Vangjeli v. Banks

1

SUZANA VANGJELI, Plaintiff v. LINWOOD BANKS, et al, Defendants

Civil Action No. 19-4635

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

April 6, 2023

MEMORANDUM

PRATTER, J.

Suzana Vangjeli asserts that she did not agree to the settlement agreement which Linwood Banks and Triple Canopy, Inc. now seek to enforce. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that there was no express authority for Ms Vangjeli's counsel to agree to the material terms of the settlement.^[1]

Background

I. Underlying Facts

Suzana Vangjeli alleges various torts stemming from her interaction with Linwood Banks, a security officer at the Social Security Administration Card Center in Philadelphia. Triple Canopy employs Mr. Banks and supplies security guards for the Card Center location. The dispute here started when Ms. Vangjeli attempted to enter the Card Center carrying a glass water bottle. A Triple Canopy guard (not Mr. Banks) who was stationed outside of the Card Center informed Ms. Vangjeli that she could not go in with the glass water bottle. After being told that she would have to leave the building to first throw the water bottle away before going in, Ms. Vangjeli stashed the water bottle out of the guard's sight. However, when she again approached the Card Center after stashing the water bottle, she was again told that she could not enter, Mr Banks, who apparently found the water bottle, returned it to Ms. Vangjeli and explained that there were posted signs saying no glass bottles were allowed in the building.

What happened next is in dispute. According to Mr. Banks and Triple Canopy, Ms. Vangjeli began yelling and was told by Mr. Banks that if she wished to transact business at the Card Center in person she would have to come back the following day. Ms, Vangjeli denies that she was yelling and does not recall being told that she could not return the same day. The parties i do agree that Ms. Vangjeli left the Card Center and actually then disposed of the water bottle outside of the building. When she attempted to enter the Card Center a third time, a guard stopped her but this time escorted her to a detention room, Ms. Vangjeli claims that she had a panic attack when the guard attempted to handcuff her. Shortly after being left alone in the room, Ms. Vangjeli left the detention area and approached the hallway leading to the Card Center. Although Ms. Vangjeli denies that she was trying to leave, guards saw her moving and interpreted it as an attempt to escape. Ms. Vangjeli alleges that Mr. Banks then tackled her, inflicting multiple injuries, II. The Settlement

At the request of all parties and counsel, the Court referred them to a very experienced and skilled magistrate judge for a settlement conference, which was held by telephone on September 23, 2022. The settlement conference reconvened on September 27, 2022-again by telephone- during which the parties reportedly reached a settlement agreement. After being informed by the magistrate judge simply that the matter had settled, the Court entered an order dismissing the case with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41.1 (b) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure.

Two days later, Ms. Vangjeli sent a letter to the Court stating that she did not agree with the settlement. The letter not only communicated Ms. Vangjeli's disagreement with the settlement, but also that Ms. Vangjeli had made her disagreement known to her attorneys shortly after the September 27 settlement conference. In response, Mr. Banks and Triple Canopy sent a letter to the Court stating that during the September 27 settlement conference, then-counsel for Ms. Vangjeli, Iljaz Shehu, advised the parties and the magistrate judge that Ms. Vangjeli had agreed to settle the case for the amount proposed by Mr. Banks and Triple Canopy, Their letter to the Court expressed their understanding that Ms. Vangjeli had agreed to the material terms of their proposal and that they believed Mr. Shehu was authorized to accept the terms on her behalf.^[2]

The Court then held a status hearing to address the settlement. The Court quickly discerned a conflict of interest between Ms. Vangjeli and her attorneys: Ms. Vangjeli's attorneys believed that she had expressly authorized them to settle, and Ms. Vangjeli maintained that she did not agree with the settlement. The Court granted the attorneys' motion to withdraw as Ms. Vangjeli's counsel and allowed Ms. Vangjeli more time to seek and retain new counsel. She did not do so.

