Vanschaick v. Letourneau

Zane Vanschaick, Respondent, v. Jacob Letourneau, et al., Appellants.

A20-0705

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS

February 8, 2021

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

Reversed and remanded

Bjorkman, Judge

Wabasha County District Court

File No. 79-CV-19-599

Jeremy L. Lampman, Patterson Dahlberg, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Leah M. Tabbert, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellants)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Larkin, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

BJORKMAN, Judge

Appellants, a state trooper and the Minnesota State Patrol, challenge the denial of summary judgment, arguing that they are entitled to official immunity and vicarious official immunity in this personal-injury action arising out of a motor-vehicle accident. Because the trooper's conduct involved the performance of discretionary duties and was not malicious, we reverse and remand for entry of judgment in favor of appellants.

FACTS

The morning of August 8, 2016, Trooper Jacob Letourneau was on patrol on Highway 247. At approximately 7:20 a.m., he observed a vehicle driving toward him that appeared to be speeding. His squad car's radar confirmed the vehicle was traveling at 84 miles per hour in the 55-mile-per-hour zone. Concerned that the vehicle presented a "significant hazard to others," he decided to turn around and initiate a traffic stop. And he reasoned he would have to do so quickly or else "travel at close to 100 mph for a significant distance to catch up with the speeding driver."

Trooper Letourneau saw a driveway to his right and decided to pull into the mouth of it to perform a U-turn. He braked to slow down, pulled into the driveway, and turned on his emergency lights. Trooper Letourneau glanced in his side-view mirror and saw a vehicle approaching from behind. He perceived that the vehicle was slowing down and believed the driver, respondent Zane Vanschaick, was ceding the right of way, so he pulled out from the driveway to complete the U-turn. Vanschaick was unable to stop and crashed into the side of the squad car.

Vanschaick sued Trooper Letourneau and the state patrol, alleging the trooper was negligent in attempting the U-turn in front of him. Trooper Letourneau and the state patrol moved for summary judgment on the grounds of official immunity and vicarious official immunity. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that the undisputed facts demonstrate that Trooper Letourneau was subject to a state patrol policy requiring him tocomply with traffic laws, the policy created a ministerial duty, and he violated that duty by violating two traffic statutes—Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 2 (2018), governing U-turns, and Minn. Stat. § 169.13, subd. 2 (2018), prohibiting careless driving. Trooper Letourneau and the state patrol appeal.

DECISION

An order denying summary judgment generally is not appealable, but an exception to this rule permits review when the denial is based on rejection of an immunity defense. Hoff v. Surman, 883 N.W.2d 631, 633 (Minn. App. 2016). Our role is to determine whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and "whether the district court erred in applying the law." Mumm v. Mornson, 708 N.W.2d 475, 481 (Minn. 2006). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. "The application of immunity is a legal question that we review de novo." Briggs v. Rasicot, 867 N.W.2d 217, 220 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. Sept. 15, 2015).

I. Trooper Letourneau is entitled to official immunity.

Common-law official immunity precludes a suit for damages against a public official arising from duties that require the exercise of discretion, unless the official acted maliciously. Id. That protection "enables public employees to perform their duties effectively, without fear of personal liability that might inhibit the exercise of their independent judgment." Mumm, 708 N.W.2d at 490. The party asserting immunity bears the burden of proof. Shariss v. City of Bloomington, 852 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Minn. App. 2014). In determining whether official immunity applies, we consider: "(1) the conduct at issue; (2) whether the conduct is discretionary or ministerial and, if ministerial, whetherany ministerial duties were violated; and (3) if discretionary, whether the conduct was willful or malicious." Vasallo ex rel. Brown v. Majeski, 842 N.W.2d 456, 462 (Minn. 2014). We address each factor in turn.

A. The Conduct at Issue

Our first task is to "identify the precise governmental conduct at issue." Raymond ex rel. Kelley v. Pine Cty. Sheriff's Office, 915 N.W.2d 518, 525 (Minn. App. 2018) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. July 17, 2018). Precision is essential because "the doctrine of official immunity is a complex and difficult area of law that must be applied to ever-changing fact patterns and governmental policies." Mumm, 708 N.W.2d at 492. Even if an official's decision to undertake a task is discretionary, ministerial duties may govern how the official completes the task. Thompson v. City of Minneapolis, 707 N.W.2d 669, 674 (Minn. 2006). The nature of a plaintiff's claim informs our assessment of what specific conduct is at issue. Raymond, 915 N.W.2d at 525.

