of Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. (See R. 63, Garcia's Acceptance of Defs.' Offer of J.; R. 64. Valerio's Acceptance of Defs.' Offer of J.; R. 65, Torres's Acceptance of Defs.' Offer of J.) After a three-day bench trial, the Court returned a verdict in favor of Collazo as to his claims under the FLSA, IMWL, and IWPCA. (R. 77.Min.Entry.) Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Filed this lawsuit against Defendants on December 14, 2012. (R. I, Compl.) At all times material to this dispute. Plaintiffs were employed by Defendants to perform garage work, which included servicing and maintaining taxi cabs, servicing and installing meter equipment, and dispatching and scheduling employees.

(Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants violated the IWPCA by failing to pay Plaintiffs the statutory minimum wages. (Id. at ¶ 27.) In addition. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants violated the FLSA and IMWL by failing to compensate Plaintiffs at a rate of one and one-half times their regular hourly rate of pay for all time worked in excess of forty hours in individual work weeks. (Id. ¶ 16, 22.) Plaintiffs. (Id. ¶ 19.)

On March 10, 2014, Plaintiffs Garcia, Valerio, and Torres accepted Defendants' Offers of Judgment. (R. 63, Garcia's Acceptance of Defs.' Offer of J.; R. 64, Valerio's Acceptance of Defs.' Offer of J.; R. 65, Torres's Acceptance of Defs.' Offer of J.) Plaintiffs recovered the following amounts: Garcia recovered $10,603.65 ($7,312.86 in backpay, and $3,290.79 in attorneys' fees): Valerio recovered $9,860.00 ($6,800.00 in backpay, and $3,060.00 in attorneys' fees); and Torres recovered $9,675.27 ($6,672.60 in backpay, and $3,002.67 in attorneys' fees). Each offer of judgment stated that the awarded amount “represents the total amount that Defendants shall be obligated to pay to Plaintiff (including costs and attorneys' fees that Plaintiff may have incurred to the date of this offer).” (R. 63–1. Garcia's Offer of J. at 1; R. 64–1, Valerio's Offer of J. at 1:R. 65–1. Torres's Offer of J. at 1.)

On March 25, 2014, following a three-day bench trial, the Court found for Collazo on all his claims, and entered a total judgment of $13,200. (R. 77.Min.Entry.) The Court awarded this amount based on its finding that Defendants' violations were willful, intentional, and committed with reckless disregard for the law. (Id. ) The judgment was entered jointly and severally against each Defendant. (Id. )

After several attempts to secure Plaintiffs' awards from Defendants. Plaintiffs' counsel prepared Citation Notices to Defendants' financial institutions. BMO Harris Bank. N.A. and Citibank. (R. 79. Citation to Discover Assets; R. 109–3, Ex. C, Engelhardt Decl. at 5–6.) The Court issued these citations on behalf of Valerio, Torres, and Garcia on April 1, 2014, (R. 79, Citation to Discover Assets; R. 109–3, Ex. C, Engelhardt Decl. at 5–6), and on behalf of Collazo on April 21, 2014, (R. 93. Citation to Discover Assets: R. 109–3, Ex. C, Engelhardt Decl. at 6). Citibank and BMO Harris Bank. N.A. answered the citations on April 7 and May 5, 2014. respectively. (R, 84, Citibank's Answer; R. 96, Harris Bank's Answer.) The parties filed Satisfactions of Judgment for Valerio, Garcia, and Torres's Offers of Judgment on April 17.2014. (R. 87. Valerio's Satisfaction of J; R. 88. Torres's Satisfaction of J; R. 89. Garcia's Satisfaction of J.), and for Collazo on May 1, 2014. (R. 95. Collazo's Satisfaction of J.).

