Valley Cities Counseling & Consultation v. Eddines

553 P.3d 693

VALLEY CITIES COUNSELING AND CONSULTATION, Respondent,

v.Ezra L. EDDINES, Appellant.

No. 84964-6-I

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

Filed August 5, 2024

Honorable Ken Schubert, Judge.

Edmund Robert; Witter, Attorney at Law, 1200 5th Ave. Ste. 700, Seattle, WA, 98101-1116, Yuan Ting, Christina Eugenie Jaccard, James Warren Norman Satterberg, King County Bar Association, 1200 5th Ave. Ste. 700, Seattle, WA, 98101-1116, Dashiell George Degraff, Ashleen Elisabeth O’brien, Housing Justice Project, 1200 5th Ave. Ste. 700, Seattle, WA, 98101-1116, for Petitioner.

Thomas Martin Morningstar, Puckett & Redford PLLC, 901 5th Ave. Ste. 800, Seattle, WA, 98164-2048, Andrew Peterson Mazzeo, Attorney at Law, 3510 53rd St., Gig Harbor, WA, 98335-8512, for Respondent.

PUBLISHED OPINION

Feldman, J.

¶1 In 2021, Washington adopted an amendment to the Residential Landlord Tenant Act (RLTA) allowing landlords to evict a tenant who "continues in possession of a dwelling unit in transitional housing after having received at least 30 days’ advance written notice to vacate … [when] the tenant has completed an educational or training or service program and is no longer eligible to participate in the transitional housing program." RCW 59.18.650(2)(j). Acting pursuant to this provision, Valley Cities Counseling and Consultation (Valley) attempted to evict Ezra Eddines after he no longer met the criteria for the applicable transitional housing program. In response, Eddines argued that Auburn City Code (ACC) 5.23.070.A forbids eviction in these same circumstances. Because the city ordinance categorically forbids what state law permits, the superior court correctly concluded that the ordinance is preempted by state law. On interlocutory review, we affirm and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I

¶2 Eddines is a tenant in a transitional housing unit as part of a program run by Valley. The program provides transitional housing to tenants who have an income of 30 percent or below the area median income and who would otherwise be unhoused. On February 25, 2022, Valley gave Eddines notice that his tenancy would be terminated because his income was more than 30 percent of the area median income and he had not accessed program services in the past year, making him ineligible for the transitional housing program.

¶3 When Eddines refused to vacate and surrender his transitional housing unit, Valley filed a complaint for unlawful detainer. A superior court commissioner scheduled a show cause hearing. In support of its unlawful detainer action, Valley argued that RCW 59.18.650(2)(j) (quoted below) permits a landlord to evict a tenant where, as here, the tenant continues in possession of a transitional housing unit after the tenant is no longer eligible for the transitional housing program. In response, Eddines argued that Auburn’s just cause ordinance, ACC 5.23.070.A (also quoted below), does not permit a landlord to evict a tenant in this circumstance.

¶4 The commissioner ruled in favor of Valley, concluding that ACC 5.23.070 is "preempted to the extent that it conflicts with RCW 59.18.650(2)(j)." Eddines thereafter filed a motion for revision. The superior court denied the motion, stating:

Applying the rules of conflict pre-emption, this Court agrees with Commissioner Hillman that the state law and city ordinance cannot be harmonized, an irreconcilable conflict exists, and that his order below is correct. This Court DENIES Eddines’ Motion for Revision.

The superior court subsequently certified its ruling for interlocutory review under RAP 2.3(b)(4). This court accepted the superior court’s certification and granted discretionary review.

II

¶5 Eddines claims the superior court erred in ruling that ACC 5.23.070.A is preempted by RCW 59.18.650. We disagree.

A

[1, 2] ¶6 "[A] state statute preempts an ordinance on the same subject [1] if the statute occupies the field, leaving no room for concurrent jurisdiction, or [2] if a conflict exists such that the statute and the ordinance may not be harmonized." Lawson v. City of Pasco, 168 Wash.2d 675, 679, 230 P.3d 1038 (2010). The first part of this quote describes field preemption, and the second part de- scribes conflict preemption. Here, Valley argues only conflict preemption, which "arises when an ordinance permits what state law forbids or forbids what state law permits." Id. at 682, 230 P.3d 1038. Whether ACC 5.23.070.A is preempted by RCW 59.18.650 is a question of law and is reviewed de novo. Rental Hous. Ass’n v. City of Seattle, 22 Wash. App. 2d 426, 437, 512 P.3d 545 (2022) (RHA).

