Vanderpool v. State

312 A.3d 803

261 Md.App. 163

Martique VANDERPOOL

v.STATE of Maryland

No. 0047, Sept. Term, 2023

Appellate Court of Maryland.

March 27, 2024

Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Case No. CT200085X, Karen Mason, Judge

Argued by Nancy S. Forster, Forster & LeCompte, Towson, MD, on brief, for Appellant.

Argued by Jillian R. Chieppor, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Anthony G. Brown, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Appellee.

Argued before: Ripken, Albright, James A. Kenney III (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned)

Ripken, J.

In September of 2019, Officer Martique Vanderpool ("Appellant") and Officer Phillip Dupree ("Ofc. Dupree") of the Fairmont Heights Police Department conducted a traffic stop which resulted in the stopped vehicle being towed. Appellant and Ofc. Dupree transported the driver ("K.T.") of the vehicle to the police station, where Appellant engaged in sexual intercourse with K.T.¹ Following the incident, Appellant was indicted for numerous offenses, including law enforcement officer engaging in a sex act with a person in custody.² At trial, Appellant was found guilty of the offense of law enforcement officer engaging in a sex act with a person in custody and acquitted of all remaining charges. Appellant timely appealed.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Appellant presents the following issues for our review:³

I. Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that K.T. was in custody when the sexual intercourse occurred.

II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it prohibited questions during cross examination of the State’s witnesses pertaining to K.T.’s related civil lawsuit.

III. Whether the trial court erred when it denied Appellant’s motion to dismiss on the grounds of discovery violations.

DISCUSSION

I. The Evidence was Sufficient to Establish that K.T. Was in Custody at the Time of the Sexual Intercourse.

A. Factual and Procedural History

In September of 2019, Appellant and Ofc. Dupree stopped a vehicle for speeding. Appellant subsequently approached the vehicle and informed the driver, K.T., of the reason for the traffic stop and requested that she provide her driver’s license and registration. K.T. provided the registration for the vehicle and explained to Appellant that she did not have a driver’s license, but she did have a permit, although it was not with her at the time.

Per K.T., after she explained the issue regarding her license, Appellant walked away from the vehicle and conversed with Ofc. Dupree. Appellant returned and ordered K.T. to exit the vehicle so that a search of the vehicle could be performed. During the search, Appellant located K.T.’s driver’s permit as well as condoms. Upon finding the condoms, Appellant began asking K.T. questions that were sexual in nature such as "[i]f [she] was a prostitute, do[es] [she] cheat on [her] boyfriend, [and] do[es] [she] have sex a lot." K.T. responded by laughing and began "pacing back and forth … get[ting] [her] emotions under control." Ofc. Dupree then forcibly restrained K.T. and placed her in handcuffs. When K.T. was put in handcuffs, she lost her phone, which was subsequently retrieved by one of the officers.

Appellant then informed K.T. that the vehicle would be impounded because she did not have a driver’s license and the vehicle was towed. The officers transported K.T. to the police station. During transport, K.T. was placed in the front seat of the police cruiser, Ofc. Dupree drove and Appellant rode in the back seat. For the duration of the drive to the police station K.T. remained in handcuffs.

K.T. testified that while the police cruiser was "unmarked[,]" it did have lights and sirens and the "whole police work, … computers and all of that stuff inside." She also testified that Ofc. Dupree was in uniform and Appellant was wearing "the pants… and the belt but not the shirt." She explained that the belt was a "police officer belt that keeps all the instruments, the weapons, and all that stuff on it."

Once they arrived at the police station, K.T. was seated in a chair and remained handcuffed, while Appellant sat behind a desk. K.T. testified that she and Appellant began discussing "what we were going to do, what solution we were going to come up with of me getting my car back." Dur- ing the conversation, Appellant asked K.T. if she had the money and what she thought they should do, and then "sex came about" in the discussion. K.T. asked to use her phone and the office phone, but both requests were denied. K.T. testified that in denying the requests Appellant stated that "safety protocols" were the reason for denying the use of the phones, although the safety protocol itself was not explained.

