Van Ever-Ford v. New York

DAPHNE VAN EVER-FORD, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF NEW YORK, OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH(BUFFALO PSYCHIATRIC CENTER), and Dr. ANN MARIE T. SULLIVAN,COMMISSIONER OF THE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH,in her official capacity, Defendants.

13-CV-412

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

April 30, 2019

DECISION & ORDER

On April 25, 2013, the plaintiff, Daphne Van Ever-Ford, commenced this action against the State of New York for discrimination on the basis of her disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112, ("ADA"). Docket Item 1. The case originally was assigned to United States District Judge Richard J. Arcara, who referred the matter to United States Magistrate Judge Jeremiah J. McCarthy for all pretrial matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B). Docket Item 14. On December 5, 2014, the State of New York moved for summary judgment. Docket Item 25. On September 21, 2015, Judge McCarthy issued a report and recommendation ("2015 R&R"), recommending that the motion be denied, Docket Item 38, and on November 30, 2015, Judge Arcara adopted the 2015 R&R, Docket Item 43.

The case was reassigned to this Court on March 8, 2016, and on March 18, 2016, this Court scheduled trial to begin on August 24, 2016. Docket Item 53. Van Ever-Ford submitted a trial brief on July 19, 2016, which explained in a footnote that her counsel had learned that because of sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment, the State of New York is immune from suit under the ADA. Docket Item 59 at 4 n.1. On August 18, 2016, Van Ever-Ford filed an amended complaint naming the State of New York Office of Mental Health ("Office of Mental Health") as the sole defendant and raising a claim only under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 ("Rehabilitation Act").¹ Docket Item 64. The Office of Mental Health moved for summary judgment, Docket Item 65, and on October 17, 2016, Judge McCarthy issued another report and recommendation ("2016 R&R"), recommending that the motion be denied, Docket Item 72. On December 21, 2016, this Court heard oral argument on the Office of Mental Health's objections to the 2016 R&R. Docket Item 78.

On June 8, 2017, before this Court had decided whether to adopt the 2016 R&R, Van Ever-Ford moved to amend the complaint again—this time, adding Office of Mental Health Commissioner Ann Marie T. Sullivan ("the Commissioner") in her official capacity as a defendant in a revived ADA claim. Docket Item 82. On September 12, 2017, Judge McCarthy issued a third report and recommendation ("2017 R&R"), recommending that Van Ever-Ford not be given leave to amend the complaint. Docket Item 94. The plaintiff objected to the R&R, Docket Item 95, and, after hearing oral argument, Docket Item 100, this Court granted Van Ever-Ford leave to amend the complaint, Docket Item 101.

On December 22, 2017, Van Ever-Ford filed the operative amended complaint. Docket Item 102. That complaint asserts claims against the Office of Mental Health under Rehabilitation Act § 504 and against the Commissioner under the ADA. Id.

On August 16, 2018, the defendants moved for summary judgment. Docket Item 111. Van Ever-Ford responded on September 17, 2018, Docket Item 115, and the defendants replied on September 28, 2018, Docket Item 116. This Court heard oral argument on the motion on November 30, 2018. Docket Item 119.

FACTS²

Van Ever-Ford began working for the Office of Mental Health at the Buffalo Psychiatric Center in January 2010. Docket Items 102 at 2, 107. She worked as a Mental Health Therapy Aid Trainee, which required her to care for seriously-ill mental-health patients. Id. Van Ever-Ford typically worked the "midnight shift," between 11:40 p.m. and 7:40 the next morning. Docket Item 102 at 2.

During the course of her employment, Van Ever-Ford suffered from hypertension, heart palpitations, fatigue, kidney stones, migraine headaches, sinusitis, and a hernia. Id. at 3. While she was working on the morning of September 26, 2010, Van Ever-Ford suffered an extremely painful headache, and Yvonne Long, the Nurse Administrator, told her that she could go home if she was not feeling well. Id. at 3-4, Docket Item 107 at 2. Van Ever-Ford therefore left work, went to the emergency room, and obtained a doctor's note stating that she could return to work two days later. Docket Item 102 at 4.She also spoke on the phone with her supervisor, Bill Hoak, and the nurse administrator, Laura Murphy, to tell them she needed the next two days off. Id. But Hoak told her that she was already scheduled and needed to return to work that night, September 27, 2010.³ Id.