¶7 Applying conflict preemption principles to the state statute and local ordinance at issue here, the superior court correctly concluded that the state statute preempts the local ordinance. The state statute at issue, RCW 59.18.650, prohibits residential landlords from evicting a tenant, refusing to continue a tenancy, or ending a periodic tenancy except in enumerated circumstances that constitute just cause. One of the enumerated circumstances is when:

The tenant continues in possession of a dwelling unit in transitional housing after having received at least 30 days’ advance written notice to vacate … [when] the tenant has completed an educational or training or service program and is no longer eligible to participate in the transitional housing program.

RCW 59.18.650(2)(j). Auburn’s ordinance, ACC 5.23.070.A, contains a similar just cause restriction:

Owners of housing units shall not evict or attempt to evict any tenant, refuse to renew or continue a tenancy after expiration of the rental agreement, or otherwise terminate or attempt to terminate the tenancy of any tenant unless the owner can prove in court that just cause exists. … The reasons for termination of tenancy listed below, and no others, shall constitute just cause under this section.

(Emphasis added.) The ordinance lists 14 circumstances that constitute just cause under the provision, but lacks any transitional housing exception as provided in the state statute. Id.

[3, 4] ¶8 Because the Auburn ordinance specifies that no reason beyond the 14 specified reasons is just cause for eviction, it forbids what states law permits, which is eviction of tenants from transitional housing units when, as here, they are no longer eligible to participate in the transitional housing program. Thus, as the superior court concluded, "the state law and city ordinance cannot be harmonized" and "an irreconcilable conflict exists." Accordingly, the superior court correctly ruled, by denying Eddines’ motion for revision, that the city ordinance is preempted by RCW 59.18.650.¹

B

¶9 At oral argument in this matter, Eddines effectively conceded that ACC 5.23.070.A forbids what RCW 59.18.650(2)(j) permits.² He nevertheless raises three arguments why preemption does not apply here. First, he argues that the result here is controlled by three cases that avoid preemption by harmonizing local and state law. Second, he claims that the state statute at issue here does not provide an affirmative right for landlords to evict tenants. Third, he contends that the Washington legislature did not intend to preempt local ordinances. Each of these arguments fails.

¶10 Starting with Eddines’ argument that the result here is controlled by three cases where the court was able to harmonize local and state law, the first case cited by Eddines is Kennedy v. City of Seattle, 94 Wash.2d 376, 617 P.2d 713 (1980), which is one of the seminal cases on this topic. The plaintiffs there owned two houseboat moorage sites in Seattle, one of which hosted the defendant’s houseboat which the plaintiffs sought to evict. Id. at 378, 617 P.2d 713. Seattle had adopted an ordinance that made it unlawful to evict a houseboat from a moorage site except for six specified reasons, and the plaintiffs argued that the ordinance was preempted by state statutes regarding forcible entry and forcible and unlawful detainer actions. Id. at 379-84, 617 P.2d 713 (citing RCW 59.12 and RCW 59.18 (the RLTA)). Although the court ultimately concluded that the ordinance was unconstitutionally prohibitory and confiscatory, it rejected the plaintiffs’ preemption argument, stating, "The ordinance does not raise further procedural barriers between landlord and tenant but simply represents another defense." Id. at 384, 617 P.2d 713.

¶11 The second case Eddines claims is controlling here is Margola Associates v. City of Seattle, 121 Wash.2d 625, 854 P.2d 23 (1993), abrogated on other grounds by Chong Yim v. City of Seattle, 194 Wash.2d 682, 451 P.3d 694 (2019), which expands on the brief discussion of conflict preemption in Kennedy. The plaintiff in Margola argued that state law preempted a Seattle ordinance that required owners of buildings with multiple housing units to obtain and post each year a certificate establishing that the building was registered with the City and created an affirmative defense to eviction if the landlord did not register the rental unit in accordance with the ordinance. Id. at 632, 854 P.2d 23. The court rejected the preemption argument, reasoning that there was no conflict between the state statute and the city ordinance because the city ordinance only added an additional requirement to the eviction process established by the RLTA. Id. at 651-54, 854 P.2d 23.

¶12 The third case Eddines claims is controlling here is RHA. The plaintiff there challenged both Seattle’s "winter eviction ban," which created a defense to eviction if the tenant would have to vacate the housing unit between December 1 and March 1, and its six-month extension of the eviction moratorium during the COVID-19 pandemic. 22 Wash. App. 2d at 432-36, 512 P.3d 545. In holding that the Seattle ordinances were not preempted, the court emphasized that the ordinances merely provided "a temporary defense to evictions," noting that "a landlord can file an unlawful detainer action, obtain an order finding the tenant to be...