Appellant suggested having sexual intercourse with K.T. and then departed the room. K.T. did not "think he was serious[,]" until Ofc. Dupree asked her "if [she] was going to do it." K.T. testified, "I wasn’t really too sure. I told him, I’m not sure. It doesn’t really seem I have much of an option here. I can’t really call, get my car back, and yeah."

When Appellant re-entered the room, he asked K.T. if she had "thought about it." K.T. testified that she felt like she could either "go to jail or have sex." At this point, she agreed and Appellant removed his police belt before lowering his pants and undergarments. Appellant proceeded to have sexual intercourse with K.T. After the sexual intercourse terminated, K.T. was permitted to use the restroom to clean herself. K.T. testified that she was then served with criminal and traffic citations, which were written by Appellant. Ofc. Dupree, Appellant, and K.T. returned to the police cruiser and K.T. was driven to retrieve her vehicle from the tow lot. Without having paid, the vehicle was released to K.T. at the request of Appellant. Additional facts will be incorporated as they become relevant.

B. Parties’ Contentions

Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction because the State failed to establish that K.T. was in his custody at the time of the sexual intercourse. Because the statute here does not define custody, Appellant urges this Court to define custody in a manner consistent with what he contends is the applicable current legal definition of the word. Hence, Appellant asserts custody should be read to "require[] the law enforcement officer to physically restrain one’s movement and maintain control over a person’s liberty to move about." In the alternative, Appellant contends that if this Court finds K.T. was in custody at the time of the sexual intercourse, she was solely in the custody of Ofc. Dupree and not Appellant.

The State disagrees and relies on the legislative history of the statute to support the contention that the term custody, as used here, need not be further defined within the statute. The State posits that the plain meaning of the term is applicable, and the definitions of custody proposed by the Appellant apply only in other limited circumstances and are not applicable here. Per the plain meaning of custody, the State argues that the evidence was sufficient to establish that K.T. was in the custody of Appellant when the sexual intercourse occurred. Furthermore, the State asserts that Appellant’s alternative argument, that K.T. was solely in Ofc. Dupree’s custody at the time of the sexual intercourse, has no merit.

C. Standard of Review

[1, 2] This Court reviews claims of insufficiency of the evidence by determining "whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Howling v. State, 478 Md. 472, 493, 274 A.3d 1124 (2022) (emphasis in original). To accomplish this task, we view the evidence "in [a] light most favorable to the State," and give due deference to the jury’s "finding of facts, its resolution of conflicting evidence, and, significantly, its opportunity to observe and assess the credibility of witnesses." White v. State, 363 Md. 150, 162, 767 A.2d 855 (2001) (quoting McDonald v. State, 347 Md. 452, 474, 701 A.2d 675 (1997)). When an evaluation of the "sufficiency of the evidence involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law" we must preliminarily "determine whether the lower court’s conclusions are legally correct under a de novo standard of review." Rodriguez v. State, 221 Md. App. 26, 35, 108 A.3d 438 (2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

D. Statutory Interpretation

[3] Statutory interpretation is a well-established practice in Maryland that has but one primary goal: "to ascertain and effectuate the General Assembly’s purpose and intent when it enacted the statute." Shivers v. State, 256 Md. App. 639, 658, 287 A.3d 1255 (2023) (quoting Wheeling v. Selene Fin. LP, 473 Md. 356, 376, 250 A.3d 197 (2021)). In effectuating that goal, "[w]e begin with an examination of the text of a statute within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, then typically review the legislative history to confirm conclusions or resolve ambiguities, and finally may consider the consequences of alternative interpretations of the statute." Westley v. State, 251 Md. App. 365, 386, 254 A.3d 106 (2021).

[4–7] Our analysis begins by "look[ing] to the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute[;]" however, "[o]ur inquiry is not confined to the specific statutory provision at issue on appeal. Instead ‘[t]he plain language must be viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs[.]’ " Id. at 386-87, 254 A.3d 106 (quoting Berry v. Queen, 469 Md. 674, 687, 233 A.3d 42 (2020)). "That context may include the statute’s "relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation, and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal, which becomes the context within which we read the particular language before us in a given case.’ " Id. at 387, 254 A.3d 106 (quoting Berry, 469 Md. at 687, 233 A.3d 42). When reading the plain language of the statute, our...