Valyou v. CSX Transp., Inc.

MICHAEL S. VALYOU, Plaintiff, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., Defendant.

16-CV-424 (DJS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

June 14, 2019

APPEARANCES:

NAUMES LAW GROUP, LLC

Attorney for Plaintiff

2 Granite Avenue, Suite 425

Milton, MA 02186

NIXON PEABODY LLP

Attorney for Defendant

677 Broadway

10th Floor

Albany, NY 12207

BURNS WHITE LLC

Attorney for Defendant

48 26th Street

Burns White Center

Pittsburgh, PA 15222

OF COUNSEL:

ROBERT T. NAUMES, ESQ.

ANDREW C. ROSE, ESQ.

T. H. LYDA, ESQ.

DANIEL J. STEWART United States Magistrate Judge

MEMORANDUM DECISION and ORDER¹

This action was brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. § 51, et. seq., for injuries suffered by Plaintiff while in Defendant's employ. Dkt. No. 1, Compl. Plaintiff claims that he was injured as a result of Defendant's negligence. Id. at ¶ 3. Defendant now moves for summary judgment under FED. R. CIV. P. 56. Dkt. No. 38. Plaintiff opposes the Motion. Dkt. No. 39. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On August 29, 2013, Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a machinist. Compl. at ¶ 2. On that date, Plaintiff was directed to inspect and qualify CSX locomotive 8867 ("the Locomotive"). Dkt. No. 38-5 at pp. 4-5.² While Plaintiff was working on the Locomotive, it exploded causing serious injuries to Plaintiff. Compl. at ¶ 4. The parties offer differing views of the facts and circumstances underlying Plaintiff's work on the Locomotive and the subsequent explosion. Those differing facts are discussed here only briefly to highlight the disputed factual questions that are discussed in more detail in Point III, infra.

As noted, Plaintiff alleges that he was directed to inspect and qualify CSX locomotive 8867. Dkt. No. 38-5 at pp. 4-5. Plaintiff testified that qualifying a locomotive entailed "check[ing] out the problem to see if there is a problem with it." Id. at p. 5.Defendant maintains that crankcase overpressure had been reported regarding the Locomotive. Id. Crankcase overpressure is a dangerous condition involving "hot gases being generated inside the crankcase." Id. Plaintiff had been trained on how to address crankcase overpressure and had dealt with it before on other locomotive engines. Id. at p. 6.

As part of the process of qualifying the Locomotive, Plaintiff started it and permitted it to run while conducting certain inspections. Id. at p. 8. Plaintiff conducted two tests on the engine using a manometer to test pressure inside the Locomotive. Id. at pp. 8-9; Dkt. No. 39-5 at p. 3. Those tests showed no pressure in the Locomotive. Dkt. No. 38-5 at pp. 8-9. After the engine had run for a period of time, Plaintiff opened a top deck cover and the explosion soon followed. Id. at p. 13. Defendant maintains that Plaintiff should not have opened the top deck cover without first stopping the engine and permitting a mandatory fifteen-minute cooling off period. Dkt. No. 38-6 at p. 6. Plaintiff contends that this cooling off period applies only to crankcase covers, which he did not open, and not to the top deck cover. Dkt. No. 38-5 at p. 12.

CSX Safety Alert # 51 expressly prohibited employees from starting an engine when it had been "Dead on Arrival" prior to performing numerous preliminary operations. Dkt. No. 39-9. Locomotive 8867 arrived in the Selkirk, New York rail yard the prior day "Dead on Arrival." Dkt. No. 39-6 at p. 6. Plaintiff's supervisor was aware the Locomotive had been Dead on Arrival. Id. Plaintiff maintains that this information was not made available to him prior to working on the Locomotive. Dkt. No. 39-3, Pl.'s Dep. at ¶ 8. He further asserts that had it been, he would have refused to attempt to qualify theLocomotive. Id. at ¶ 10. Locomotive 8867 had a history of maintenance issues including abnormal oil sample tests. Id. at ¶ 8. Plaintiff was unaware of this history at the time he was working on the Locomotive. Id. at ¶ 10.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER FELA

Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate only where "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The moving party bears the burden to demonstrate through "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with [ ] affidavits, if any," that there is no genuine issue of material fact. F.D.I.C. v. Giammettei, 34 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).

