Del Valle v. Trivago GMBH

56 F.4th 1265

Mario DEL VALLE, Enrique Falla, Angelo Pou, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Carolina Fernandez, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.TRIVAGO GMBH, a German Limited Liability Company, Booking.com B.V., a Dutch Limited Liability Company, Grupo Hotelero Caribe, Corporacion De Comercio y Turismo Internacional Cubanacan S.A., Grupo De Turismo Gaviota S.A., Raul Doe 1-5, Mariela Roe 1-5, Expedia, Inc., et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 20-12407

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Filed: November 22, 2022

Ana C. Malave, Jorge Alejandro Mestre, Andres Rivero, Alan H. Rolnick, Rivero Mestre, LLP, Coral Gables, FL, Carlos Antonio Rodriguez, II, Carlos A. Rodriguez Law, PLLC, Miami, FL, Manuel Vazquez, Manuel Vazquez, PA, Coral Gables, FL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants Mario Del Valle, Enrique Falla.

Ana C. Malave, Andres Rivero, Alan H. Rolnick, Rivero Mestre, LLP, Coral Gables, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant Angelo Pou.

Michael A. Duffy, Patricia Mathy, Michael C. McCutcheon, Kyle Richard Olson, Baker & McKenzie, LLP, Chicago, IL, L Andrew S. Riccio, Baker & McKenzie LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellee Booking.com B.V.

David Shank, Jane Marie Webre, Scott Douglass & McConnico, LLP, Austin, TX, Lolita T. Sosa, Akerman, LLP, Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellee Expedia, Inc.

David Shank, Jane Marie Webre, Scott Douglass & McConnico, LLP, Austin, TX, for Defendants-Appellees Hotels.com L.P., Hotels.com GP, LLC, Orbitz, LLC.

Michael A. Duffy, Michael C. McCutcheon, Kyle Richard Olson, Baker & McKenzie, LLP, Chicago, IL, L Andrew S. Riccio, Baker & McKenzie LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellee Booking Holdings Inc.

Bradley M. Rose, Kaye Rose & Partners, LLP, Santa Monica, CA, Darren W. Friedman, Foreman Friedman, PA, Miami, FL, for Amicus Curiae Cruise Lines International Association.

Lewis Yelin, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, DC, Lisa Tobin Rubio, U.S. Attorney Service - Southern District of Florida, U.S. Attorney Service, Miami, FL, Sharon Swingle, U.S. Attorney General's Office, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae United States of America.

Before Jordan and Newsom, Circuit Judges, and Burke,^* District Judge.

JORDAN, Circuit Judge:

On April 17, 2019, the Trump administration announced that it would not suspend the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (known as the "Helms-Burton Act") for the first time since its enactment in 1996. Shortly after this announcement, the cause of action created by Title III of the Helms-Burton Act became fully effective in U.S. courts. As explained in more detail below, Title III generally provides a private cause of action for United States nationals against persons who knowingly traffic in property expropriated by the Cuban government after the start of the Cuban revolution.

In this appeal we confront questions of personal jurisdiction and Article III standing in an action brought under Title III. We conclude that, based on the uncontroverted allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaint, the district court has specific jurisdiction over the defendants pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(2) and that the exercise of jurisdiction does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We also conclude that the plaintiffs have standing to assert their Title III claims.

I

In January of 1959, Fidel Castro and the 26th of July Movement ousted dictator Fulgencio Batista and seized control of the Cuban government. During the years that followed, the Cuban government nationalized all manner of property held by foreigners and Cuban nationals alike.

Congress enacted the Helms-Burton Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021 et seq. , in 1996. The goal was to deter trafficking of confiscated properties by providing "United States nationals who were the victims of th[o]se confiscations ... with a judicial remedy in the courts of the United States." § 6081(11).

Title III of the Helms-Burton Act establishes a private right of action for "any United States national who owns the claim to [confiscated property]" against "any person that ... traffics in [such] property." § 6082(a)(1)(A). Until 2019, Title III was suspended by successive Presidential decrees. See § 6085 (allowing the President to suspend the effective date of Title III if suspension is "necessary to the national interests of the United States").