The Court subsequently held an evidentiary hearing to assess whether counsel for Ms. Vangjeli had express authority to settle the case and had accepted the settlement on her behalf

III. Ms. Vangjeli's September 29, 2022 Letter

The Court construes Ms. Vangjeli's September 29, 2022 letter to the Court essentially as a pro se motion to set aside the Order of dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). Cf. Anariba v. Dir. Hudson Cnty. Corr. Ctr., 17 F.4th 434, 439 (3d Cir. 2021) (“Focusing on the substance of the filing over its form or label, we construe [the] ‘motion to reopen' as we would a Rule 60(b)(6) motion.”); Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 208 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[W]e are free to recharacterize the motion to amend to match the substance of the relief requested,”); Ortho Phartn. Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 887 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1989) (determining how to categorize a motion “from its substance and not from its form”); Turner v. Evers, 726 F,2d 112, 114 (3d Cir. 1984) (analyzing a motion based on its “function ... not its caption”); see also In re Burnley, 988 F.2d 1, 2 (4th Cir. 1992) (construing an unnamed motion, which did not refer to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, as a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from a judgment or order based on the substance of the filing). Although Ms. Vangjeli was represented by counsel at the time she sent this letter to i the Court, the letter demonstrates a clear conflict of interest between Ms. Vangjeli and her counsel regarding the settlement agreement? Further, the letter shows Ms. Vangjeli's disavowal of the Court's Rule 41.1(b) dismissal order. She writes in relevant part: “DISAGREEMENT OF JUDGE'S SETTLEMENT ORDER[.] I, Suzana Vangjeli, the Plaintiff of the case above: DO NOT AGREE WITH THE JUDGE'S SETTLEMENT ORDER ABOVE.” Pl.'s Sept. 29, 2022 Letter to Ct. at 1. Based on the substance of Ms, Vangjeli's letter and her apparent request for relief, the Court construes Ms. Vangjeli's letter as a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Cf. Anariba, 17 F.4th at 439; Ahmed, 291 F.3d at 208.^[3]

Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) provides relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding “for any other reason that justifies relief' beyond the reasons enumerated in Rule 60(b).^[4] Rule 60(b) “vests power in courts adequate to enable them to vacate judgments whenever > such action is appropriate to accomplish justice.” Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 615 (1949). Courts should only exercise their powers under Rule 60(b)(6) in “extraordinary circumstances where, without such relief an extreme and unexpected hardship would occur.” Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 120 (3d Cir. 2014) (emphasis added). The Court concludes that based upon an assessment of the testimonial evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, all as discussed below, this matter presents just such circumstances.

Discussion

State law applies to determine counsel's authority for entering into a settlement on behalf of a client. Pennsylvania law which requires express authority to settle, governs. Hence, Ms. Vangjeli's counsel needed express authority to settle.

I. Nature of the Claims and Jurisdiction

Ms. Vangjeli's claims are state law claims. She filed her complaint against Mr. Banks and Triple Canopy in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas alleging three state law torts: (1) negligence in the form of negligent training, negligent hiring, failure to train, and failure to exercise due care; (2) assault and battery; and (3) false imprisonment. This Court also exercises federal question jurisdiction because Mr. Banks and Triple Canopy properly removed the case pursuant to the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442.^[5]

II. Authority Required for Settlement

Even where a court exercises federal question jurisdiction, state law still governs the question of an attorney's authority to settle. See, e.g., Patterson v. GlaxoSmithKline Pharm. Co., No. 04-cv-4202, 2007 WL 966742, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2007) (“Our jurisdiction in this case is predicated upon the presence of a federal question. However, we apply Pennsylvania law to this issue [related to authority to settle] because the settlement of a lawsuit and the relationship between an attorney and his or her client are areas traditionally governed by state law and there is no i conflicting federal interest.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mowrer v Warner-Lambert Co,, No. 98-cv-2908, 2000 WL 974394, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 14, 2000) (“Although, in this case, jurisdiction is predicated upon the presence of a federal question, . . the court will apply Pennsylvania substantive law because the settlement of a lawsuit and the relationship between an attorney and his or her client are areas traditionally governed by state law and there is no conflicting federal interest.”).

Here, the Court will apply Pennsylvania law to determine whether Ms. Vangjeli's attorney had authority to settle.^[6] See Patterson, 2007 WL 966742, at *4.

A. Pennsylvania Law Requires Express Authority for Settlement

“The law in [Pennsylvania] is quite clear that an attorney must have express authority to settle a cause of action of the client.”^[7] Rothman v. Fillette, 469 A.2d 543, 545 (Pa. 1983); accord Tiernan v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024, 1033 ...