Vann v. San Francisco

316 Cal.Rptr.3d 105

Matthew VANN, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al., Defendants and Respondents.

A165231

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2.

Filed December 12, 2023

Trial Court: San Francisco County Superior Court, Trial Judge: Honorable Richard B. Ulmer (San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. CGC21596140)

Abbey, Weitzenberg, Warren & Emery, P.C., Scott R. Montgomery, Santa Rosa; Law Offices of Tiffany J. Gates, Tiffany J. Gates, Santa Rosa, for Plaintiff and Appellant Matthew Vann.

David Chiu, City Attorney; Meredith B. Osborn, Chief Trial Deputy; Katherine B. Bearman, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendants and Respondents, City and County of San Francisco, et al.

Richman, Acting P. J.

Plaintiff and appellant Matthew Vann (appellant), a firefighter with the San Francisco Fire Department (SFFD), was injured when Louis Yu (Yu), a bus driver with the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency (SFMTA), drove through an active emergency scene and over a fire hose, which broke off from a fire engine and struck appellant. He now appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered in favor of defendants and respondents City and County of San Francisco (City) and Yu after the trial court sustained their demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend on the basis that the action was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Lab. Code, § 3200 et seq.).¹ We affirm.

BACKGROUND

The Facts and the General Setting²

On November 2, 2020, appellant, a fire-fighter with the SFFD, responded to an emergency on Spear Street between Market Street and Mission Street in the City and County of San Francisco. Yu, a bus driver with the SFMTA, then drove a bus through the location of the active emergency. The bus went over a firehose, which became entangled with the bus’s wheels and stretched until it broke off the fire engine it was attached to. When the firehose broke away, it hit appellant’s legs, sweeping him off his feet and causing him to slam backwards onto the ground. His helmet flew off, and the back of his head struck the street surface. As a result, appellant sustained catastrophic injuries, including a traumatic brain injury, a fractured left clavicle, an internal hemorrhage in his right eye, and damage to his throat and vocal chords.

On November 4, the City sent appellant a "Notice Regarding Disability Pay/Labor Code section 4850 benefits," The notice stated that the "City and County of San Francisco is handling [appellant’s] workers’ compensation claim on behalf of SF Fire Dept.," and that he was receiving workers’ compensation benefits for the injuries he sustained in the November 2, 2020 incident.

On August 18, 2021, appellant submitted an application for leave to present a late government tort claim to the City pursuant to Government Code section 910 et seq., along with the proposed claim. In the application, appellant asserted that he is a "City and County San Francisco[] firefighter"; that he was "discharging his duties as a firefighter for the City and County of San Francisco" when responding to the emergency call in November 2020; and that "the City and County of San Francisco has been on notice of the illegal conduct of its Muni Bus driver, Yu." (Italics added.) And on the claim form, he wrote in Yu’s name where it asked to identify the name and "City Department of City Employee who allegedly caused injury or loss." (Italics added.)

On August 31, the City granted appellant leave to present a late claim, but denied the claim.

The Proceedings Below

On November 8, appellant filed a form complaint against the City and Yu (when referred to collectively, respondents), alleging causes of action for motor vehicle negligence, general negligence, and negligence per se. The complaint is sparse on detail: it alleges "Defendants negligently operated an SF Muni Coach 8800," before briefly describing how the incident caused appellant’s injuries, and also alleges "Defendants violated [Vehicle Code sections 21707 and 21708]."

On February 2, 2022, respondents filed a demurrer on various grounds, including that the Workers’ Compensation Act (§ 3200 et seq.) provides the exclusive remedy for appellant’s claims against the City as his employer (§§ 3600, subd. (a), 3602, subd. (a)), and against Yu as his coemployee (§ 3601, subd. (a)). As such, respondents argued, the trial court lacked subject jurisdiction over this action.

