Vasanwala v. Dep't of Fin. & Prof'l Reg. & Cecilia Abundis

230 N.E.3d 282

2024 IL App (4th) 220933

Rikhav VASANWALA, M.D., Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.The DIVISION OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION OF the DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION AND CECILIA ABUNDIS, in Her Official Capacity as Director of the Division of Professional Regulation, Defendants-Appellees.

NO. 4-22-0933

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

Filed January 12, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon County, No. 22MR403, Honorable Robin L. Schmidt, Judge Presiding.

Michael K. Goldberg and Robert A. Bauerschmidt, of Goldberg Law Group, LLC, of Chicago, for appellant.

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Chicago (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Bridget DiBattista, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees.

OPINION

JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Plaintiff, Rikhav Vasanwala, M.D., appeals from the circuit court’s judgment dismissing his complaint for administrative review against defendants, the Division of Professional Regulation of the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (Department) and Cecilia Abundis, in her official capacity as Director of the Division of Professional Regulation (Director). On appeal, plaintiff argues he was denied due process when the Director temporarily suspended his medical license without a hearing under section 37(d) of the Medical Practice Act of 1987 (Medical Act) (225 ILCS 60/37(d) (West 2022)). He further contends the Director’s order temporarily suspending his medical license pending further proceedings was a final administrative decision and that the court erroneously dismissed his complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On September 13, 2022, the Department filed an administrative complaint, alleging discipline of plaintiff’s Illinois medical license was appropriate under section 22 of the Medical Act (225 ILCS 60/22 (West 2022)) after he was arrested for "(i) Rape, a class Y felony, and (ii) Video Voyeurism, a class D Felony," in Benton County, Arkansas. The Department also simultaneously filed a petition to temporarily suspend plaintiff’s medical license pending a formal hearing on its complaint.

¶ 4 The Department’s filings alleged the following. On January 31, 2022, while at his residence in Arkansas, plaintiff videotaped himself performing multiple acts of oral, anal, and vaginal penetration against "AV." Because "she was unconscious" and "her body was limp," plaintiff "had to manually spread AV’s legs apart," remove her clothing, and "move [her] body into different positions as he was performing sexual acts on her." On February 17, 2022, plaintiff obtained his Illinois medical license. On February 23, 2022, plaintiff was arrested in Arkansas after "AV reported [the] aforementioned sexual assault," and plaintiff stipulated that probable cause existed for both the rape and voyeurism charges.

¶ 5 The Department supported its allegations with an affidavit from Dr. Shami Goyal, the Department’s chief medical coordinator, who reviewed the information obtained by the Department, as well as various documents from the criminal matter in Arkansas. Dr. Goyal also watched the video of plaintiff molesting "AV" while she was unconscious and opined "that the continued practice of medicine by [plaintiff] presents an immediate danger to the safety of the public in *** Illinois." The Director thereafter found the public interest, safety, and welfare imperatively required emergency action to prevent plaintiff’s continued practice of medicine, "in that [plaintiff’]s actions constitute[d] an immediate danger to the public." The Director temporarily suspended plaintiff’s Illinois license pending a formal hearing on the complaint, which was scheduled in nine days.

¶ 6 On September 21, 2022, plaintiff filed a motion to limit the hearing’s purpose "to the issue of whether [plaintiff] constitutes an immediate danger to the public to justify the summary suspension." The formal administrative hearing on the Department’s complaint against plaintiff was held the next day. At the hearing, plaintiff asserted he had not been given an opportunity to argue whether the requirements for a temporary suspension were met and that "it [made] logical sense that the hearing would not be on the complaint, but would be on whether the temporary suspension is proper." After reviewing the relevant provisions under Title 68 of the Illinois Administrative Code (68 Ill. Adm. Code 1110 (2019)), covering the Department’s rules of practice in administrative hearings, and the Medical Act, the administrative law judge (ALJ) denied plaintiff’s motion. In doing so, the ALJ noted she lacked a legal basis to grant plaintiff’s motion because there existed no authority that would allow her to review the Director’s finding or limit the hearing.