To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must set out specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial and cannot rest merely on allegations or denials of the facts submitted by the movant. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also Scott v. Coughlin, 344 F.3d 282, 287 (2d Cir. 2003) ("Conclusory allegations or denials are ordinarily not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment when the moving party has set out a documentary case."); Rexnord Holdings, Inc. v. Bidermann, 21 F.3d 522, 525-26 (2d Cir. 1994). To that end, sworn statements are "more than mere conclusory allegations subject to disregard . . . they are specific and detailed allegations of fact, made under penalty of perjury, and should be treated as evidence in deciding a summary judgment motion" and the credibility of such statements is better left to a trier of fact.Scott v. Coughlin, 344 F.3d at 289 (citing Flaherty v. Coughlin, 713 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1983) and Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1995)).

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc., 164 F.3d 736, 742 (2d Cir. 1998). "[T]he trial court's task at the summary judgment motion stage of the litigation is carefully limited to discerning whether there are any genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to deciding them. Its duty, in short, is confined at this point to issue-finding; it does not extend to issue-resolution." Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P'ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994).

This ordinary summary judgment standard is considerably more plaintiff-friendly in FELA cases. In FELA cases, the standard for summary judgment is liberally construed in light of the strong federal policy in favor of letting juries decide cases arising under FELA. Accordingly, a FELA case must not be dismissed at the summary judgment phase unless there is absolutely no reasonable basis for a jury to find for the plaintiff.

Curran v. Long Island R.R. Co., 161 F. Supp. 3d 253, 256-57 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted). As a result, "an employer seeking summary judgment on FELA claims has 'a particularly heavy burden.'" Monington v. CSX Transp., Inc., 2012 WL 716285, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2012) (quoting Wahlstrom v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 89 F.Supp.2d 506, 514 (S.D.N.Y.2000)).

III. DISCUSSION

"To succeed on a claim under FELA, a plaintiff 'must prove the traditional common law elements of negligence.'" Hewitt v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 244 F. Supp.3d 379, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting Tufariello v. Long Island R.R. Co., 458 F.3d 80, 87 (2d Cir. 2006)). This requires the plaintiff to establish "duty, breach, foreseeability, and causation." Tufariello v. Long Island R.R. Co., 458 F.3d at 87; see also Peterson v. Pan Am Railways, Inc., 2015 WL 2451227, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. May 21, 2015).

Defendant raises several issues on this Motion. It first argues that it did not breach any duty of care owed to Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 38-2, Def.'s Mem. of Law at pp. 8-10. Next, Defendant contends that because Plaintiff was the sole cause of the accident resulting in his injuries, it is not liable under FELA. Id. at pp. 10-12.

A. Defendant's Breach of Duty

"Defendant had a duty to provide its employees with a safe workplace." Cogan v. Nat. R.R. Passenger Corp., 2015 WL 1417130, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2015) (citing Tufariello v. Long Island. R.R. Co., 458 F.3d at 91). "An employer breaches its duty to provide a safe workplace when it knows or should know of a potential hazard in the workplace, yet fails to exercise reasonable care to inform and protect its employees." Gallose v. Long Island R.R. Co., 878 F.2d 80, 84-85 (2d Cir. 1989). "Reasonable care is determined in light of whether or not a particular danger was foreseeable." Syverson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 19 F.3d 824, 826 (2d Cir. 1994).

Plaintiff specifically alleges that Defendant failed to properly maintain Locomotive 8867. Compl. at ¶ 4. In the months leading up to the explosion, maintenance records indicate that the Locomotive had abnormal oil samples, including evidence of metal contamination, problems with its fuel injection system, and other indications of problems with the engine. Dkt. 39-5 at pp. 18-19; Dkt. No. 39-4 at p. 4. Defendant'sown employee testified that a faulty bearing was a contributing factor to the explosion and that this failure could have happened over a long period of time or very quickly. Dkt. No. 38-6 at pp. 6-8. While Defendant may be able to show that it acted reasonably in addressing these maintenance issues leading up to the events giving rise to this litigation, and thus prove to a jury that it did not breach its duty to provide Plaintiff with a safe workplace, it has not made that showing as a matter of law here and, therefore, is not entitled to summary judgment on this basis. In Sinclair v. Long Island R.R., the Second Circuit stated "[w]e have held that whether the railroad used reasonable care in furnishing its employees a safe place to work is normally a question for the jury." 985 F.2d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation and citation omitted). On this record, whether CSX properly maintained Locomotive 8867 is clearly a question that should be left to the jury.

The Court notes that questions of fact are also present as to Defendant's argument...