Vanschaick's complaint and his argument opposing the application of immunity demonstrate that the conduct at issue is not Trooper Letourneau's decision to stop a speeding vehicle but his actions in doing so—attempting a sudden U-turn in front of Vanschaick's vehicle in order to stop the speeding driver.

B. Discretionary or Ministerial

When determining whether the conduct at issue involves discretionary or ministerial duties, we look to "the nature of the act." Shariss, 852 N.W.2d at 281 (quotation omitted). A discretionary act is one that "requires" the exercise of judgment. Briggs, 867 N.W.2d at 221 (quotation omitted). It "involves individual professional judgment that necessarilyreflects the professional goal and factors of a situation." Vasallo, 842 N.W.2d at 462 (quotation omitted). By contrast, a ministerial duty is "absolute, certain, and imperative, and involve[s] merely execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts." Briggs, 867 N.W.2d at 221 (quotation omitted). It is "simple and definite, leaving nothing to the discretion of the official." Id. (quotation omitted).

The work of a law-enforcement officer requires considerable discretion. Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 678 (Minn. 1988). This is particularly true in "emergency conditions," where "little time for reflection" and "incomplete and confusing information" require "the exercise of significant, independent judgment and discretion." Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38, 41 (Minn. 1992). And it is the reason official immunity "is regularly applied to the judgment required of police officers in discharging their duties." Gleason v. Metro. Council Transit Operations, 582 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Minn. 1998). But our supreme court has expressly declined to hold that all police conduct, or even all police conduct in emergency situations, is discretionary. Mumm, 708 N.W.2d at 492. "[G]overnmental entities have the authority to eliminate by policy the discretion of their employees in emergency situations." Vasallo, 842 N.W.2d at 462-63. A policy or statute that "sets a sufficiently narrow standard of conduct" that a law-enforcement officer is "bound to follow," creates a ministerial duty. Id. at 463.

This case involves both a policy and statutes. State patrol policy provides that troopers "shall obey all traffic laws and shall not assume any special privileges, except while responding to an emergency call or involved in a pursuit situation." Similarly, Minn. Stat. § 169.03, subd. 5 (2018), states: "No driver of any authorized emergency vehicle shallassume any special privilege under [traffic laws] except when such vehicle is operated in response to any emergency call or in the immediate pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law." Both plainly establish a standard of conduct applicable to Trooper Letourneau—he must comply with traffic statutes.

Trooper Letourneau and the state patrol argue that (1) this standard of conduct did not apply at the time of the accident because the trooper was pursuing a speeding motorist, and (2) even if he was not exempt from this standard, the relevant traffic statutes are not sufficiently narrow to create ministerial duties. Because their second argument is dispositive, we begin our analysis there.

Assuming, without deciding, that Trooper Letourneau was required to comply with traffic laws, we consider the specific statutes at issue. We first note that some traffic statutes impose a specific obligation—stop at a red light, Minn. Stat. § 169.06, subd. 5(a)(3)(i) (2018); do not exceed the speed limit, Minn. Stat. § 169.14, subd. 2(a) (2018); drive in the indicated direction on a one-way street, Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 6(a) (2018). Other traffic statutes are less definite, including the two Vanschaick contends Trooper Letourneau violated. The first traffic statute provides that a driver must not "turn the vehicle to proceed in the opposite direction unless the movement can be made safely and without interfering with other traffic." Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 2. The second traffic statute prohibits driving "carelessly or heedlessly in disregard of the rights of others, or in a manner that endangers or is likely to endanger any property or any person." Minn. Stat. § 169.13, subd. 2.

Compliance with such less-definite statutes requires a driver to exercise judgment, as the supreme court recognized in Vasallo. There, the court considered the duties of an officer responding to an emergency call to "slow down as necessary for safety" when approaching a red or stop signal, then to "proceed cautiously." 842 N.W.2d at 463 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 169.03, subd. 2 (2012)). It...