¶ 7 On September 26, 2022, plaintiff filed the instant complaint for administrative review. In his complaint, plaintiff asserted, among other things, defendants "violated [his] procedural rights by refusing to grant him a hearing on the Temporary Suspension Order and refusing to grant him any right to contest the Temporary Suspension Order in any way." Plaintiff further noted the temporary suspension of his medical license would "stay in place until there is a final decision on the [Department’s] Complaint in this case," which, plaintiff complained, "could take months or even up to a year."

¶ 8 On October 3, 2022, defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint under section 2-619(a)(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Civil Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(1) (West 2022)). The motion asserted the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to address plaintiff’s complaint because (1) the order temporarily suspending plaintiff’s medical license was not a final administrative decision and (2) plaintiff had failed to exhaust all of his available administrative remedies. In so arguing, defendants highlighted plaintiff’s own admission that administrative proceedings were ongoing. Defendants explained the General Assembly adopted the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et. seq. (West 2022)) as the exclusive method for reviewing final administrative decisions under the Medical Act. Defendants also pointed out, under section 3-101 of the Administrative Review Law, the term "administrative decision" was defined as "any decision, order or determination of any administrative agency rendered in a particular case, which affects the legal rights, duties or privileges of parties and which terminates the proceedings before the administrative agency." 735 ILCS 5/3-101 (West 2022).

¶ 9 In response, plaintiff argued "there [were] no remaining administrative procedures that exist as to the suspension" because defendants "refused to allow [him] any opportunity to contest the suspension." Plaintiff also claimed, although "the term of the [temporary] suspension [would] end upon a decision on the Administrative Complaint," the decision would not "review or reverse the suspension currently in effect." Thus, according to plaintiff, the order temporarily suspending his medical license was a final administrative decision because it was "an order of an administrative agency" that affected his legal rights and privileges as a physician and disposed of all proceedings to contest the suspension.

¶ 10 Following a hearing on October 4, 2022, the circuit court entered a written order dismissing plaintiff’s complaint, finding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review the order temporarily suspending plaintiff’s medical license because it was not a final administrative decision.

¶ 11 This appeal followed.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

[1] ¶ 13 On appeal, plaintiff argues he was denied due process when the Director temporarily suspended his medical license without a hearing under section 37(d) of the Medical Act (225 ILCS 60/37(d) (West 2022)). He fUrther contends the order temporarily suspending his medical license pending a formal hearing on the Department’s complaint was a "final administrative decision" and that the circuit court erroneously dismissed his complaint for administrative review for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Defendants assert the court properly dismissed plaintiff’s complaint under section 2-619(a)(1) of the Civil Code, which provides for the dismissal of a claim where "the court does not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action." 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(1) (West 2022). This court reviews dismissals under section 2-619 de novo. Dawkins v. Fitness International, LLC, 2022 IL 127561, ¶ 24, 463 Ill.Dec. 653, 210 N.E.3d 1184.

[2–4] ¶ 14 In cases involving review of an administrative decision, circuit courts exercise "special statutory jurisdiction." Ameren Transmission Co. of Illinois v. Hutchings, 2018 IL 122973, ¶ 13, 427 Ill. Dec. 931, 120 N.E.3d 998. When the governing statute adopts the Administrative Review Law, "a circuit court may not redress a party’s grievance through any other type of action" (Goral v. Dart, 2020 IL 125085, ¶ 40, 450 Ill.Dec. 384, 181 N.E.3d 736), and a party seeking to invoke that jurisdiction must "comply strictly with the procedures prescribed by the statute." Ameren Transmission Co. of Illinois, 2018 IL 122973, ¶ 13, 427 Ill.Dec. 931, 120 N.E.3d 998. The Medical Act adopts the Administrative Review Law and provides, "[a]ll final administrative decisions of the Department are subject to judicial review." 225 ILCS 60/41(a) (West 2022). "Under the Administrative Review Law, courts may only judicially review an administrative decision that both (1) ‘affects the legal rights, duties or privileges of parties,’ and (2) ‘terminates the proceedings before the administrative agency.’ " Sherman West Court v. Arnold, 407 Ill. App. 3d 748, 750, 348 Ill.Dec. 514, 944 N.E.2d 467, 469 (2011) (quoting 735 ILCS 5/3-101 (West 2008)). If those procedures are not followed, the circuit court lacks jurisdiction. Slepicka v....