Appellant opposed the demurrer, arguing that workers’ compensation is not his sole remedy. As to Yu, appellant asserted he and Yu were not coemployees because (1) appellant was employed by SFFD, while Yu was employed by SFMTA, and (2) SFFD and SFMTA are separate legal entities akin to separate businesses within a multiunit corporate enterprise. As to the City, appellant argued there were no facts at that procedural juncture to support the conclusion that the City, as opposed to SFFD, was his employer as a matter of law.

Respondents filed their reply, arguing appellant’s assertion "that neither he nor Mr. Yu is a City employee is untenable as a matter of law," because SFFD and SFMTA, as municipal departments, "have no ‘legal personality separate from’ the City." In addition, citing Walker v. City and County of San Francisco (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 901, 219 P.2d 487 (Walker) and Colombo v. State of California (1991) 3 Cal.App.4th 594, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 567 (Colombo), respondents contended that California courts have rejected appellant’s theory that government departments are akin to separate business entities and can thus be subdivided into different entities for purposes of the workers’ compensation law. Thus, respondents maintained that appellant and Yu share the same employer—the City. Respondents separately asserted that City Charter provisions establish that the City employed both appellant and Yu.

On March 23, after holding a hearing, the trial court issued an order sustaining the demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend. Relying on Walker and Colombo, the court was unpersuaded by appellant’s attempt to draw an analogy between SFMTA and SFFD as two separate corporate entities within a large corporation. Instead, the court determined: "In 1999, the City’s municipal transportation agency was formed to, inter alia, operate the City’s street cars and buses. However, that agency, along with the City’s fire department, remains part of ‘a single governmental entity’—the City." And the court held, "[appellant] is receiving workers’ compensation and the City correctly asserts that is his sole remedy."

Judgment was entered in favor of respondents.

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

The Standard of Review

[1–5] As we explained in Amiodarone Cases: "Our standard of review is well-established. We accept as true the well-pleaded allegations in the operative complaint. (Chiatello v. City and County of San Francisco (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 472, 480 [117 Cal.Rptr.3d 169].) ‘"‘"We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed." [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.]’" [Citation.] We likewise accept facts that are reasonably implied or may be inferred from the complaint’s express allegations. [Citations.] ‘"‘"A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint …." [Citations.] On appeal from a dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer, we review the order de novo, exercising our independent judgment about whether the complaint states a cause of action as a matter of law. [Citations.]’"’ (Ibid.)

[6] "Although our review is de novo, it is plaintiffs’ burden to affirmatively demonstrate that the demurrer was erroneously sustained as a matter of law …. (Intengan v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1052 [154 Cal. Rptr.3d 727].)" (Amiodarone Cases, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1100–1101, 300 Cal. Rptr.3d 881.)

[7, 8] Further, our Supreme Court has stated that when a complaint "is sustained without leave to amend, we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion and we affirm." (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318, 216 Cal.Rptr. 718, 703 P.2d 58.) "[T]he burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion. [Citations.] Plaintiff must show in what manner he can amend his complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading." (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375, 556 P.2d 737 (Goodman).)

The Workers’ Compensation Exclusive Remedy Rule

Section 3600, subdivision (a) provides that, with exceptions not relevant here, an employer’s liability to pay compensation under the Workers’ Compensation Act is "in lieu of any other liability whatsoever" if specified "conditions of compensation³ concur …." (§ 3600, subd. (a); Kuciemba v. Victory Woodworks, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 993, 1006, 310 Cal.Rptr.3d 97, 531 P.3d 924.) So, when the statutory conditions for recovery are met, the employer is immune from civil damages liability for on-the-job injuries because workers’ compensation is the injured employee’s "exclusive remedy." (§§ 3600, 3601, 3602, subd. (a).)

[9] A parallel exclusive remedy provision is section 3601, subdivision (a), which "prohibits actions against coemployees for injuries they cause when [acting within the scope of their employment.]" (Hendy v. Losse (1991) 54 Cal.3d 723, 730, 1 Cal. Rptr.2d 543, 819 P.2d 1.) "To prevent employees from circumventing the exclusivity rule by bringing lawsuits for work-related injuries against co-employees, who in turn would seek indemnity from their employers, the Legislature … provided immunity to co-employees acting...