Under Title III, a person "traffics" in confiscated property if that person knowingly and intentionally

(i) sells, transfers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, manages, or otherwise disposes of confiscated property, or purchases, leases, receives, possesses, obtains control of, manages, uses, or otherwise acquires or holds an interest in confiscated property,

(ii) engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated property, or

(iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, trafficking (as described in clause (i) or (ii)) by another person, or otherwise engages in trafficking (as described in clause (i) or (ii)) through another person,

without the authorization of any United States national who holds a claim to the property.

§ 6023(13).

The plaintiffs in this case—Mario del Valle, Enrique Falla, and Angela Pou—filed suit in the Southern District of Florida under Title III against several entities that own and operate travel websites, including Booking.com BV and Booking Holdings, Inc. (the Booking Entities), and Expedia Group, Inc., Hotels.com L.P., Hotels.com GP, and Orbitz, LLC (the Expedia Entities). The plaintiffs alleged that they are U.S. nationals and living heirs to separate beach-front properties nationalized by the Cuban government after the 1959 revolution. After seizing the properties, the Cuban government built the Starfish Cuatro Palmas and the Memories Jibacoa Resort (the Resorts) on the confiscated land. Until recently, visitors could reserve lodging at the Resorts through third-party travel booking websites. According to the complaint, the Booking Entities and Expedia Entities trafficked in those properties on their travel booking websites.

The Booking Entities and Expedia Entities moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim. Notably, they did not submit any affidavits or other exhibits rebutting the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint. The personal jurisdiction challenge, therefore, was facial and not factual.

The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ Title III claims without leave to amend, ruling that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants under the relevant provisions of Florida's long-arm statute. See Fla. Stat. §§ 48.193(1)(a)(1), 48.193(1)(a)(2), 48.193(2). The district court did not reach the defendants’ other grounds for dismissal.

Following a review of the record, and with the benefit of oral argument, we reverse. The plaintiffs alleged that the Booking Entities and Expedia Entities operate fully interactive travel websites that are accessible in Florida, and that Florida residents have used those websites to book accommodations at the Resorts. These allegations, which were not controverted below, establish personal jurisdiction. We also conclude that the plaintiffs have Article III standing for their Title III claims.¹

II

We exercise plenary review as to the district court's dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A. , 558 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2009). We accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true to the extent that they are uncontroverted and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor. See Fraser v. Smith , 594 F.3d 842, 846 (11th Cir. 2010).

A

Even in cases arising under federal law, "[f]ederal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds of their jurisdiction over persons." Daimler AG v. Bauman , 571 U.S. 117, 125, 134 S.Ct. 746, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) ). Under this paradigm, a federal court generally undertakes a two-step analysis to determine whether there is personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. See Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd. , 94 F.3d 623, 626 (11th Cir. 1996). First, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to subject the defendant to the forum state's long-arm statute. See id. Second, if the court determines that the forum state's long-arm statute has been satisfied, it must then decide whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id .

The operative complaint here set out the following allegations in support of the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Booking Entities and Expedia Entities:

? The websites of the Booking Entities and Expedia Entities "are fully-interactive websites that have robust internet e-business capabilities. They have worldwide reach and are fully accessible in Florida."

? Florida residents could—and did —use the websites of the Booking Entities and Expedia Entities to book accommodations at the Resorts.

? The Booking Entities and Expedia Entities promote their websites and the ability to book lodgings at the Resorts on their websites through banner ads directed at Florida residents, follow-up emails sent to Florida residents who have searched for the Resorts or other geographically proximate hotels, and search engine optimization (SEO) efforts intended to maximize performance on search engine results pages.

? In addition to the direct benefit of "receiving commissions or other fees for the booking" of the Resorts, the Booking Entities and Expedia Entities "also derive an indirect benefit" by "receiving advertising revenues driven by or related to" the web traffic generated through their offering of the ability to book lodging at the Resorts.

? "A substantial part" of the Booking Entities’ and Expedia Entities’ "business and revenue derives from their Florida offices."

D.E. 50 at ¶¶ 13, 15, 16, 39, 49-51, 58-59.

B

With respect to the first...