On September 16, 2014, Valerio, Torres. Garcia, and Collazo jointly filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs. (R. 109, Mot, Atty'ys' Fees at 1), and supporting memorandum. (R. 110, Pls.' Mem.). Plaintiffs seek attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $157,495.00. and $3,452.36 respectively.¹ (Id. ) On October 23, 2014, Defendants filed a response to Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and costs. (R. 117, Def.'s Resp.) Plaintiffs replied on November 6.2014. (R. 118. Pls.' Reply.)

LEGAL STANDARD

The FLSA provides that, in addition to any judgment awarded, plaintiffs may recover reasonable attorneys' fees. 29 USC § 216(b) ; see also Batt v. Micro Warehouse, Inc., 241 F.3d 891, 893 (7th Cir.2001). The IMWL also provides for attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/12(a).

To calculate an appropriate fee award, courts start with the “lodestar” amount, determined by “multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” Small v. Richard Wolf Med. Instruments Corp., 264 F.3d 702, 707 (7th Cir.2001) ; see also Hensl e y v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). Under this approach, the party seeking fees bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of the hours worked and rates claimed. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). A good faith effort must be made to exclude excessive, redundant, or unnecessary hours. Id. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933. The Court, for its part, must exclude hours it deems inadequately documented or not reasonably expended on the litigation. Id. at 433–34, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ; Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 175 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir.1999).

Once the lodestar amount has been determined, the Court may adjust the award based on a number of factors, including “the complexity of the legal issues involved, the degree of success obtained, and the public interest advanced by the litigation.” Gastineau v. Wright, 592 F.3d 747, 748 (7th Cir.2010). “The standard is whether the fees are reasonable in relation to the difficulty, stakes, and outcome of the case.” Id. (quoting Connolly v. Nat'l. Sch. Bus Serv., Inc., 177 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir.1999) ): see also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n. 3, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (1983) (listing “the novelty and difficulty of the questions” and “the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly” as two of the factors determining a fee award). When making reductions, a court cannot simply “eyeball the fee request and cut it down by an arbitrary percentage because it seemed excessive to the court.” People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 90 F.3d 1307, 1314 (7th Cir.1996) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, it must provide a “concise but clear explanation of its reasons” for any reduction. Uphoff v. Elegant Bath. Ltd., 176 F.3d 399, 409 (7th Cir.1999).

ANALYSIS

I. Local Rule 54.3

Local Rule 54.3 sets forth the procedures that must be followed in connection with fee applications in this District. The rule imposes on counsel for the parties the obligation to “confer and attempt in good faith to agree on the amount of fees or related nontaxable expenses that should be awarded,” and to exchange certain specified information. N.D. Ill. L.R. 54.3(d). “[Local Rule 54.3 ] aims to promote amicable resolution by encouraging the parties to define their areas of actual disagreement regarding fee awards.” Tenner v. Zurek, 168 F.3d 328, 331 (7th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). If a compromise cannot be reached, the party seeking fees may file a motion, attaching a joint statement prepared by both parties. N.D. Ill. L.R. 54.3(e). The joint statement must specify the total amount of fees or related expenses sought, the total amount which the responding party believes should be awarded, and “a brief description of each specific dispute remaining between the parties as to the fees or expenses.” Id. “Rule 54.3 was adopted by the district court as a means of reducing the time spent on fee disputes.”

Sears , Roebuck & Co. v. Menard. Inc., No. 01 C 9843, 2004 WL 2423964, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 23, 2004). The rule compels the parties to focus on specifics, and should result in the presentation of “discrete objections to specific items in the fee petition that can be ruled upon with relative dispatch.” Id.

According to Plaintiffs' counsel, the parties' attorneys discussed resolving the fee petition several times without a successful resolution. (R. 109–3, Ex. C, Engelhardt's Decl. at 6.) The parties could not agree on hourly rates, or other contested issues. (id. ) The parties did, however, in compliance with Rule 54.3(e), submit a Joint Statement that sufficiently delineates the remaining outstanding issues between them. (R. 109–1, Ex. A, Local Rule 54.3 Joint Statement.) Therefore, based on the Joint Statement, the Court proceeds to consider an...