On September 30, 2010, Van Ever-Ford provided her employer with a doctor's note, excusing her from work until October 2, 2010. Id., Docket Item 107 at 2. She then worked October 2 through October 8, 2010, without further incident or any discussion of her absences. Docket Item 102 at 5.

On October 15, 2010, however, Van Ever-Ford was terminated from employment for violating her employer's time and attendance policy. Docket Items 102 at 2, 107 at 1. She was told that the reason for her termination was excessive time off. Docket Items 102 at 5, 107 at 3. Despite the fact that she had spoken to Mr. Hoak and Ms. Murphy, a report characterized her September 28, 2010 absence as a "no call, no show." Docket Item 102 at 5.

Before filing this action, Van Ever-Ford pursued a disability claim against her employer under the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"). On March 9, 2011, she filed a verified complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights⁴ ("Division of Human Rights"). In that complaint, Van Ever-Ford alleged that she was thetarget of discrimination, and terminated from her employment with the Office of Mental Health, "based on a disability that forced [her] to miss work because [her] symptoms and problems interfered with day-to-day living." Docket Item 112-1 at 3. Van Ever-Ford also filed her complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), asserting disability discrimination under the ADA. Docket Item 112-2. The Office of Mental Health answered Van Ever-Ford's Division of Human Rights complaint on December 2, 2011. Docket Item 112-3.

On August 24, 2011, the Division of Human Rights found that there was probable cause to support the allegations in Van Ever-Ford's complaint and that material issues of fact required a hearing. Docket Item 112-4. On January 23, 2012, Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Martin Erazo, Jr., held a public hearing on Van Ever-Ford's Division of Human Rights complaint of disability discrimination. Docket Item 112-7. On June 26, 2012, ALJ Erazo issued his "Recommended Findings of Fact, Opinion and Decision, and Order," concluding that Van Ever-Ford "did not meet her burden of proof to show that [the Office of Mental Health] treated her differently, failed to accommodate her, and terminated her employment, because of her disabilities"; the ALJ therefore recommended that the matter be dismissed. Docket Item 112-8 at 4. Van Ever-Ford objected to the recommendation, Docket Item 112-9, but on September 13, 2012, the Commissioner of the Division of Human Rights adopted the ALJ's recommended findings, Docket Item 112-10. On January 24, 2013, the EEOC followed suit and adopted the Division of Human Rights's findings. Docket Item 102-1 at 7. Van Ever-Ford then commenced this action. Docket Item 1.

DISCUSSION

The defendants raise three arguments to support their motion for summary judgment. The first two address Van Ever-Ford's claims under the Rehabilitation Act. First, the defendants argue that the Division of Human Rights decision on Van Ever-Ford's NYSHRL claim precludes her Rehabilitation Act claim under the principle of res judicata.⁵ Docket Item 114 at 6. Second, the defendants argue that even if res judicata does not preclude Van Ever-Ford's claims, the principle of collateral estoppel⁶ precludes her from relitigating the factual issues decided against her in the Division of Human Rights proceeding. Id. at 12. The defendants' third argument addresses Van Ever-Ford's ADA claim against the Commissioner. They argue that because the Commissioner does not have the authority to perform the relief sought, the action is not covered by the Ex parte Young exception to states' sovereign immunity—the basis for Van Ever-Ford's claim against the Commissioner.

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). There is a genuine dispute of material fact "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "While genuineness runs towhether disputed factual issues can 'reasonably be resolved in favor of either party,' materiality runs to whether the dispute matters, i.e., whether it concerns facts that can affect the outcome under the applicable substantive law." Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250). "[T]he court must view the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party" and must draw "all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Abdu-Brisson, 239 F.3d at 466. But "conclusory statements, conjecture, or speculation by the party resisting the motion will not defeat summary judgment." Kulak v. City of New York, 88 F.3d 63, 71 (2d Cir. 1996).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Rehabilitation Act Claims

The defendants argue that because the Division of Human Rights decided Van Ever-Ford's claims against her after an administrative evidentiary hearing, she is precluded from pursuing her Rehabilitation Act § 504 claims in this Court. For the reasons that follow, this Court agrees.

1. Preclusive Effect of State Administrative Determinations under the Rehabilitation Act

Issue and...